United States v. Montello Hood
United States v. Montello Hood
Opinion
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4338 Doc: 24 Filed: 01/19/2024 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4338
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MONTELLO MARQUETTE HOOD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. (0:10-cr-00707-JFA-1)
Submitted: January 4, 2024 Decided: January 19, 2024
Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Jeremy A. Thompson, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Jenny D. Smith, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Adair F. Boroughs, United States Attorney, Jonathan Scott Matthews, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4338 Doc: 24 Filed: 01/19/2024 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Montello Marquette Hood appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his
supervised release and sentencing him to time served. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
To revoke supervised release, a district court need only find a violation of
supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). “We
review a district court’s factual findings underlying a revocation of supervised release for
clear error and its ultimate decision to revoke a defendant’s supervised release for abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Cohen,
63 F.4th 250, 254(4th Cir.) (cleaned up), cert. denied,
144 S. Ct. 165(2023). When revoking a defendant’s supervised release, a district court
must “adequately demonstrate for us the evidence on which it relied . . . so that we may
understand its reasons for revoking supervised release.” United States v. Patterson,
957 F.3d 426, 434(4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). A district court need not issue a written
decision so long as “the transcript and record compiled before the trial judge enable the
reviewing court to determine the basis of the trial court’s decision.”
Id. at 433(internal
quotation marks omitted).
Hood first contends that the district court’s factual findings are insufficient to allow
meaningful appellate review. While the court’s ruling may have been imprecise, it is
adequate for our consideration. We believe there are two plausible ways to interpret the
district court’s ruling. First, it could have considered the two assessments at Catawba Area
Mental Health Center (“Catawba”) to be one incident and thus was referring to that and
Hood’s failure to attend an appointment at Three Trees Center for Change (“Three Trees”).
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4338 Doc: 24 Filed: 01/19/2024 Pg: 3 of 5
Second, the court could have discounted the Three Trees incident and thus was referring
solely to the two Catawba assessments. These incidents were close in time, and all were
discussed at the two hearings. And while the district court’s ruling at the end of the second
hearing was brief, the court was engaged throughout the two hearings, listening to Hood,
responding to Hood’s claims, informing Hood when the court had issues with his
assertions, and attempting to accommodate Hood’s legitimate concerns. Thus, we have an
adequate record to review.
Relying on Cohen, Hood next argues that the district court erred in revoking his
supervised release because he did not fail to participate in treatment and that the district
court impermissibly conflated participation with perfect compliance. In Cohen, we held
that a district court erred in finding that the defendant “violated the condition requiring him
to participate in a sex offender treatment program by failing to follow the rules of that
program.”
63 F.4th at 254(internal quotation marks omitted). While we recognized “that
at some point noncompliance with rules may become so frequent or severe as to preclude
further participation,” we emphasized that “the treatment provider itself did not consider
[the] rules violation to be disqualifying.”
Id. at 255.
Here, by contrast, the staff at Catawba found Hood’s conduct to preclude further
participation, twice instructing him to leave his initial assessment. While Hood selects
portions of the record where the district court agreed with some of his concerns, it is clear
by the end of the second hearing that the district court did not find Hood credible. The
district court sought to mollify Hood’s concern about signing Catawba’s terms without
reviewing them, but Hood then shifted into arguing that he did not need treatment. When
3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4338 Doc: 24 Filed: 01/19/2024 Pg: 4 of 5
the district court noted Hood had shifted his position, Hood went into a lengthy discussion
of his understanding of “treatment” versus “counseling.” As the parties began discussing
Hood’s employment, Hood made bizarre claims that he had slept with Queen Elizabeth,
had smoked marijuana with President Obama, and had donated $30,000 to then-candidate
Obama’s campaign. Hood then brought up concerns about transportation and giving his
employer sufficient notice for his appointment at Three Trees, but he refused to commit to
attending sessions when the district court tried to address these concerns.
Hood’s behavior did not improve at the second hearing. When the district court
asked Hood if he admitted or denied the probation officer’s allegations, Hood repeated his
claims about transportation and notice at Three Trees and brought up the fact that he could
not afford treatment. The district court twice asked Hood if he would consent to treatment
if the Government would pay for it, and both times Hood went into a lengthy discussion of
other considerations. After observing Hood’s demeanor and listening to Hood over the
course of two hearings, the district court found Hood not credible and accepted the
probation officer’s account that Hood refused to participate in mental health treatment at
Catawba, prompting them to demand he leave, and failing to attend the session at Three
Trees. This conclusion is further supported by Hood’s conduct at the hearings, as Hood
repeatedly deflected and refused to agree to attend treatment whenever the district court
sought to address his stated concerns.
4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4338 Doc: 24 Filed: 01/19/2024 Pg: 5 of 5
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished