Frank Johnson v. Builders Firstsource Southeast Group, LLC

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Frank Johnson v. Builders Firstsource Southeast Group, LLC

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1530 Doc: 18 Filed: 01/14/2025 Pg: 1 of 5

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-1530

FRANK L. JOHNSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

BUILDERS FIRSTSOURCE SOUTHEAST GROUP, LLC,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Sherri A. Lydon, District Judge. (3:21-cv-02612-SAL)

Submitted: November 20, 2024 Decided: January 14, 2025

Before WYNN and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Ryan K. Hicks, CROMER BABB PORTER & HICKS, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. D. Christopher Lauderdale, Laura A. Ahrens, JACKSON LEWIS P.C., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Frank L. Johnson appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to alter

or amend the court’s prior order and judgment adopting the recommendation of the

magistrate judge with a modification and granting summary judgment to Defendant

Builders FirstSource Southeast Group, LLC (BFS) in his civil action. Johnson argues that

the district court erred in retaining jurisdiction over his claim under South Carolina state

law for defamation after granting summary judgment to BFS on his claim for

discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, erred in relying on the

declaration of BFS employee Sharlene Herbert, and erred in granting summary judgment

to BFS on his defamation claim. We affirm.

A district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction “over all other claims that

are so related to claims in the action within [the court’s] original jurisdiction that they form

part of the same case or controversy.”

28 U.S.C. § 1367

(a). The court “has wide latitude

in determining whether or not to retain jurisdiction over state claims when all federal claims

have been extinguished.” Henderson v. Harmon,

102 F.4th 242, 251

(4th Cir. 2024)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “The doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction thus is a

doctrine of flexibility, designed to allow courts to deal with cases involving pendent claims

in the manner that most sensibly accommodates a range of concerns and values.”

Shanaghan v. Cahill,

58 F.3d 106, 110

(4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In deciding whether to retain jurisdiction, a district court is to “consider the convenience

and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity,

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and considerations of judicial economy.” Henderson,

102 F.4th at 251

(internal quotation

marks omitted).

Here, the district court acknowledged the factors it was required to consider in

deciding whether to retain jurisdiction over the defamation claim, determined that the claim

did not implicate concerns of comity or issues of federal policy, and determined that

convenience and fairness to the parties and considerations of judicial economy warranted

that it exercise its discretion and retain jurisdiction over the claim. We discern no abuse of

discretion by the district court and reject as without merit Johnson’s appellate arguments

challenging these determinations.

Johnson also contends that the district court erred in relying on Herbert’s declaration

because it was undated and thus did not satisfy the requirements of

28 U.S.C. § 1746

. We

reject this contention because the predicate undergirding it is not established. It is true that

Herbert’s initial declaration appended to BFS’ motion for summary judgment was not

dated. But, before granting summary judgment to BFS on Herbert’s defamation claim, the

district court granted its motion for leave to file an addendum to Herbert’s declaration in

which Herbert stated—under penalty of perjury in a signed and dated declaration—the date

on which she had signed her initial declaration and that this statement was true and correct

to the best of her knowledge. Thus, the modified declaration the district court in fact

considered in adjudicating BFS’ summary judgment motion was, contrary to Johnson’s

argument, dated. In his opening brief, Johnson proffers no argument challenging the

propriety of the district court’s ruling granting BFS’ motion for leave to file an addendum,

and, although he argues for the first time in his reply brief that it was error for the court to

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have allowed the addendum, we deem this argument waived. United States v. Caldwell,

7 F.4th 191

, 212 n.16 (4th Cir. 2021).

Finally, Johnson challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to BFS

on his defamation claim. We discern no reversible error by the district court. See Smith v.

CSRA,

12 F.4th 396, 402

(4th Cir. 2021) (noting parameters of review).

In South Carolina, “[a] person makes a defamatory statement if the statement tends

to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or

deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.” Fountain v. First Reliance Bank,

730 S.E.2d 305, 309

(S.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The tort of defamation

thus permits “a plaintiff to recover for injury to his or her reputation as the result of the

defendant’s communications to others of a false message about the plaintiff.” Erickson v.

Jones St. Publishers, LLC,

629 S.E.2d 653, 664

(S.C. 2006). “Defamatory communications

take two forms: libel and slander. Slander is a spoken defamation while libel is a written

defamation or one accomplished by actions or conduct.”

Id.

To prevail on a defamation

claim, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) a false and defamatory statement was made; (2) the

unprivileged publication was made to a third party; (3) the publisher was at fault; and (4)

either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special

harm caused by the publication.” Fountain,

730 S.E.2d at 309

(internal quotation marks

omitted). Johnson based his defamation claim on the facts that he received a written

disciplinary warning and had his employment with BFS terminated for actions he claims

he did not take. The district court determined that no false statements were published and

rejected Johnson’s effort suggesting he was defamed by insinuation. Johnson’s appellate

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arguments challenging these determinations are without merit, and we therefore reject

them.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders and judgment. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

5

Reference

Status
Unpublished