USCA4 Appeal: 23-1958 Doc: 35 Filed: 06/18/2024 Pg: 1 of 17

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-1958

ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE; ERIE INSURANCE COMPANY; ERIE INSURANCE PROPERTY & CASUALTY COMPANY; ERIE FAMILY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; ERIE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK; FLAGSHIP CITY INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiffs – Appellants,

v.

THE MARYLAND INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION; KATHLEEN A. BIRRANE,

Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Julie R. Rubin, District Judge. (1:23-cv-01553-JRR)

Argued: May 7, 2024 Decided: June 18, 2024

Before GREGORY, HEYTENS, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Heytens wrote the opinion, which Judge Gregory and Judge Benjamin joined.

ARGUED: Alex Jonathan Brown, SHAPIRO SHER GUINOT & SANDLER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. John Van Lear Dorsey, MARYLAND INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Michael S. Bullock, SHAPIRO SHER GUINOT & SANDLER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Anthony G. Brown, Attorney General, Betty S. Diener, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. USCA4 Appeal: 23-1958 Doc: 35 Filed: 06/18/2024 Pg: 2 of 17

TOBY HEYTENS, Circuit Judge:

An insurance company is facing an enforcement action by a state regulatory agency.

Asserting the agency has violated state and federal law and thus tainted the upcoming

administrative proceeding, the company asked a federal district court to step in. But “the

normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings” like these

is “not to issue such injunctions.” Younger v. Harris,

(1971). Like the

district court, we see no reason to depart from that norm here. We thus affirm the district

court’s dismissal of the insurance company’s complaint.

I.

In 2021, the Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA) opened “two separate

administrative investigations” into Erie Insurance Company after receiving complaints that

Erie was “engaged in racial and geographic discrimination.” JA 9–10. The first

investigation broadly examined Erie’s “market conduct.” JA 10. The second investigation

focused on the “specific . . . allegations” in the individual complaints.

The two

investigations were handled by different divisions within the MIA.

Between 2021 and 2023, the MIA repeatedly advised Erie that the individual

complaints investigation “was subject to a de facto ‘stay,’ or on hold, pending completion

of the” market conduct investigation. JA 10. Still, Erie provided written responses to three

sets of questions about the individual complaints investigation while the market conduct

investigation “was in full swing.” JA 11. Erie also understood that there would be “further

discussions and interviews” with the MIA about the individual complaints investigation

once the market conduct investigation was finished.

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In 2022 and 2023, the MIA received letters from the NAACP asking about the

progress of each investigation, and it sent back letters in response. In both responses, the

MIA confirmed that the investigations were “ongoing.” JA 92, 95. The MIA’s second letter

also advised that, under Maryland law, all information about its market conduct

investigation—including “the materials provided to the MIA during the course of the

investigation”—would remain “confidential” while the investigation was pending. JA 95.

A few months later, the division responsible for the individual complaints

investigation issued “four public Determination Letters” that Erie had violated the state’s

insurance laws. JA 12. Those letters referenced documents obtained by the MIA as part of

the market conduct investigation, for which the MIA had not issued a report or

determination letter.

Erie exercised its statutory right to a hearing on all four determination letters, and

the MIA granted each request. In its initial letters granting the hearing requests, the MIA

said that the materials “that were considered as part of the complaint investigation process

w[ould] be submitted to the hearing officer to become part of the evidentiary file” but that

Erie could “object to having a document accepted as evidence” by filing an objection with

the hearing officer “before the hearing.” JA 199–206. In a follow-up letter sent after Erie

filed this lawsuit, the MIA said it would not send the documents to the hearing officer

before the hearing and would instead submit evidence during the hearing itself.

Shortly after the MIA granted its requests for administrative hearings, Erie sued the

MIA and its commissioner in federal district court, asserting due process claims under

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and violations of Maryland state law. 1 The complaint asked the district

court to declare that the determination letters were “unlawful,” to enjoin the defendants

“from disseminating the Determination Letters to any person or entity,” and to require the

defendants to “publicly withdraw” them. JA 42, 45. That same day, Erie requested a

temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction “enjoin[ing]” the MIA from

“us[ing] . . . the unlawful Determination Letters and the confidential Market Conduct

Materials” in “any Administrative Hearing” related to the determination letters. JA 52–53.

The district court convened a teleconference, during which it set a hearing on Erie’s

motion and directed the parties to submit pre-hearing briefs “on Younger and Burford

abstention,” as well as “any other briefing re the motion.” JA 3. After reviewing the

submitted materials, the court determined no hearing was necessary because “the issues

raised can be resolved on the parties’ submissions alone.” JA 228. The court said it was

“going to abstain from exercising jurisdiction under both the Burford and Younger

abstention doctrines,” “deny the PI Motion on grounds of abstention,” and “dismiss the

complaint without prejudice.” JA 246; see JA 255 (order dismissing complaint without

prejudice).

II.

Erie first asserts that the district court committed reversible error by denying its

motion for a preliminary injunction without holding a hearing on that motion. That

1 The complaint lists six plaintiffs, all of which are insurance companies associated with Erie. The presence of multiple plaintiffs makes no difference to this appeal.

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argument fails because it misapprehends the case’s procedural posture.

“The traditional office of a preliminary injunction is to protect the status quo and to

prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of a lawsuit” so as “to preserve the court’s

ability to render a meaningful judgment on the merits.” United States v. South Carolina,

(4th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks removed); see Di Biase v. SPX Corp.,

(4th Cir. 2017) (describing the purpose of a preliminary injunction as

“protect[ing] the status quo and prevent[ing] irreparable harm during the pendency of a

lawsuit”). But a preliminary injunction plays no role in preserving the status quo once a

lawsuit has reached final judgment, and this lawsuit ended the moment the district court

dismissed Erie’s complaint. Accord Mount Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan,

, 1450 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissing appeal from denial of preliminary injunction as

moot where the district court later entered summary judgment against the party whose

motion was denied). Erie also has not asked this Court to grant an injunction pending its

appeal of the district court’s dismissal order. See Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(2). This case thus

comes to us as an appeal of the district court’s final decision dismissing Erie’s complaint,

not as an appeal of an interlocutory order denying interim injunctive relief.

True, it does not appear that the defendants ever formally moved to dismiss Erie’s

complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. But Erie does not ask us to reverse

the district court’s judgment on that ground. And at any rate, “[e]ven if a party does not

make a formal motion,” a district court may dismiss a complaint on its own motion so long

as “the procedure employed is fair to the parties.” Robertson v. Anderson Mill Elementary

Sch.,

(4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Wright & Miller, 5B Fed. Prac. & Proc.

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Juris. § 1357). That is exactly what happened here. Before it ruled, the district court

directed the parties to “submit briefing on Younger and Burford abstention” (JA 3), which

gave Erie “notice of the court’s intention” to potentially dismiss the case and the

“opportunity to amend the complaint or otherwise respond.” Robertson,

.

Erie then submitted a “bench memorandum on abstention,” attaching four exhibits not

previously included in the complaint. JA 176. No further procedure was required.

Finally, as much as Erie’s briefs can be read as suggesting that a district court must

always conduct an evidentiary hearing or make findings of fact before dismissing a

complaint based on abstention, that argument fails. Both the Supreme Court and this one

have affirmed district court decisions that abstained under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). See, e.g., Kugler v. Helfant,

, 125 n.5 (1975); Nivens v. Gilchrist

(Nivens II ),

, 247 n.7 (4th Cir. 2006). And—of course—a district court

applying Rule 12(b)(6) need not hold an evidentiary hearing and cannot make factual

findings. See, e.g., National Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. ---,

,

at *10 (2024).

III.

We turn to the merits of the district court’s abstention ruling. Because the district

court dismissed Erie’s complaint, we must assume the truth of Erie’s well-pleaded “factual

allegations.” Kugler,

n.5. We review the district court’s ultimate decision

to abstain “for abuse of discretion,” while remembering that “whether a case satisfies the

basic requirements of abstention constitutes a legal question subject to de novo review.”

VonRosenberg v. Lawrence,

(4th Cir. 2015) (brackets and quotation

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marks removed). Applying those standards, we conclude the district court committed no

reversible error in abstaining under Younger v. Harris,

(1971). We thus do not

reach the district court’s alternative holding that abstention was also warranted under

Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,

(1943).

A.

Like all abstention doctrines, Younger abstention “is an exception to the general rule

that federal courts must decide cases over which they have jurisdiction.” Air Evac EMS,

Inc. v. McVey,

, 96 (4th Cir. 2022). That flavor of abstention is based on two

deep-rooted concepts. The first comes from traditional equity practice—the idea that

“courts of equity should not act” to restrain another proceeding “when the moving party

has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable

relief.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44. The second and “even more vital consideration” is

“the notion of ‘comity,’ ” including the “belief that the National Government will fare best

if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their

separate ways.”

.

Although the Younger doctrine can be intricate, many of its components are not in

dispute here. To begin, Erie does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that the type

of state proceedings it asked the district court to enjoin are “quasi-criminal” and thus “fall

within” a “categor[y ]” that can “trigger Younger abstention.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v.

Jacobs,

(2013). Erie also does not contest the district court’s determination

that two of the three “additional factors” needed for Younger abstention to apply to

proceedings like these are present.

.

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Erie does, however, take aim at two of the district court’s conclusions. First, Erie

argues that one final “basic requirement[]” for Younger abstention is not present here.

VonRosenberg,

. Second, Erie insists that—even if the district court “had

[the] authority to abstain”—it exceeded its discretion in exercising that authority because

this case falls within a category of situations in which “Younger left room for federal

equitable intervention.” Jonathan R. by Dixon v. Justice,

, 327 n.3 (4th Cir.

2022) (emphasis removed) (first quote); Kugler,

(second quote). We are

unpersuaded by both arguments.

B.

Younger only permits abstention in deference to proceedings that will “provide[ ] an

adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges.” Air Evac, 37 F.4th at 93. As the

party asking a federal court to intervene, Erie bears “the burden” of showing that it lacks

such an opportunity here because “state procedural law bar[s] presentation of its claims.”

Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,

(1987) (alterations removed). Because this

question implicates “whether the district court had authority to abstain,” we review this

issue de novo. Johnathan R. by Dixon,

n.3 (emphasis removed). Like the

district court, we conclude Erie failed to carry its burden.

Erie’s argument stumbles right out of the gate. Maryland’s highest court has held

“that the MIA is . . . fully competent to address issues regarding the constitutionality of

statutes or ordinances, whether as applied or on its face.” United Ins. Co. of Am. v.

Maryland Ins. Admin.,

, 1240 n.10 (Md. 2016). Under Maryland law, then,

Erie is free to raise its federal law claims in the administrative hearings that it has already

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been granted. If Erie is dissatisfied with the treatment it receives before the MIA, it may

then seek review—including of constitutional issues—in the Maryland state courts.

See

.

Erie responds that its opportunity to raise constitutional claims during the hearing

itself will come too late. We find its arguments unpersuasive.

To begin, Erie insists that the MIA has already violated its statutory and

constitutional rights by first considering and later including confidential information in its

publicly issued determination letters. The purpose of an injunction, however, is to prevent

future harms rather than redress those that have already occurred. See generally City of Los

Angeles v. Lyons,

, 105–11 (1983). True, Erie seeks an order directing the MIA

to withdraw its already issued letters. But there is nothing preventing Erie from seeking

such relief from the hearing officer and the Maryland courts.

Erie also asserts that “even transferring the” underlying administrative materials “to

the hearing officer will, in and of itself, create new, irreparable injury” by exposing its

private information “to the general public” in violation of some combination of Maryland

statutory law, longstanding Maryland administrative practice, and its federal constitutional

rights. Erie Br. 29. This is so, Erie says, because Maryland law requires the hearing officer

“to make the MIA’s entire file part of the hearing record,” which will then expose the

information to broad scrutiny via “civil litigation, subpoenas to the hearing officer and

Public Information Act requests.”

That argument fails too. Even if Erie correctly describes how proceedings before

the hearing officer typically work, Maryland law provides mechanisms that permit it to

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raise its constitutional objections to any further public disclosure of the allegedly

confidential information. Most relevant here, the hearing officer may use the Maryland

Rules of Civil Procedure “as a guide for resolving issues regarding the conduct of the

hearing.”

.02.01.07(H). Under those rules, the hearing officer can

prevent public disclosure by issuing protective orders and orders to seal. See Md. Rule 2-

403 (protective orders); Md. Rule 20-201.1(d) (orders to seal). And if the original

complainants intervene in the administrative hearing—a particular concern of Erie’s—the

hearing officer can order the complainants not to “disclose[ ]” Erie’s “trade secret[s]” or

“commercial information,” or order that “discovery be conducted with no one present

except persons designated by the” hearing officer. Md. Rule 2-403(a)(6), (8). Finally, as

already noted, Erie has a right to seek review of the MIA’s decisions in state court. See

.

Erie counters that Maryland law only gives the hearing officer “the option of using”

those various privacy-protecting tools and says it needs federal court intervention to ensure

“certainty against public disclosure.” Erie Reply Br. 13–14. That argument gets the

principles of “Our Federalism” reflected in Younger backwards.

. Younger

is grounded on the “assump[tion]” that “absen[t] . . . unambiguous authority to the

contrary,” “state procedures will afford an adequate remedy.” Pennzoil Co.,

(emphasis added). This is particularly so when, as here, “a litigant has not attempted to

present” its “federal claims” to a state-provided adjudicator before seeking federal court

intervention.

Still, Erie worries that the hearing officer might improperly decline to protect the

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privacy of its information and thus put Erie in the “impossible position” of having to “stand

on [its] confidentiality” argument and “not defend” itself at the hearing and then “take [the

issue] up on appeal after [it] lose[s].” Oral Arg. 7:55–8:44. But litigants face that sort of

hard choice all the time, and the fact that Erie fears the MIA “will likely decide a

constitutional issue in a way contrary to what [Erie] believe[s] the Constitution mandates

is not a sufficient basis to avoid application of Younger abstention.” Nivens v. Gilchrist

(Nivens I ),

(4th Cir. 2003). What matters is that Erie will have the

chance to make its arguments to the hearing officer and later (if necessary) to the

“presumptively competent” Maryland state courts. Tafflin v. Levitt,

(1990). That is all Younger demands. 2

C.

Even when “the basic requirements” for Younger abstention are present, there are a

few carefully limited circumstances where a district court “may disregard Younger’s”

otherwise-ironclad “mandate.” VonRosenberg,

(quotation marks removed)

(first quote); Nivens II,

(second quote). As with other “decision[s] rest[ing]

on evaluation of equitable considerations or other traditionally discretionary factors,” Lord

& Taylor, LLC v. White Flint, L.P.,

(4th Cir. 2015), we review a district

court’s bottom-line judgment about whether any of these “exceptions” apply for abuse of

2 Erie’s assertion that it needs federal court intervention to prevent further violations of Maryland law fails for another reason as well. Abstention doctrines aside, federal courts have no authority to “instruct[ ] state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,

(1984).

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discretion, Air Evac, 37 F.4th at 93. At the same time, we remain mindful that any decision

reflecting “an error of law” is “by definition an abuse of discretion.” Hunter v. Earthgrains

Co. Bakery,

(4th Cir. 2002). Applying those standards here, we continue

to see no cause to disturb the district court’s decision.

Erie faults the district court for not addressing each of what it says are “five separate,

dispositive exceptions” to Younger abstention. Erie Br. 42. But it is the district court, not

Erie, that has the law right. Under this Court’s precedent, there are “three exceptions to the

court’s duty to abstain,” Air Evac, 37 F.4th at 96 (emphasis added); accord Kugler,

(listing same three exceptions), and the district court acknowledged each

of them in rejecting Erie’s arguments.

On appeal, Erie primarily invokes the third Younger exception, which covers

“extraordinary circumstances or unusual situations.” Air Evac, 37 F.4th at 96 (quotation

marks removed). In essence, Erie argues that—rather than follow its normal procedure and

allow the investigation to unfold—the MIA, under the direction of a new Governor “who

has made addressing racial discrimination a priority,” “bowed to political pressure” from

the NAACP. Erie Br. 19, 34. As support, Erie points to the sequence of events between the

filing of the complaints against it in 2021 and the publication of the determination letters

in 2023. Erie asserts the MIA’s actions violated the Maryland Insurance Code and deprived

it of an adequate opportunity to participate in the investigation. This, Erie says, reveals the

MIA’s bias against it, and creates an “actual impediment to” MIA’s “ability to address the

federal issues” in the administrative proceedings. Air Evac, 37 F.4th at 100. Like the district

court, we reject that argument.

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Erie relies most heavily on this Court’s decision in Air Evac, which affirmed a

district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction despite an argument that it needed to

abstain under Younger. See Air Evac, 37 F.4th at 93. To be sure, there are some high-level

similarities between that case and this one: in both, a regulated entity sought an injunction

to prevent state-law enforcement proceedings that it claimed were motivated by political

pressure. See id. at 100–01. But Air Evac repeatedly cited the “deferential standard of

review” in affirming the district court’s conclusion that extraordinary circumstances were

present in that case (id. at 93, 101), and here the district court reached the opposite

conclusion. Air Evac also emphasized “that the path to extraordinary circumstances is

exceedingly narrow,” that “there is nothing inherently wrong with a regulatory agency

communicating with one of its citizens,” and that its decision “should not be construed as

a license to broadly interpret the extraordinary circumstances exception.” Id. at 100–02.

Erie also cites Gibson v. Berryhill,

(1973), but that decision does not

help it either. In Gibson, the Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s decision not to

abstain under Younger where a board “composed solely of optometrists in private practice”

aimed “to revoke the licenses of all optometrists in the State who were employed by

business corporations.”

. Citing two previous decisions, the Court reiterated

“that those with [a] substantial pecuniary interest in” a legal proceeding “should not

adjudicate” it.

.

Despite admitting that this case—unlike Gibson—presents no allegations “of bias

due to” a regulator’s “pecuniary interests,” Erie insists that abstention is unwarranted

because “[t]he regulators here are alleged to be biased” for non-pecuniary reasons. Erie

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Br. 39. Erie asserts that because “the hearing officer is appointed by the Commissioner” of

the MIA “and serves at the Commissioner’s pleasure, there is a ‘possibility’ that the hearing

officer will be biased by his or her interest in preserving his or her job by not finding the

Commissioner has acted in a biased or improper manner.” Id. at 43. In so arguing, however,

Erie ignores Kugler v. Helfant,

(1975), a Supreme Court decision issued less

than two years after Gibson that rejected a claim of non-pecuniary bias much like the one

Erie presses here.

In Kugler, a state court judge asserted he could not get a fair trial in New Jersey

state court because the State’s “Chief Justice and other members of the [state] Supreme

Court” played a direct role in coercing his grand jury testimony.

. Because

the district court had dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court assumed the

complaint’s “factual allegations” were all true.

at 125 n.5. The Court acknowledged that

“the State Supreme Court, and particularly its Chief Justice”—who were accused of

“unlawfully inject[ing] [themselves] into the prosecution of the charges against” the

plaintiff—were “vested with considerable administrative authority over the trial court that

w[ould] initially determine” the plaintiff ’s “federal constitutional claims.”

. The

Court also allowed for the possibility “that there might be a judge in the State who, in an

effort to curry favor or to avoid administrative transfer to a less desirable assignment,

would decide the case with an eye to the supposed attitudes of his superiors in the judicial

hierarchy.”

Yet the Supreme Court still concluded that the district court was right to

abstain because “the New Jersey judicial system provide[d] procedural safeguards to

guarantee that” the plaintiff would “not be denied due process of law in the state trial or

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appellate process.”

. So too here, where the administrative procedures discussed

above preserve Erie’s ability to get a fair shake. See Part III(B), supra; see also Md. Code.

Ann., State Gov’t § 10-219(a)(1)(i) (forbidding the hearing officer from “communicat[ing]

ex parte directly or indirectly regarding the merits of any issue in the case” with “any party

to the case or the party’s representative or attorney”). 3

Turning its attention from claims of bias back to the hearing procedures, Erie insists

there is no way to avoid due process problems because “the hearing officer will be

irreparably tainted by [the officer’s] review of the confidential and privileged” materials

that Erie thinks are inadmissible and must be protected. Erie Br. 42. But the only authorities

Erie cites to support that striking assertion are non-controlling and far afield, and a

moment’s reflection reveals why Erie’s argument must be wrong. Trial judges and other

adjudicators constantly resolve questions about whether materials are privileged or

otherwise inadmissible, and they must often see the underlying information in making such

determinations. Yet no one thinks that this fact, standing alone, is enough to require their

disqualification under the Due Process Clause. Indeed, even a trial judge who “was

reversed in earlier rulings” is not “disqualified from sitting in a retrial.” Withrow v. Larkin,

(1975) (quotation marks removed).

3 To the extent that Erie’s assertions of “improper purpose” (Erie Br. 46) are also a vague attempt to invoke Younger’s first exception—which covers “bad faith or harassment,” Air Evac, 37 F.4th at 96—Erie has not done enough to preserve that issue for our review. See Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC,

(4th Cir. 2017). At any rate, “[t]here is no case since Younger was decided in which the [Supreme] Court has found” the first Younger exception “was applicable.” Wright & Miller, 17B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 4255 (3d ed. 2023).

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Finally, Erie fares no better in its brief invocation of Younger’s second exception.

Erie does not assert that the Maryland laws it is accused of violating are “flagrantly and

patently violative of express constitutional provisions,” which is how that exception

normally works. Air Evac, 37 F.4th at 96; accord Nivens II,

(same). Instead,

Erie asserts that the charging documents that give rise to the administrative proceedings—

that is, the four “Determination Letters”—“are on their face plainly invalid due to their

overt reliance on Erie’s confidential Market Conduct Materials.” Erie Br. 46–47 (emphasis

and quotation marks removed).

That argument also fails to convince. For one thing, the only decision that Erie cites

in support of this argument addressed a different issue—whether state enforcement

proceedings that are alleged to be preempted by federal law may be enjoined despite

Younger—and it left that question undecided. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council

of City of New Orleans (NOPSI ),

(1989). And even if the MIA violated

the law in issuing the determination letters, the Supreme Court has made clear that previous

“error[s]” of “state or federal law” do not, on their own, justify diverging from ordinary

abstention principles. Hicks v. Miranda,

(1975). Were it otherwise, “the

rule of Younger v. Harris” could easily “be swallowed up by its exception.”

What

matters is that, even if Erie is right about what happened in the past, “we cannot

conclusively say” “without further factual inquiry” that future proceedings will not afford

it constitutionally adequate process. NOPSI,

. “[A]nd what requires further

factual inquiry can hardly be deemed ‘flagrantly’ unlawful for purposes of a threshold

abstention determination.”

For this reason too, the district court committed no reversible

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error in deciding to abstain under Younger.

* * *

The district court’s judgment is

AFFIRMED.

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