USCA4 Appeal: 23-2287 Doc: 39 Filed: 12/17/2024 Pg: 1 of 19

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-2287

ROBERT E. STAFFORD, JR., on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; MELISSA BONETTI, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated; HERBERT MALLET, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; JACQUELINE JOHNSON, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated; CATHRINE ALLEN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated; DEVRON JONES, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; TABITHA DANIEL, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated; LAQUASHA OSAGHEE, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated; RONDA COLE, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs – Appellees,

v.

BOJANGLES’ RESTAURANTS, INC.,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (3:20−cv−00266−MOC−SCR)

Argued: October 30, 2024 Decided: December 17, 2024

Before WILKINSON and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and Brendan A. HURSON, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion in which Judge Berner and Judge Hurson joined. USCA4 Appeal: 23-2287 Doc: 39 Filed: 12/17/2024 Pg: 2 of 19

ARGUED: Brendan P. Biffany, ROBINSON, BRADSHAW & HINSON, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. L. Michelle Gessner, GESSNERLAW, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Charles E. Johnson, Douglas M. Jarrell, Emma T. Kutteh, ROBINSON, BRADSHAW & HINSON, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.

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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

The defendant here challenges the certification of a class action involving

allegations of unpaid off-the-clock work and unauthorized edits to employee time records.

The classes certified had only one parameter: class members must have worked as a

Bojangles shift manager in the relevant state within three years of the filed complaint. We

hold that the district court abused its discretion in certifying this class action because it

employed an inappropriately high level of generality when (1) identifying the policies

which allegedly unify prospective class members’ wide-ranging claims, and (2) creating

overly broad class definitions. These errors cut to the core of the district court’s Rule 23(a)

and Rule 23(b)(3) analyses, and we thus vacate the certification order and remand to the

district court.

I.

A.

Bojangles’ Restaurants, Inc. (“Bojangles”) is a southern-style fast-food chain. In

2020, the company owned and operated 311 restaurant locations across eight states. J.A.

205. In its restaurants, Bojangles employs a three-tier management structure. Shift

managers are the lowest tier of management. They report to assistant general managers,

who, in turn, report to general managers. While most of Bojangles’ shift managers are full-

time employees, some work less than forty hours per week. J.A. 205.

Bojangles has an internal policy that requires all employees be paid for time worked.

Bojangles’ pay policy emphasizes that “[n]o crewmember is permitted to work ‘off the

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clock’ at Bojangles.” J.A. 229. Therefore, employees, including shift managers, must clock

in and out of their shifts to track their hours worked. As required by the Fair Labor

Standards Act (“FLSA”), any tracked hours exceeding forty hours a week are paid at “one

and one-half times the regular rate.”

(a)(1); see J.A. 229.

Bojangles permits alterations to employees’ clocked time in order to correct errors.

To prevent unauthorized edits to an employee’s clocked time, the company requires that

such time-record changes be signed by both the employee and the supervisor making the

edit. For instance, if a shift manager’s time records need to be corrected, an assistant

general manager or general manager would need to initiate the edit, and both that manager

and the shift manager would need to physically sign off on the change. J.A. 229.

The present case arises from a series of allegations that Bojangles systematically

violated its own policies, requiring shift managers to work off the clock, and sometimes

even editing these employees’ time records to avoid exceeding state and federal overtime

thresholds.

B.

Named plaintiff Richard Stafford was an hourly-paid shift manager at Bojangles.

After being fired in 2020, Stafford filed suit against Bojangles under the FLSA and the

North Carolina Wage and Hour Act, claiming that the company “frequently required [him]

to stay on the premises, on duty, after closing to clean up and close down the restaurant”

while off the clock, did not compensate him for the time spent driving between different

restaurants for work-related activities, and, as a result, failed to pay him the correct amount

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of overtime wages. J.A. 54, 58-60. He alleged that his experiences were part of a systematic

effort by Bojangles to artificially suppress their labor costs to stay within specified labor

budgets. J.A. 75.

On November 2, 2020, the United States District Court for the Western District of

North Carolina conditionally certified a collective action for shift managers’ FLSA claims

under

(b). J.A. 6. With the gates thus open, the claims against Bojangles

rapidly accumulated. By April 2022, nearly 550 individuals had joined the collective

action. Opening Br. at 6.

On April 15, 2022, Stafford filed a second amended complaint, which added new

named plaintiffs and sought class certification of various state wage-and-hour law claims

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs proposed classes for North

Carolina, South Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia. J.A. 107-

09.

Plaintiffs brought a variety of claims centering around the allegation that Bojangles

“requires its Shift Managers to perform compensable work tasks before and after their

scheduled shifts, during their unpaid meal periods, on their way to and from work, and on

their days off, when they are not clocked into Defendant’s timekeeping system.” J.A. 109.

Among the tasks that prospective class members claimed to perform off the clock were

pre-shift work activities such as disabling alarms and surveilling the parking lot for

suspicious activity; miscellaneous post-closing tasks, including cleaning; workday trips to

the bank for deposits and travel between store locations to assist understaffed restaurants

or to transport goods. See, e.g., J.A. 299-305, 539-49. The second amended complaint also

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alleged that Bojangles was “systematically” shaving hours off shift managers’ time records

in order to avoid paying overtime wages. J.A. 117.

The exact composition of claims and tasks performed varied among prospective

class members. Not all claimed to have experienced time-shaving adjustments, nor did all

claim to have worked off the clock in the same fashion as their peers.

In its response to plaintiffs’ amended complaint, Bojangles opposed the certification

of the new classes. J.A. 149-51.

C.

The district court denied certification of the Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky,

Tennessee, and Virginia classes on the basis that the proposed class representatives could

not “fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class” as required by Rule 23(a)(4).

Stafford v. Bojangles’ Restaurants, Inc., No. 20-CV-266,

, at *2-3

(W.D.N.C. Oct. 20, 2023). The district court did, however, find that the proposed North

Carolina and South Carolina classes met Rule 23(a) and (b)(3)’s requirements for

numerosity, commonality, and predominance, and that proposed class representatives had

claims typical of the class and would “fairly and adequately” advocate for class interests.

.

With regard to commonality, the district court relied most heavily on the fact that

an estimated 80% of prospective class members worked opening shifts and thus were

subject to Bojangles’ Opening Checklist. This checklist allegedly mandates that certain

tasks be performed prior to clocking in, and the district court found that this “creates a

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common question of fact.”

. The court further determined that common questions

predominated here because “[d]espite differences in the character and extent of Plaintiffs’

off-the-clock work, all class members’ claims originate from the same alleged policies and

practices, including Bojangles Opening Checklist.”

(internal quotation marks

omitted) (citing Jahagirdar v. Computer Haus NC, Inc., No. 20-CV-33,

(W.D.N.C. Nov. 5, 2021)).

In its order certifying the North and South Carolina classes, the district court defined

the classes as follows:

North Carolina Class: “All persons who worked as a shift manager at Bojangles in the state of North Carolina at any time from three years prior to the filing of this Complaint to the entry of judgment in the case.”

South Carolina Class: “All persons who worked as a shift manager at Bojangles in the state of South Carolina at any time from three years prior to the filing of this Complaint to the entry of judgment in the case.”

These class definitions were effectively the same as those proffered by plaintiffs. See

J.A. 126 (“All similarly situated current and former Shift Managers who work or have

worked for Bojangles at any of their restaurant locations in [North Carolina/South

Carolina] at any time during the applicable statutory period.”).

On November 3, 2023, Bojangles petitioned for permission to appeal the

certification order, contending that the district court erred in applying Rule 23’s

commonality and predominance analysis. Petition for Permission to Appeal Under Rule

23(f), Stafford, No. 20-CV-266 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 3, 2023), ECF No. 429. We granted the

petition to take this appeal. J.A. 48-49.

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II.

We review the district court’s certification of a class under an abuse-of-discretion

standard. In re Marriott Int’l, Inc.,

(4th Cir. 2023). In this context, abuse

of discretion occurs when a district court “materially misapplies the requirements of Rule

23.” EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair,

(4th Cir. 2014). Such misapplications

include clear errors in the district court’s factual findings or legal errors. See Thorn v.

Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co.,

, 317 (4th Cir. 2006).

Here the district court committed legal errors in its application of Rule 23’s

commonality and predominance standards in two principal ways: (1) relying on a vague

and overly general “policy” by which Bojangles allegedly mandated shift managers’ off-

the-clock work and time-record edits, and (2) creating overly broad class definitions. 1

A.

We set forth at the outset some basics of class-certification law. The area is one that

has been beset by a seemingly endless tug of pros and cons. On the one hand, class actions

offer the promise of resolving many similar suits at a single time. See Am. Pipe & Constr.

Co. v. Utah,

(1974) (identifying the promotion of “efficiency and

economy of litigation” as the “principal purpose of the [class-action] procedure”). This

1 The present appeal concerns the district court’s certification of classes for plaintiffs’ state-law claims. Thus, we do not discuss the certification requirements for collective actions, which are governed by different, albeit somewhat overlapping, standards under the FLSA. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,

(2016).

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spares defendants the drip of repeated individual actions and offers the prospect of rooting

out unlawful pervasive practices through an aggregate and collective effort.

On the other hand, class-action lawsuits can ratchet liability to potentially ruinous

levels and force companies to settle or bet the store. See Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski,

(2023) (citing HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW

120 (1973)). They may incentivize litigation with awards of large attorneys’ fees at the

same time class members may receive little more than a pittance. See, e.g., Deborah L.

Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1205-09 (1982); S. REP.

NO. 108-123, at 15-18 (2003). Rule 23 seeks a balance between the worthy uses and serious

abuses of the class-action device, and the humdrum recitation of the Rule’s requirements

should not obscure the fact that it is one of the Rule drafters’ gems.

Plaintiffs seeking to certify a putative class must comply with the requirements

outlined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Under Rule 23(a), the moving party must

first demonstrate the (1) numerosity of prospective class members, (2) common questions

of law or fact, (3) typicality of the claims brought by the proposed class representative, and

(4) whether the proposed class representative will adequately and fairly represent the

interests of the entire class. G.T. v. Bd. of Educ. of Cnty. of Kanawha,

, 202

(4th Cir. 2024). In addition, the class action must “fall within one of the three categories

enumerated in Rule 23(b).” Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc.,

(4th

Cir. 2003). The present class action falls within Rule 23(b)(3), which requires a finding

that common questions “predominate over” any individualized questions, and that “a class

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action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the

controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; see also Gunnells,

.

Rule 23 holds plaintiffs to a higher bar than a pleading standard. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc. v. Dukes,

(2011). Rather, “[a] party seeking class certification must

affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule.” Id.; accord. EQT Prod.,

(“[T]he party must present evidence that the putative class complies with Rule 23.”).

The Supreme Court provided clear guidance in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes as to the evidence

required to establish commonality. Plaintiffs must establish that the common contention is

one “capable of classwide resolution” such that “determination of its truth or falsity will

resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”

. Thus, courts must only permit class-wide proceedings if they have the potential

to generate “common answers that drive the litigation.” Brown v. Nucor Corp.,

(4th Cir. 2015).

Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement is necessarily intertwined with Rule

23(a)’s commonality requirement. Predominance presupposes that a common question

exists and measures the question’s significance to the pending litigation. While

commonality serves to ask whether class-wide proceedings are even possible,

predominance “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant

adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,

(1997); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP,

(4th Cir. 2004).

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B.

The district court found commonality on the basis that an estimated 80% of

prospective class members likely worked an opening shift and had thus conducted off-the-

clock pre-shift work while completing tasks on the Opening Checklist. See Stafford v.

Bojangles Restaurants, Inc., No. 20-CV-266,

, at *3-4 (W.D.N.C. Oct.

20, 2023). The district court did not address whether any of plaintiffs’ other off-the-clock

work and time-shaving claims constituted a common question.

(“The Court does

not—and need not—make any such finding with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims regarding

Bojangles’ time edit authorization policy.”). Yet, the court summarily concluded that those

claims were “[all] entitled to class treatment” because the plaintiffs had satisfied Rule 23

with respect to their pre-shift work claims.

Plaintiffs argue that the common applicability of the Opening Checklist for most

class members absolves them of any duty to find that other claims have common questions.

See

But the Rule 23 inquiry does not end upon the identification of a common question

alone. Plaintiffs’ common contention surrounding the Opening Checklist must

predominate over all other individualized issues. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). And because

of the diversity of claims involved in this class action, a common question exclusive to pre-

shift work will not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement alone. Indeed,

resolution of whether or not the Opening Checklist mandates off-the-clock pre-shift work

does not “resolve” the time-shaving claims or claims of unpaid off-the-clock wages at any

other time. Wal-Mart,

. At least some of these other claims must embody

common questions for the classes to establish Rule 23(b)(3) predominance.

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The district court noted in this regard that “all class members’ claims ‘originate from

the same alleged policies and practices,’ including Bojangles’ Opening Checklist.”

Stafford,

, at *6. However, this only appears to allude to plaintiffs’ vague

and overly general assertion that Bojangles had a policy to violate its own policy regarding

off-the-clock work. See Response Br. at 4. Beyond allegations of pre-shift work

encompassed in the Opening Checklist, the district court made no effort to distinguish

between other alleged off-the-clock activities, nor did it identify any company policies

pertaining to those activities. Instead the district court leaned into generalities, emphasizing

in its typicality analysis that “[r]epresentative parties and class members are ‘unified by a

common theory of being worked off the clock,’ regardless of the specific uncompensated

activities they were required to perform.”

.

Allegations of generalized policies are not usually sufficient for the purposes of

class certification. Appellate courts are skeptical, for instance, when plaintiffs or district

courts rely on nebulous references to “systemic failures” or “systemic deficiencies” to

satisfy commonality. See, e.g., J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez,

(10th Cir.

1999); M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry,

(5th Cir. 2012). Such vagueness

may mask a multitude of disparities. Plaintiffs may invoke overly general policies precisely

because “they are at a loss for a more specific thread to tie claims together.” In re White,

(D.C. Cir. 2023). Indeed, it is circular logic for plaintiffs to create a

laundry list of factually diverse claims and then assert that these claims, in turn, prove the

existence of a uniform company policy. We endeavor to ensure that commonality is not

based on such “semantic dexterity.” Brown,

.

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“Rule 23 does not allow for [] a 30,000 foot view of commonality,” In re White,

, and courts have the obligation to “examine whether differences between class

members impede the discovery of common answers,” Brown,

; see also

Wal-Mart,

(“[P]laintiff[s] [must] demonstrate that the class members ‘have

suffered the same injury . . . .’”). Here it is unclear from the district court’s analysis that

the many types of claims plaintiffs advance can be united by a common question of

liability. The district court pointed to no specific documentation or concrete evidence

narrowing the broad theoretical policy by which Bojangles allegedly mandated all different

forms of off-the-clock work and time-shaving. On our review of the record, we do not see

the equivalent of the Opening Checklist for edits to shift managers’ time records or for time

spent on off-the-clock bank deposits, inter-restaurant travel, or post-closing activities, for

example.

All these activities whether pre-shift, workday, or post-closing, would raise distinct

questions. What kind of off-the-clock work did an employee perform? How much time was

spent on it? For whom was time-shaving attempted? While evidence of commonality

among employees may come in many forms, and may not appear exactly like the Opening

Checklist, we require something more than conclusory assertions of some highly

generalized company policy to have shift managers work without pay.

C.

The district court also erred in crafting overly general class definitions that run afoul

of Rule 23’s core tenets. Rule 23(c)(1)(B) requires that “[a]n order that certifies a class

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action must define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses.” This requirement is

no mere formality. Rather, it aids class members in deciding whether to opt out of a class

and facilitates appellate review. See Wachtel ex rel. Jesse v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

(3d Cir. 2006). To achieve those functions, class definitions must be

written with specificity. We find the views of our colleagues on the Third Circuit

instructive on this matter:

[T]he requirement of Rule 23(c)(1)(B) that a certification order “define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses,” means that the text of the order or an incorporated opinion must include (1) a readily discernible, clear, and precise statement of the parameters defining the class or classes to be certified, and (2) a readily discernible, clear, and complete list of the claims, issues or defenses to be treated on a class basis.

; accord. Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC,

(3d Cir.

2015).

Here the parameters of the North and South Carolina classes are “too broad and ill-

defined to reach the thresholds of class certification.” Braidwood Mgmt., Inc. v. EEOC,

(5th Cir. 2023). The classes’ sole defining characteristic is that they contain

Bojangles shift managers who worked for the company during a three-year period. Simply

being at a place of employment is, without more, unedifying. No reference is made to the

type of off-the-clock work class members performed or whether a class member even

performed off-the-clock work at all. Nor does the class definition elucidate whether class

members must allege that they were denied overtime pay or were subject to time-shaving.

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Failure to illuminate appropriate class parameters has implications even beyond

Rule 23(c)(1)(B). The sheer breadth of the class definitions here bespeaks underlying flaws

with the classes’ commonality, predominance, and typicality.

“[A] circular class definition [can] reveal the lack of a genuinely common issue of

law or fact.” In re White,

. The present case exemplifies this issue. The

district court’s certification order again presumes, without more, that all shift managers

who worked within the relevant timeframe have a viable claim against Bojangles. In doing

so, the district court risked including individuals who would not have a right to recovery

but for the sweeping scope of the class certification itself. See Kohen v. Pacific Inv. Mgmt.

Co.,

(7th Cir. 2009) (“[I]f the [class] definition is so broad that it sweeps

within it persons who could not have been injured by the defendant’s conduct, it is too

broad.”); accord. Olean Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC,

, 669 n.14 (9th Cir. 2022).

Here the putative class is too overinclusive to ensure commonality. Firstly, some

class members may lack any off-the-clock or time-shaving claim against Bojangles, and

thus no question of law or fact is common with these individuals. Secondly, even assuming

all class members have some legitimate state-law claim, the district court still did not

specify what type of factual claims fall within the ambit of the class definition. And Wal-

Mart does not permit commonality on the sole basis that class members “all suffered a

violation of the same provision of law,” as this does not ensure that a common answer can

address the entire class’s claims.

. The “sweeping class definition” before

us instead raises the “obvious” issue that the district court may inadvertently be “lump[ing]

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together” a great many “disparate plaintiffs with widely varying individual claims.” Jamie

S. v. Milwuakee Pub. Schs.,

(7th Cir. 2012). Thus, in the absence of

more precise class parameters, we cannot assure ourselves that the classes meet Rule

23(a)’s commonality requirement. Furthermore, because the composition of claims is

unknown, we cannot know that common questions predominate over individualized ones,

as required under Rule 23(b)(3).

Overly general class definitions also threaten the assurance that class members will

receive fair and adequate representation. Such neutral representation depends, in large part,

on the typicality of class representatives’ claims. See Amchem,

n.20 (“The

adequacy-of-representation requirement ‘tend[s] to merge’ with the commonality and

typicality criteria of Rule 23(a).”) A broader class may bring a more wide-ranging set of

claims than those presented to the district court. While this is always a risk in aggregate

litigation, the drafters of Rule 23 wisely sought to minimize such deviations through

encouraging specificity in certification orders. But the fact that the certified classes facially

allow a broader swath of claims than those discussed by the district court “suggests both

that the named plaintiffs’ claims are not typical of those of the enormous class certified and

that they could not adequately represent such a class.” Barney v. Holzier Clinic, Ltd.,

(6th Cir. 1997).

III.

When a district court has proffered an overly general class definition, an appropriate

remedy may be to vacate the order and remand, rather than “flatly denying certification.”

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In re Marriott Int’l, Inc. Consumer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,

, 142 (D. Md.

2022) (“An overbreadth problem, however, ‘can and often should be solved by refining the

class definition[s] . . . .’” (quoting Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSys.,

(7th Cir. 2012))); accord. Olean Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc. v. Bumble Bee

Foods LLC,

, 669 n.14 (9th Cir. 2022).

An appropriate class definition should provide proper detail to identify whether or

not a prospective class member was injured and whether their claim coheres with the rest

of the certified class. There is no brightline rule for how such a definition should read, and

district courts have discretion in their phrasing.

Upon remand, the district court may also consider whether any recertification order

should identify discrete subclasses. Rule 23(c)(5) provides that “[w]hen appropriate, a class

may be divided into subclasses that are each treated as a class under this rule.” And the

Supreme Court has held that district courts may “certify[] subclasses sua sponte.” U.S.

Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty,

(1980); see also 7AA WRIGHT &

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1790 (3d ed. 2024).

Subclasses may be appropriate when proposed classes sweep widely because overly

general class definitions heighten the concern that members have “divergent interests.” 1

MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:45 (21st ed. 2024). Breaking down a broad class into

subclasses can help ensure not only that common questions are properly defined and

predominate within each subclass, but also that class representatives actually have claims

typical of the subclass they purport to represent. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). This helps

avoid unnecessary “significant, fundamental, intraclass conflict” and the potential

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subordination of some types of claims to others during litigation and/or settlement. 3

NEWBERG & RUBENSTEIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 7:31 (6th ed. 2024).

Indeed, when such conflicts threaten Rule 23(a)(4)’s promise of fair and adequate

representation, district courts are obligated to divide or decertify the class. See id.; see also

Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,

(1997). While a district court does not

“bear the burden of constructing subclasses” in lieu of decertification, if it chooses to

undertake that course sua sponte it must find that each subclass meets Rule 23’s

prerequisites individually. 3 NEWBERG & RUBENSTEIN, supra, § 7:30. Thus, subclassing

involves a careful balancing of ensuring the homogeneity and numerosity of each subclass.

See 32B AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 2D FEDERAL COURTS § 1718; see also In re Literary

Works in Electronic Databases Copyright Litig.,

(2d Cir. 2011). We

offer subclassing not as a directive but as one example of the tools the district court may

employ to achieve the proper specificity of a challenged policy and class contours

necessary to ensure Rule 23 compliance.

IV.

When properly crafted and certified, the class-action device can serve as an

administrable vehicle favorable to the needs of all parties. State and federal laws are both

sensitive to the plight of hourly-wage employees in America and to the value of each dollar

to their households. Workers deserve every penny earned for the honest work they provide

their employers, and aggregate litigation may often provide the best means through which

to seek relief.

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However, the class-action mechanism is a carefully constructed compromise in our

legal system—one which Article III courts play a critical role in maintaining. A class action

is “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the

individual named parties only.” Deiter v. Microsoft Corp.,

(4th Cir.

2006) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon,

(1982)); see Broussard

v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc.,

, 338 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[L]itigation by

representative parties adjudicates the rights of all class members.”). And plaintiffs who

could never have individually marshaled the resources or satisfied jurisdictional amount-

in-controversy requirements may through aggregate litigation seek proper vindication in a

court of law. See

(a), (d)(2). But, in exchange for this ability, parties must

adhere to Rule 23’s prerequisites and requirements. These requirements ensure that judicial

resources are not wasted pursuing litigation that is aggregate only in theory. Without Rule

23, the most ill-defined and loosely constructed classes would become commonplace, all

but ensuring that courts would be bogged down unknotting unnecessarily disparate claims.

Our legal system has rightly spurned such a litigious prospect.

Our goal today is simply to ensure that the class-action train stays on the tracks. It

is the district court’s responsibility in the first instance to determine whether plaintiffs have

met their burden to present a case properly amenable to class treatment. Thorn, 445 F.3d

at 321-22. It would be premature for an appellate court to pass judgment on this question

at this juncture. We thus vacate the certification order and remand to the district court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED

19