USCA4 Appeal: 21-1157 Doc: 33 Filed: 01/09/2024 Pg: 1 of 9

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-1157

STANFORD LANCE WEAVER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken. J. Michelle Childs, District Judge. (1:19-cv-02700-JMC)

Argued: December 5, 2023 Decided: January 9, 2024

Before NIEMEYER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Jonathan Joseph Marshall, JENNER & BLOCK, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Michael David Weaver, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michelle S. Kallen, JENNER & BLOCK LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Adair Ford Boroughs, United States Attorney, Marshall Prince, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina; Stephan J. Boardman, Chief Counsel, Appellate and Commercial Litigation, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 21-1157 Doc: 33 Filed: 01/09/2024 Pg: 2 of 9

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Stanford Lance Weaver appeals from the district court’s order dismissing

as time-barred his lawsuit against the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) and denying

leave to amend his complaint as futile. In dismissing Weaver’s complaint, the district court

adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation after reviewing the report under

a clear error standard of review. Because Weaver provided objections to the magistrate

judge’s report that were sufficiently specific to warrant de novo review by the district court,

we vacate and remand.

I.

On September 23, 2019, Weaver filed a pro se complaint alleging violations of the

Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). See

to 2654. 1 In the

complaint’s one-paragraph Statement of Claim, Weaver alleged that USPS violated the

FMLA when, between September 2014 and May 2016, it denied him leave during his

wife’s pregnancy and following the birth of their child. He also alleged that USPS retaliated

against him “for FMLA leave in 2015.” J.A. 9. 2

USPS moved pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Weaver’s claims as time-barred.

In its motion, USPS argued that Weaver failed to comply with the two-year statute of

limitations for filing an FMLA claim involving a non-willful violation of the statute; failed

1 In his original complaint, Weaver also cited the Fair Labor Standards Act. However, Weaver did not appear to raise any allegations that would implicate the Fair Labor Standards Act, and Weaver does not pursue a Fair Labor Standards Act claim on appeal. 2 Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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to allege a willful violation of the FMLA that could invoke the FMLA’s three-year statute

of limitations; and failed to comply with the three-year statute of limitations even if it

applied because that limitations period lapsed by May 2019—more than three months

before Weaver filed his complaint on September 23, 2019. See

(c)(1)–(2)

(FMLA statute of limitations).

Weaver then filed a motion to amend his complaint and also filed a response to

USPS’s motion to dismiss. The district court denied without prejudice his motion to amend

because he failed to attach a copy of his proposed amended complaint to the motion, and

Weaver then filed a second motion to amend his complaint that followed the required

procedure. His proposed amended complaint expanded on his allegations, most notably

adding that he was terminated on September 23, 2016; that his September 23 termination

was “a result of four letters of warning . . . dated 10/2014, 6/2015, 2/2016, and 6/2016”;

and that USPS’s FMLA violations were willful. J.A. 38–39. In his response to USPS’s

motion to dismiss, Weaver argued that the three-year statute of limitations applied, and that

his complaint was timely because it was filed exactly three years after his September 23,

2016, termination.

USPS opposed Weaver’s motion to amend, contending that it was futile. In support

of its motion, USPS submitted two documents related to Weaver’s termination: 1) a June

3, 2016, letter from USPS, which indicated that Weaver would be removed from service

July 5, 2016, and 2) a September 23, 2016, letter from a union representative, stating that

the union was “withdrawing” a case involving Weaver “from the grievance/arbitration

process.” J.A. 50. USPS argued that the two documents established that the June 3 letter

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notified Weaver of his termination, and that his removal from service on September 23 was

delayed from the July 5 date stated in the letter solely because of the labor grievance. USPS

further argued that, under Delaware State College v. Ricks,

(1980), the June

3 notice of termination started the statute of limitations period, and the complaint was

therefore untimely even under the three-year limitations period.

The magistrate judge agreed with USPS and concluded that, regardless of whether

the two- or three-year statute of limitations applied, Weaver’s complaint was untimely

under the FMLA. In doing so, the magistrate judge acknowledged Weaver’s claimed

September 23, 2016, termination date. But the magistrate judge found that “Weaver’s

statute of limitations began to run when he was notified of his termination on June 3, 2016,

and Weaver filed this action more than three years after that date.” J.A. 54–55.

Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended granting USPS’s motion to dismiss and

denying Weaver’s motion to amend as futile.

Weaver timely objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The

district court found that Weaver’s objections did “not specifically address the Magistrate

Judge’s findings concerning the untimeliness of his Complaint” and concluded that it

would therefore review the magistrate judge’s report only for clear error. Weaver v. U.S.

Postal Serv., No. 1:19-CV-2700-JMC,

, at *3 (D.S.C. July 1, 2020).

After concluding that the magistrate judge had not clearly erred, the district court adopted

the magistrate judge’s report, denied Weaver’s motion to amend as futile, and dismissed

his complaint with prejudice.

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Weaver moved for reconsideration, explaining how his objections to the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation specifically addressed whether his complaint was

timely under the FMLA. The district court denied the motion as “repetitive,” and Weaver

timely appealed. 3

II.

On appeal, Weaver contends that the district court erred by rejecting his objections

to the magistrate judge’s report and by reviewing the report only for clear error. Because

we agree with Weaver that this issue is dispositive, we do not reach Weaver’s additional

arguments related to the contents of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation.

A.

We review the sufficiency of objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation de

novo. Elijah v. Dunbar,

(4th Cir. 2023).

B.

After a magistrate judge issues a report and recommendation, any party may object

to the report.

(b)(1). “If the grounds for objection are clear, district court

judges must consider them de novo.” Elijah,

; see also

(b)(1)

(“A [district] judge . . . shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report

or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate

judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.”). Otherwise, the district court need

3 We have jurisdiction pursuant to

.

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only review the magistrate judge’s report for clear error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory

committee’s note to 1983 amendment.

We have recognized that not all objections are clear enough to trigger de novo

review. For example, a plaintiff must do more than generally state “I object” to mandate

de novo review by a district court. Elijah,

(quoting Lockert v. Faulkner,

(7th Cir. 1988)). But the bar for de novo review is low: objections

need only “reasonably . . . alert the district court of the true ground for the objection.”

United States v. Midgette,

(4th Cir. 2007). And objections “need not be

novel to be sufficiently specific.” Elijah,

.

When deciding whether a party alerted the district court of the true ground for an

objection, we are mindful of the requirement that we construe pro se filings liberally.

Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007). “Thus, when reviewing pro se objections to a

magistrate[ judge’s] recommendation, district courts must review de novo any articulated

grounds to which the litigant appears to take issue.” Elijah, 66 F.4th at 460–61 (citing

Martin v. Duffy,

, 245–46 (4th Cir. 2017)).

For example, in Martin v. Duffy, we found a pro se plaintiff’s objections sufficient

to warrant de novo review even though they merely restated most of the plaintiff’s claims

from his complaint. Martin, 858 F.3d at 245–46. Since restating the claims was sufficient

to “alert[] the district court that [the pro se plaintiff] believed the magistrate judge erred in

recommending dismissal of those claims,” we held that the district court was required to

review dismissal of the claims de novo.

.

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Here, Weaver—who proceeded pro se before the district court—provided three

specific objections to the magistrate judge’s report. First, he argued the magistrate judge

should have granted his motion to amend before reviewing USPS’s motion to dismiss.

Second, he argued that the magistrate judge misapplied Delaware State College v. Ricks,

and that, under a correct application of Ricks, the September 23 termination should have

started the statute of limitations for his claim. Finally, Weaver argued that even if the statute

of limitations began to run on the June 3 notification date, the magistrate judge should have

recommended equitably tolling the statute of limitations.

The district court found those objections did “not specifically address the Magistrate

Judge’s findings concerning the untimeliness of his Complaint” and that Weaver

impermissibly attempted to “rehash[]” “the same factual allegations that were before the

Magistrate Judge.” Weaver,

, at *3. We disagree.

First, each of Weaver’s objections took issue with a specific portion of the

magistrate judge’s report, as well as the ultimate recommendation that the district court

dismiss his complaint as untimely. Not only did the objections identify the portions of the

report to which Weaver objected, but they also articulated how Weaver believed the

magistrate judge’s reasoning was incorrect. For example, in discussing Ricks, Weaver

explained his view that the June 3 letter did not start the statute of limitations on his claim

because USPS did not follow the correct procedures for approving the notice of removal.

Therefore, “[e]ven if we did not apply the liberal construction provided to pro se litigants,”

Weaver “reasonably alerted the district court of the true ground for the objection[s].”

Elijah,

(cleaned up).

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Second, while some of Weaver’s objections mirrored the arguments he presented to

the magistrate judge, “[i]t is immaterial that his objections resembled arguments he had

made previously; district courts must solely consider the specificity, not the novelty, of

objections to magistrate [judge] recommendations.”

Indeed, in our recent opinion in

Elijah v. Dunbar, we pointed to the district court’s opinion in this case as one of many

examples of a district court erroneously disregarding objections based on a mistaken belief

that objections may not “rehash” arguments made before a magistrate judge. See

at 460

n.4 (identifying eight district court opinions that fail to follow the rule laid out in Martin).

So, Weaver’s objections readily satisfied the low bar of alerting the district court of the

grounds on which he objected, and the district court was therefore required to review

Weaver’s objections de novo.

C.

“[W]e generally don’t reach factual or legal questions in a magistrate judge’s report

that were not first subject to de novo review by the district court.” United States v. De

Leon-Ramirez,

(4th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, we decline to address the

remainder of the issues raised by the parties and remand for de novo review by the district

court. By doing so, “we ensure appropriate district court review while leaving the door

open for future appeals.” Elijah,

.

III.

Because Weaver made several specific objections to the magistrate judge’s report

and recommendation, we vacate the district court’s order and remand for de novo review.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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