United States v. Roberto Darden
United States v. Roberto Darden
Opinion
USCA4 Appeal: 24-6725 Doc: 6 Filed: 01/13/2025 Pg: 1 of 3
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-6725
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERTO ANTOINE DARDEN, a/k/a Dizz-e, a/k/a Javon,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Arenda L. Wright Allen, District Judge. (4:11-cr-00052-AWA-LRL-1)
Submitted: December 19, 2024 Decided: January 13, 2025
Before WYNN and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Roberto Antoine Darden, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-6725 Doc: 6 Filed: 01/13/2025 Pg: 2 of 3
PER CURIAM:
Roberto Antoine Darden appeals the district court’s order dismissing without
prejudice his third Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion as an unauthorized, successive
28 U.S.C. § 2255motion and denying or dismissing his five petitions for a writ of mandamus. 1 We
affirm.
A certificate of appealability is not required to appeal the district court’s
jurisdictional categorization of a Rule 60(b) motion as an unauthorized, successive § 2255
motion. United States v. McRae,
793 F.3d 392, 400(4th Cir. 2015). We review the district
court’s ruling de novo.
Id. at 397. Our review of the record confirms that the district court
properly construed Darden’s third Rule 60(b) motion as a successive § 2255 motion over
which it lacked jurisdiction because he failed to obtain prefiling authorization from this
court. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h); McRae,
793 F.3d at 397-400; see also
Bixby v. Stirling,
90 F.4th 140, 148(4th Cir. 2024) (explaining that Rule 60(b) motion
should be treated as successive habeas petition where it “seeks to revisit the federal court’s
denial on the merits of a claim for relief” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Consistent with our decision in United States v. Winestock,
340 F.3d 200, 208(4th
Cir. 2003), we construe Darden’s notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to
file a second or successive § 2255 motion. Upon review, we conclude that Darden’s claims
Contrary to Darden’s assertion, the district court’s order is a final order over which 1
we have jurisdiction. See Martin v. Duffy,
858 F.3d 239, 246-47(4th Cir. 2017).
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6725 Doc: 6 Filed: 01/13/2025 Pg: 3 of 3
do not meet the relevant standard. See
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). We therefore deny
authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion.
Turning to Darden’s mandamus petitions, we review de novo the district court’s
determination that Darden did not satisfy the requirements for mandamus relief. See
Marquez-Ramos v. Reno,
69 F.3d 477, 479(10th Cir. 1995). We have reviewed the record
and find no reversible error in the district court’s determination that Darden’s first, second,
and fourth mandamus petitions sought relief unavailable by way of mandamus. 2 See
United States ex rel. Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., P.C.,
198 F.3d 502, 511(4th Cir. 1999)
(discussing requirements for mandamus); see also United States v. Ferguson,
55 F.4th 262,
270 (4th Cir. 2022) (discussing § 2255’s role as “the exclusive method of collaterally
attacking a federal conviction or sentence”).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
2 We limit our review to the three mandamus petitions Darden addresses in his informal brief. See Jackson v. Lightsey,
775 F.3d 170, 177(4th Cir. 2014) (limiting appellate review to issues raised in informal brief).
3
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished