USCA4 Appeal: 22-4512 Doc: 28 Filed: 01/09/2024 Pg: 1 of 7

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4512

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

UILFRIDO LOPEZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (1:16-cr-00136-MOC-WCM-1)

Submitted: January 2, 2024 Decided: January 9, 2024

Before GREGORY and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Howard W. Anderson, III, TRULUCK THOMASON LLC, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney, Elizabeth M. Greenough, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Uilfrido Lopez appeals his conviction, following a bench trial, for operating an

unlicensed money transmitting business, in violation of

(a), and two

counts of money laundering, in violation of

. On appeal, Lopez argues

that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements he

made to law enforcement officers who did not provide Miranda * warnings and that

insufficient evidence supports his conviction for operating an unlicensed money

transmitting business. We affirm.

First, we need not determine whether the district court erred in denying the motion

to suppress as untimely because we conclude that the district court’s reasoning in denying

the motion on the merits is persuasive. Cf. United States v. Swann,

(4th

Cir. 1998) (holding that this court “may affirm the district court’s judgment for any reason

supported by the record, even if it is not the basis that the district court used”). “In assessing

a district court's decision on a motion to suppress, we review the court’s factual findings

for clear error and its legal determinations de novo.” United States v. Linville,

(4th Cir. 2023). In doing so, we “construe the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prevailing party, and give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident

judges and law enforcement officers.”

(internal quotation marks omitted).

“The Fifth Amendment provides that ‘[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself.’” United States v. Azua-Rinconada, 914 F.3d

* Miranda v. Arizona,

(1966).

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319, 325 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). “And the Supreme Court has

mandated the use of procedural measures to ensure that defendants, when subjected to

custodial interrogations, are advised of their Fifth Amendment rights.”

(citing Miranda,

). “[U]nless a defendant is advised of his Fifth Amendment rights

pursuant to Miranda and voluntarily waives those rights, statements he makes during a

custodial interrogation must be suppressed.”

“Coercive police activity is a necessary

finding for a confession or a Miranda waiver to be considered involuntary.” United States

v. Giddins,

(4th Cir. 2017).

“An individual is in custody for Miranda purposes when, under the totality of the

circumstances, a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal

arrest.” United States v. Leggette,

(4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Courts ask two questions when making this determination.

First, we

determine “whether a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to

terminate the interrogation and leave.”

(internal quotation marks omitted). Second, if

a reasonable person would not have felt at liberty to leave, we ask “whether the relevant

environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house

questioning at issue in Miranda.”

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Although a reasonable person in Lopez’s position might not have felt at liberty to

terminate the encounter with law enforcement officers, Lopez has not established that the

interaction presented the same coercive pressures as a stationhouse interrogation. The

entire encounter, which began as a knock and talk, lasted no more than an hour, including

the ensuing consensual search of Lopez’s residence; further, none of the officers drew a

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weapon, physically restrained Lopez, threatened him with arrest, or frisked him. Their

questions were polite and conversational, and no officer ever touched Lopez. See

. Moreover, Lopez consented to the knock and talk, invited the officers inside his

residence, answered their questions willingly, and consented to the search of both the

packages addressed to him and of the apartment. Therefore, we conclude that the district

court did not err in finding there was no custodial interrogation, and thus Miranda warnings

were not required. See

. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying

the motion to suppress.

Turning to Lopez’s sufficiency challenge, “[a] defendant who challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden.” United States v. Small,

(4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Although we review challenges

to the sufficiency of evidence de novo, our role is limited to considering whether there is

substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support the

conviction.” United States v. Ziegler,

(4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could

accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.”

(cleaned up). The relevant question is “whether, after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Musacchio v. United

States,

(2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]ppellate reversal

on grounds of insufficient evidence is confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is

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clear.” United States v. Savage,

(4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

It is a crime to knowingly conduct, control, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or

part of an unlicensed money transmitting business.

(a). An unlicensed

money transmitting business is “a money transmitting business which affects interstate or

foreign commerce in any manner or degree” and either “is operated without an appropriate

money transmitting license in a State where such operation is punishable as a misdemeanor

or a felony under State law,” “fails to comply with the money transmitting business

registration requirements under section 5330 of title 31, United States Code, or regulations

prescribed under such section,” or “otherwise involves the transportation or transmission

of funds that are known to the defendant to have been derived from a criminal offense or

are intended to be used to promote or support unlawful activity.”

(b)(1).

Lopez argues that his conviction is unsupported by any evidence beyond his

uncorroborated confession, thus rendering the evidence insufficient as a matter of law.

Although a criminal conviction “cannot rest entirely on an uncorroborated extrajudicial

confession,” United States v. Riley,

(4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation

marks omitted), “extrinsic proof is sufficient which merely fortifies the truth of the

confession, without independently establishing the crime charged,” United States v.

Stephens,

(4th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). Thus, “it is sufficient if the

corroboration supports—not establishes—the essential facts admitted, and that

corroboration need only tend to establish—not establish—the trustworthiness of the

confession.” United States v. Abu Ali,

(4th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up).

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Here, Lopez’s confession was not the only evidence linking him to criminal

conduct. See

Between his two encounters with law enforcement, Lopez was connected

to money that was both shipped to him and transported in his checked baggage between

North Carolina and California, and which appeared packaged to avoid drug detection.

Moreover, a drug canine alerted to both the shipped money and the money in Lopez’s

baggage, indicating the presence of the odor of narcotics. The money in the checked

baggage also tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine and cocaine. The two

shipped parcels were from an individual known to investigators as a significant

methamphetamine distributor in the Western District of North Carolina; further, an

informant explained that Lopez was the “money man” who transported the drug proceeds

from North Carolina to California. Officers also discovered a safe, bundles of cash, a scale,

and two rolls of plastic wrap in Lopez’s apartment. We therefore conclude that ample

evidence supports Lopez’s conviction.

Finally, we reject Lopez’s arguments that the Government failed to prove the

existence of a “money transmitting business,” see United States v. Singh,

(9th Cir. 2021), or that the business was unlicensed, see

(b)(1)(C)

(clarifying that an unlicensed money transmitting business is one that “involves the

transportation or transmission of funds that are known to the defendant to have been

derived from a criminal offense or are intended to be used to promote or support unlawful

activity”).

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Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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