United States v. Jonathan McCall

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

United States v. Jonathan McCall

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4335 Doc: 24 Filed: 01/17/2024 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4335

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JONATHAN MARCUS MCCALL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (7:18-cr-00039-BHH-1)

Submitted: November 30, 2023 Decided: January 17, 2024

Before KING and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Howard W. Anderson III, TRULUCK THOMASON LLC, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Leesa Washington, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4335 Doc: 24 Filed: 01/17/2024 Pg: 2 of 4

PER CURIAM:

Jonathan Marcus McCall pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute and to distribute cocaine base, cocaine, and heroin, in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 846

, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and aiding and

abetting, in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 2

, 924(c)(1)(A). The district court sentenced McCall

to 157 months’ imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of supervised release, and he

now appeals.

On appeal, McCall asserts that the district court erred by including in the written

judgment conditions of supervised release that were not orally pronounced at sentencing.

The Government moves to dismiss the appeal as barred by the appellate waiver contained

in McCall’s plea agreement. Rather than contesting the validity of the waiver, McCall

contends that his argument on appeal falls outside the waiver’s scope. For the following

reasons, we deny the Government’s motion but affirm the criminal judgment.

“[I]n order to sentence a defendant to a non-mandatory condition of supervised

release, the sentencing court must include that condition in its oral pronouncement of a

defendant’s sentence in open court.” United States v. Singletary,

984 F.3d 341, 345

(4th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Rogers,

961 F.3d 291, 296

(4th Cir. 2020)). A valid

appeal waiver does not preclude a defendant from asserting a Rogers claim. See Singletary,

984 F.3d at 345

. Thus, the waiver in McCall’s plea agreement does not bar review of the

issue he raises on appeal, and we therefore deny the Government’s motion to dismiss the

appeal.

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Turning to the merits, we review McCall’s claim of Rogers error de novo. See

United States v. Cisson,

33 F.4th 185, 193

(4th Cir. 2022). As is relevant here, a district

court may “satisfy its obligation to orally pronounce discretionary conditions through

incorporation—by incorporating, for instance, all [Sentencing] Guidelines ‘standard’

conditions when it pronounces a supervised-release sentence, and then detailing those

conditions in the written judgment.” Rogers,

961 F.3d at 299

.

McCall contends that the district court failed to orally announce or incorporate the

13 standard conditions of supervised release listed in the criminal judgment. Our holding

in Cisson forecloses this claim. In Cisson, the district court stated at sentencing “that it

would impose the ‘mandatory and standard conditions’ of supervised release.”

33 F.4th at 194

(emphasis omitted). We observed that the District of South Carolina has no standing

order listing supervised release conditions that differ from the standard conditions in the

Guidelines. Id.; see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.3(c), p.s. (2023). “Thus,

there [wa]s no other set of ‘standard’ conditions to which the court could have been

referring other than the Guidelines ‘standard’ conditions.” Cisson,

33 F.4th at 194

.

Because there were no other standard conditions of supervision to which the district court

could have been referring in this case, and McCall’s judgment does not impose any

additional discretionary conditions of supervised release that were not incorporated in the

court’s oral pronouncement, we conclude that the district court sufficiently pronounced the

standard conditions of supervision. See

id.

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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

4

Reference

Status
Unpublished