Frank Johnson v. Builders Firstsource Southeast Group, LLC
Frank Johnson v. Builders Firstsource Southeast Group, LLC
Opinion
USCA4 Appeal: 23-1530 Doc: 18 Filed: 01/14/2025 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-1530
FRANK L. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
BUILDERS FIRSTSOURCE SOUTHEAST GROUP, LLC,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Sherri A. Lydon, District Judge. (3:21-cv-02612-SAL)
Submitted: November 20, 2024 Decided: January 14, 2025
Before WYNN and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Ryan K. Hicks, CROMER BABB PORTER & HICKS, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. D. Christopher Lauderdale, Laura A. Ahrens, JACKSON LEWIS P.C., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
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PER CURIAM:
Frank L. Johnson appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to alter
or amend the court’s prior order and judgment adopting the recommendation of the
magistrate judge with a modification and granting summary judgment to Defendant
Builders FirstSource Southeast Group, LLC (BFS) in his civil action. Johnson argues that
the district court erred in retaining jurisdiction over his claim under South Carolina state
law for defamation after granting summary judgment to BFS on his claim for
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, erred in relying on the
declaration of BFS employee Sharlene Herbert, and erred in granting summary judgment
to BFS on his defamation claim. We affirm.
A district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction “over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within [the court’s] original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy.”
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The court “has wide latitude
in determining whether or not to retain jurisdiction over state claims when all federal claims
have been extinguished.” Henderson v. Harmon,
102 F.4th 242, 251(4th Cir. 2024)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “The doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction thus is a
doctrine of flexibility, designed to allow courts to deal with cases involving pendent claims
in the manner that most sensibly accommodates a range of concerns and values.”
Shanaghan v. Cahill,
58 F.3d 106, 110(4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In deciding whether to retain jurisdiction, a district court is to “consider the convenience
and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity,
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and considerations of judicial economy.” Henderson,
102 F.4th at 251(internal quotation
marks omitted).
Here, the district court acknowledged the factors it was required to consider in
deciding whether to retain jurisdiction over the defamation claim, determined that the claim
did not implicate concerns of comity or issues of federal policy, and determined that
convenience and fairness to the parties and considerations of judicial economy warranted
that it exercise its discretion and retain jurisdiction over the claim. We discern no abuse of
discretion by the district court and reject as without merit Johnson’s appellate arguments
challenging these determinations.
Johnson also contends that the district court erred in relying on Herbert’s declaration
because it was undated and thus did not satisfy the requirements of
28 U.S.C. § 1746. We
reject this contention because the predicate undergirding it is not established. It is true that
Herbert’s initial declaration appended to BFS’ motion for summary judgment was not
dated. But, before granting summary judgment to BFS on Herbert’s defamation claim, the
district court granted its motion for leave to file an addendum to Herbert’s declaration in
which Herbert stated—under penalty of perjury in a signed and dated declaration—the date
on which she had signed her initial declaration and that this statement was true and correct
to the best of her knowledge. Thus, the modified declaration the district court in fact
considered in adjudicating BFS’ summary judgment motion was, contrary to Johnson’s
argument, dated. In his opening brief, Johnson proffers no argument challenging the
propriety of the district court’s ruling granting BFS’ motion for leave to file an addendum,
and, although he argues for the first time in his reply brief that it was error for the court to
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have allowed the addendum, we deem this argument waived. United States v. Caldwell,
7 F.4th 191, 212 n.16 (4th Cir. 2021).
Finally, Johnson challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to BFS
on his defamation claim. We discern no reversible error by the district court. See Smith v.
CSRA,
12 F.4th 396, 402(4th Cir. 2021) (noting parameters of review).
In South Carolina, “[a] person makes a defamatory statement if the statement tends
to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.” Fountain v. First Reliance Bank,
730 S.E.2d 305, 309(S.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The tort of defamation
thus permits “a plaintiff to recover for injury to his or her reputation as the result of the
defendant’s communications to others of a false message about the plaintiff.” Erickson v.
Jones St. Publishers, LLC,
629 S.E.2d 653, 664(S.C. 2006). “Defamatory communications
take two forms: libel and slander. Slander is a spoken defamation while libel is a written
defamation or one accomplished by actions or conduct.”
Id.To prevail on a defamation
claim, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) a false and defamatory statement was made; (2) the
unprivileged publication was made to a third party; (3) the publisher was at fault; and (4)
either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special
harm caused by the publication.” Fountain,
730 S.E.2d at 309(internal quotation marks
omitted). Johnson based his defamation claim on the facts that he received a written
disciplinary warning and had his employment with BFS terminated for actions he claims
he did not take. The district court determined that no false statements were published and
rejected Johnson’s effort suggesting he was defamed by insinuation. Johnson’s appellate
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arguments challenging these determinations are without merit, and we therefore reject
them.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders and judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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Reference
- Status
- Unpublished