USCA4 Appeal: 22-4693 Doc: 42 Filed: 01/17/2024 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4693

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NATHANIEL BLAYN BECKER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Irene C. Berger, District Judge. (2:21-cr-00234-1)

Submitted: December 6, 2023 Decided: January 17, 2024

Before QUATTLEBAUM and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Charles M. Henter, HENTERLAW, PLC, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. William S. Thompson, United States Attorney, Joshua C. Hanks, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4693 Doc: 42 Filed: 01/17/2024 Pg: 2 of 4

PER CURIAM:

Nathaniel Blayn Becker was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of placing a

pipe bomb on a vessel, in violation of

(a)(2), and two counts of possessing

an unregistered destructive device, a pipe bomb, in violation of

(d),

5871. The charges arose after pipe bombs were found on barges in the Ohio River in

October 2021. Becker asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions

and the district court erred in applying the Sentencing Guidelines for obstruction of justice

and creating a substantial risk of death and serious bodily injury. We affirm.

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether there is

substantial evidence to support the verdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the

government. United States v. Young,

(4th Cir. 2019). Substantial

evidence is “evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

(internal quotation marks omitted). In assessing whether substantial evidence is present,

we are “not entitled to assess witness credibility and must assume that the jury resolved

any conflicting evidence in the prosecution’s favor.” United States v. Robinson,

(4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). We “consider both

circumstantial and direct evidence, and allow the government all reasonable inferences that

could be drawn in its favor.” United States v. Harvey,

(4th Cir. 2008).

Defendants “bear[] a heavy burden, as appellate reversal on grounds of insufficient

evidence is confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v.

2 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4693 Doc: 42 Filed: 01/17/2024 Pg: 3 of 4

Savage,

(4th Cir. 2018). We have reviewed the evidence and conclude

that substantial evidence supports the convictions.

“In assessing whether a district court properly calculated the Guidelines range,

including its application of any sentencing enhancements, this Court reviews the district

court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v.

Pena,

(4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[C]lear error

exists only when the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Slager,

(4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the Guidelines, a defendant’s offense level should be increased two levels if

he “willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration

of justice” relating to the “offense of conviction,” “relevant conduct,” or “a closely related

offense.” See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (2021); see also United States v.

Kiulin,

(4th Cir. 2004) (in applying this enhancement, “the district court

must conclude that the government has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the

administration of justice” (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is well established that

the obstruction enhancement specifically applies to “committing, suborning, or attempting

to suborn perjury.” USSG § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(B). Thus, a district court can apply the

enhancement based on trial testimony when a defendant gives “false testimony concerning

a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony.” United States v.

Dunnigan,

(1993); see United States v. Perez,

, 192

3 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4693 Doc: 42 Filed: 01/17/2024 Pg: 4 of 4

(4th Cir. 2011) (noting three elements necessary to impose the enhancement for

obstruction of justice based on the defendant’s testimony: “(1) . . . false testimony;

(2) concerning a material matter; (3) with willful intent to deceive”). We conclude that the

district court properly found the necessary elements to apply the two-level enhancement

for obstruction of justice.

Pursuant to USSG § 2K1.4, if the offense “created a substantial risk of death or

serious bodily injury to any person other than a participant in the offense, and that risk was

created knowingly; or . . . involved the destruction or attempted destruction of . . . a vessel,

or a vessel’s cargo,” the base offense level is 24. We have reviewed the record and

conclude that the district court did not err in finding that the pipe bombs tossed on to barges

in the Ohio River created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to persons

other than Becker.

Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentence. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

4