Roxana Martinez-Fuentes v. Merrick Garland
Roxana Martinez-Fuentes v. Merrick Garland
Opinion
USCA4 Appeal: 22-2137 Doc: 30 Filed: 02/08/2024 Pg: 1 of 3
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-2137
ROXANA CAROLINA MARTINEZ-FUENTES,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Submitted: October 27, 2023 Decided: February 8, 2024
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Petition dismissed in part and denied in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Eric H. Singer, LAW OFFICE OF ERIC SINGER, LLC, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Jennifer R. Khouri, Senior Litigation Counsel, Robert P. Coleman, III, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-2137 Doc: 30 Filed: 02/08/2024 Pg: 2 of 3
PER CURIAM:
Roxana Carolina Martinez-Fuentes, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for
review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) denying her motion to
accept her appeal out of time and dismissing the appeal. The Attorney General moves to
dismiss the petition. Because we lack jurisdiction to review the Board’s discretionary
decision not to certify the case for appeal, we grant in part the Attorney General’s motion
to dismiss. See Idrees v. Barr,
923 F.3d 539, 542-43(9th Cir. 2019).
Martinez-Fuentes also contends that the Board erred by not considering whether to
equitably toll the 30-day appeal period. The Attorney General counters that this issue is
not properly before this court because Martinez-Fuentes failed to exhaust this issue before
the Board by requesting that the appeal period be equitably tolled. A final order may be
reviewed only if “the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien
as of right.”
8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). The Supreme Court recently held that this limitation
on review is not jurisdictional. Santos-Zacaria v. Garland,
598 U.S. 411, 414-20(2023).
We have since concluded that the exhaustion requirement of § 1252(d)(1) is a “mandatory
claim-processing rule.” Tepas v. Garland,
73 F.4th 208, 213(4th Cir. 2023) (denying
review of unexhausted claim after Attorney General properly invoked § 1252(d)(1)). A
mandatory claim-processing rule is “unalterable if properly raised by the opposing party.”
Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert,
139 S. Ct. 710, 714(2019) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Because the Attorney General correctly asserts in his motion to dismiss and brief
that the court should not consider Martinez-Fuentes’ equitable tolling claim for failure to
exhaust, we will not review the claim and deny the petition in part.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2137 Doc: 30 Filed: 02/08/2024 Pg: 3 of 3
Accordingly, we grant in part the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss and dismiss
in part the petition for review. We also deny in part the petition for review. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART
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Reference
- Status
- Unpublished