USCA4 Appeal: 23-4407 Doc: 31 Filed: 02/27/2024 Pg: 1 of 3

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4407

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ZURIEL GUZMAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge. (1:22-cr-00375-CCE-2)

Submitted: February 22, 2024 Decided: February 27, 2024

Before NIEMEYER and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Brian Michael Aus, BRIAN AUS, ATTORNEY AT LAW, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Kyle David Pousson, Assistant United States Attorney, Margaret McCall Reece, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4407 Doc: 31 Filed: 02/27/2024 Pg: 2 of 3

PER CURIAM:

Zuriel Guzman pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to conspiracy to

distribute methamphetamine, in violation of

(b)(1)(A), 846, and

distribution of methamphetamine, in violation of

(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). The

district court sentenced Guzman to 144 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,

(1967), stating that there are no

meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Guzman’s sentence is reasonable.

Although informed of his right to do so, Guzman has not filed a pro se supplemental brief,

and the Government has elected not to file a brief. We affirm.

We review “all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the

[Sentencing] Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United

States v. Torres-Reyes,

, 151 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In conducting this review, we must first ensure that the sentence is procedurally

reasonable, “consider[ing] whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s

advisory [G]uidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate

sentence, considered the

(a) factors, and sufficiently explained the

selected sentence.”

(internal quotation marks omitted). If the sentence is free of

“significant procedural error,” we then review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing]

into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the

Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States,

(2007). A sentence must be

“sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the statutory purposes of sentencing.

(a). “Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated

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Guidelines range is presumptively [substantively] reasonable.” United States v. Louthian,

(4th Cir. 2014).

Here, the district court correctly calculated Guzman’s advisory Guidelines range,

heard argument from counsel, provided Guzman an opportunity to allocute, considered the

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors, and explained its reasons for imposing the chosen sentence.

Because Guzman has not demonstrated that his term of imprisonment “is unreasonable

when measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors,” he has failed to rebut the presumption

of reasonableness accorded his below-Guidelines sentence. Id. We therefore conclude that

Guzman’s sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Guzman, in writing, of the right to petition the

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Guzman requests that a petition

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state

that a copy thereof was served on Guzman. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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