USCA4 Appeal: 22-6607 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/05/2024 Pg: 1 of 14

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-6607

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ANGEL MANUEL CENTENO-MORALES,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg. Elizabeth Kay Dillon, District Judge. (5:15-cr-00012-EKD-1)

Argued: October 24, 2023 Decided: January 5, 2024

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Richardson joined.

ARGUED: Andrea Lantz Harris, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Jonathan Patrick Jones, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Juval O. Scott, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Christopher R. Kavanaugh, United States USCA4 Appeal: 22-6607 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/05/2024 Pg: 2 of 14

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

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AGEE, Circuit Judge: Federal prisoner Angel Centeno-Morales moved for compassionate release under

(c) after his wife, who was the primary caregiver for their minor son, died

of COVID-19. In his § 3582(c) motion, Centeno-Morales argued that his wife’s death

constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for release and that a reassessment of

the

(a) factors also favored his release given his changed circumstances

and his post-sentencing rehabilitative conduct. The district court agreed that the death of

Centeno-Morales’ wife constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief, but

found that the § 3553(a) factors strongly weighed in favor of his continued incarceration.

The district court therefore denied Centeno-Morales’ motion for compassionate release.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court’s order denying relief.

I.

A.

Angel Centeno-Morales has a long criminal history of offenses involving drugs and

violence. Before committing the offenses for which he is now incarcerated, he was

previously convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, battery, illegal

possession of weapons, and several drug offenses. In 2010, Centeno-Morales was

convicted in Virginia state court for possession of methamphetamine with the intent to

distribute. He was released from custody on probation in 2013 and almost immediately

became involved in the drug trafficking conspiracy that led to his current incarceration.

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From spring to fall of 2014, Centeno-Morales and his co-conspirators trafficked

methamphetamine in and around Staunton, Virginia. Centeno-Morales often sold

methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm. He frequently used a firearm to

threaten those to whom he sold methamphetamine, particularly to prevent them from

cooperating with law enforcement.

Centeno-Morales’ enterprise ended in September 2014, when based on a tip from a

confidential informant, law enforcement instigated a traffic stop of his vehicle. A search of

the vehicle yielded $3,000 in cash and a loaded handgun. Centeno-Morales was arrested

for possession of a firearm by a felon and later charged with drug offenses based on

information received from informants.

Centeno-Morales entered into a plea agreement with the United States under which

he pleaded guilty to distribution of more than 500 grams of methamphetamine, in violation

of

(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), and to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a

drug trafficking crime, in violation of

(c). In exchange, the United States

moved to dismiss six other charges. The district court, Judge Elizabeth K. Dillon presiding,

accepted Centeno-Morales’ plea and later sentenced Centeno-Morales to 180 months’

imprisonment: 120 months for the distribution offense and a consecutive 60 months for the

firearms offense.

B.

In May 2021, after serving about six years of his sentence, Centeno-Morales filed a

pro se motion for compassionate release under

(c)(1)(A). In that motion,

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Centeno-Morales argued that he should be released because of his poor health and the risks

of COVID-19 in correctional facilities. Centeno-Morales argued that COVID-19, coupled

with his medical conditions, created an extraordinary and compelling circumstance

warranting release. The district court appointed counsel to represent Centeno-Morales, but

she declined to file a supplemental brief.

C.

Before the district court could rule on this first motion for compassionate release,

Centeno-Morales’ wife died of COVID-19. Centeno-Morales, this time through his court-

appointed counsel, filed a supplemental motion arguing that these circumstances also

warranted release under § 3582(c)(1)(A).

In his supplemental motion, Centeno-Morales argued that the death of his wife left

his minor son without a primary caregiver and created an additional extraordinary and

compelling reason justifying an early release. In support of this contention, Centeno-

Morales highlighted the importance of a parent’s presence in the life of an adolescent and

described the personal difficulties he experienced as a child without a father figure.

Centeno-Morales then argued that the § 3553(a) factors favored his early release because

of his disciplinary record, his rehabilitative efforts, and his post-release arrangements.

The Government opposed the motion. It conceded that the death of Centeno-

Morales’ wife constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason, but it argued that the

§ 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of Centeno-Morales’ continued incarceration. The

Government pointed to the violent nature of Centeno-Morales’ offense, his criminal

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history, the proximity of prior offenses to the ones for which he is incarcerated, his

disciplinary infractions while incarcerated, and his potential danger to the community if

released. The Government also noted that Centeno-Morales did not address whether

anyone else was available to care for his son, nor did he show that his release would result

in a more stable environment for his child.

As detailed below, the district court denied the motion. * Although the court agreed

with the parties that Centeno-Morales could show “extraordinary and compelling reasons”

to support his motion given the death of his wife, it disagreed with his argument that the

§ 3553(a) factors supported his release.

After the district court denied relief, Centeno-Morales noted a timely appeal. We

have jurisdiction under

and

.

II.

A.

At the outset, we note that ordinarily a sentencing court “may not modify a term of

imprisonment once it has been imposed.”

(c). Congress provided an

exception to that general rule—on which Centeno-Morales now relies—which permits

courts to reduce a sentence or permit immediate release based on “extraordinary and

* In the same order, the district court also rejected the original grounds for the motion after concluding that Centeno-Morales had not shown that COVID-19 created for him an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief. Centeno-Morales does not challenge that finding on appeal. 6 USCA4 Appeal: 22-6607 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/05/2024 Pg: 7 of 14

compelling reasons warrant[ing]” such relief.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). For many years, only

the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons could make such a request. Id.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) (2002). But in 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which allows

federal inmates to directly file motions for compassionate release once they have exhausted

their administrative remedies. See Pub. L. No. 115–391, § 603(b),

, 5239

(2018).

To grant a compassionate release motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the district court

must conduct a two-step analysis. First, the court must determine that the prisoner is

eligible for a sentence reduction because he has shown “extraordinary and compelling

reasons” for release. United States v. Hargrove,

, 194–95 (4th Cir. 2022). After

a district court finds that an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for sentence

modification exists, it must then evaluate the relevant § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 195. Those

factors include, among others, “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” “the history

and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the need for the sentence imposed—

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with . . . medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”

(a).

District courts “enjoy broad discretion” in evaluating the § 3553(a) factors when

deciding a motion for compassionate release. United States v. Bethea,

, 834

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(4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). District courts must consider new arguments for sentence

modification, but they need not address in turn every argument raised by the movant. See

United States v. High,

, 188–89 (4th Cir. 2021). Rather, district courts must

only “set forth enough to satisfy our court that it has considered the parties’ arguments and

has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority, so as to allow

for meaningful appellate review.”

(cleaned up).

It is “significant”—and weighs against finding an abuse of discretion—“when the

same judge who sentenced the defendant rules on the compassionate release motion.”

Bethea,

(citation omitted). Indeed, “[w]hen the same sentencing judge

assesses the § 3553(a) factors again for compassionate release purposes, there’s a strong

indication that the judge knows of the defendant’s circumstances, both favorable and

unfavorable, and considers the totality of the record when assessing whether a different

sentence is now warranted.” Id. (citation omitted).

A movant for compassionate release bears the burden of showing why the § 3553(a)

factors justify a modified sentence. See High,

. In this circuit, district courts

are presumed to have sufficiently considered the relevant factors in deciding a motion for

compassionate release, though the movant may rebut this presumption by presenting

substantial post-sentencing mitigating evidence.

If the movant rebuts the presumption,

the district court is required to provide a more thorough explanation in considering the

motion.

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B.

The § 3553(a) step of the analysis governs the resolution of this case. The parties

below agreed—and the district court found—that the death of Centeno-Morales’ wife

constituted an extraordinary and compelling circumstance. That conclusion—uncontested

on appeal—is consistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A), which explicitly identifies the

death of the primary caregiver for an inmate’s minor child as an extraordinary and

compelling reason.

After finding that Centeno-Morales fulfilled the first prong of the inquiry, the district

court denied the motion based on an analysis of the § 3553(a) factors. In its ruling, the

district court recited the relevant § 3553(a) factors and concluded that they weighed against

releasing Centeno-Morales. The district court then elaborated on the reasons for its

determination: Centeno-Morales had distributed a large quantity of methamphetamine

while on probation, he had used firearms for intimidation and coercion, and he had received

two disciplinary infractions while serving his current sentence. The district court expressed

sympathy for Centeno-Morales’ loss, but it nonetheless concluded that his continued

incarceration was “necessary to reflect the seriousness of Centeno-Morales’ offenses,

protect the public from further crimes, provide for just punishment, promote respect for the

law, and provide deterrence.” United States v. Centeno-Morales, No. 5:15-cr-00012,

, at *4 (W.D. Va. May 16, 2022).

We review the district court’s denial of Centeno-Morales’ motion for compassionate

release for abuse of discretion. High,

. “A district court abuses its discretion

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when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to follow statutory requirements, fails to

consider judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of discretion, relies on

erroneous factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.” Bethea,

(cleaned up). Under this standard, this Court may not substitute its own judgment for that

of the district court. United States v. Vidacak,

(4th Cir. 2009).

C.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in analyzing the § 3553(a) factors and

concluding that those factors did not warrant relief even though Centeno-Morales satisfied

the first step of showing extraordinary and compelling circumstances. First, the record

reflects that the district court did not overlook any of Centeno-Morales’ arguments about

post-sentencing mitigation or rehabilitation. Rather, the record shows that the district court

considered each argument Centeno-Morales raised. Second, the district court was not

required to offer a detailed explanation of its reasoning on each of Centeno-Morales’

arguments. Centeno-Morales failed to present evidence of rehabilitation sufficient to

warrant the robust and detailed explanation he requests. Third, and finally, that the same

judge presided over both Centeno-Morales’ sentencing and motion for compassionate

release weighs heavily in favor of affirming the district court’s ruling, even if it lacked

some detail or depth, because it demonstrates the judge had an overarching familiarity with

Centeno-Morales’ history. We address each of these conclusions in turn.

First, nothing in the record suggests that the district court overlooked

Centeno-Morales’ arguments about his changed circumstances. In fact, the district court

explicitly acknowledged Centeno-Morales’ loss at least twice, but it still concluded that the

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§ 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of his continued incarceration. The district court was

not required to address all the possible implications of the death of Centeno-Morales’ wife.

See High,

(rejecting the notion that the court must “acknowledge[] and

address[]” each argument raised by a movant in a motion for compassionate release). Our

precedent requires only that the district court consider evidence of post-sentencing changed

circumstances in evaluating the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 188–89. The record shows that the

district court fulfilled its obligation here, particularly as Centeno-Morales never addressed

why no other party was available and suitable to serve as the minor child’s caregiver.

Second, the district court owed Centeno-Morales no detailed explanation of its

reasoning on his arguments about post-sentencing rehabilitation. We have previously held

that where a movant presents substantial evidence of post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts,

a district court must provide “a more robust and detailed” explanation in ruling on a motion

for compassionate release. High,

(quoting United States v. Martin,

(4th Cir. 2019)). But that requirement is the exception, not the rule. The movant

in Martin presented “a mountain of new mitigating evidence that the sentencing court never

evaluated.” Martin,

. What’s more, the movant in Martin was incarcerated

for nearly two decades, became a respected tutor for other inmates, and exhibited such

exemplary behavior that correctional staff moved her into a low-security facility.

But

our guidance in Martin was based on the specific record presented to the district court in

that case. We have repeatedly observed that district courts must only “set forth enough to

satisfy our court that it has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for

exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority, so as to allow for meaningful appellate

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review.” High,

(cleaned up). Thus, the district court does not owe every

movant for compassionate release a “robust and detailed” explanation on every argument

about post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts. Id.; Martin,

.

Moreover, Centeno-Morales presented no “mountain” of mitigating evidence here.

He completed just a few vocational courses and received two disciplinary infractions while

incarcerated. Importantly, he remains classified as a “medium” security inmate. This is not

the kind of exceptional post-sentencing evidence for which Martin would require a “robust

and detailed” explanation on a motion for compassionate release. Martin,

.

Rather, as we have repeatedly affirmed, the district court was only required to “consider[]

the parties’ arguments” and exercise “a reasoned basis” for its decision. High,

. The record reflects that the district court amply fulfilled that obligation here.

Third, and of final relevance to our review, we note that the same judge presided

over both Centeno-Morales’ sentencing and his motion for compassionate release, a factor

that we have previously deemed relevant when reviewing the sufficiency of a court’s

explanation for its denial of a motion for compassionate release. In short, because Judge

Dillon presided over both proceedings, she is presumed to have known of Centeno-

Morales’ circumstances—both favorable and unfavorable—and to have considered the

totality of the record when ruling on Centeno-Morales’ motion for compassionate release.

Bethea,

.

The record shows that the district court did not ignore or inadequately explain its

reasoning on Centeno-Morales’ arguments about the death of his wife or his rehabilitative

efforts. The district court acknowledged both Centeno-Morales’ loss and his prison

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disciplinary record in its decision. Absent some conspicuous absence in the district court’s

decision, we presume that the district court considered all the relevant evidence. The

presumption is stronger still when the same judge sentenced the defendant and later decided

the motion for compassionate release. Centeno-Morales points to nothing here sufficient to

overcome that presumption. On each of these issues—changed circumstances and

mitigating evidence—Centeno-Morales bore the burden of persuasion. See High,

. Centeno-Morales failed to meet that burden. He points to no mountain of evidence

ignored by the district court. And before this Court at oral argument, Centeno-Morales

again failed to explain why he was the best or only option to care for his son. At each stage,

Centeno-Morales failed to present compelling evidence—as was his responsibility—and

his motion therefore fails. This Court will not overturn a denial of a motion for

compassionate release for abuse of discretion absent a showing that the district court

overlooked some substantial mitigating evidence produced by the movant. That did not

happen here.

III.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Centeno-Morales’ motion

for compassionate release. The record does not support Centeno-Morales’ contention that

the district court ignored his arguments about post-sentencing conduct and changed

circumstances. Rather, the record reflects that the district court explicitly considered each

of those arguments. Further, our precedent does not require that a district court engage in

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depth with each new argument raised by a defendant when hearing a motion for

compassionate release. All our precedent requires, absent substantial mitigating evidence,

is that the district court consider new arguments when evaluating the § 3553(a) factors. The

district court did so here and therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Centeno-

Morales’ motion for compassionate release.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court denying Centeno-Morales’

motion for compassionate release.

AFFIRMED

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