USCA4 Appeal: 24-1540 Doc: 21 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-1540

SONYA HEATH,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

GOHEALTH, LLC,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (3:23-cv-00791-MOC-DCK)

Submitted: January 23, 2025 Decided: January 27, 2025

Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Cory A. Williams, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Charles E. Johnson, ROBINSON, BRADSHAW & HINSON, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina; William J. Tarnow, Kathleen E. Okon, NEAL GERBER & EISENBERG, LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1540 Doc: 21 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 2 of 4

PER CURIAM:

Sonya Heath appeals the district court’s order dismissing her complaint alleging that

her employer, GoHealth, LLC (“GoHealth”), subjected her to a hostile work environment,

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e

to 2000e-17. * The district court concluded that Heath’s claim was time-barred. On appeal,

Heath does not contest that her claim was untimely but argues that the district court

improperly concluded that she was not entitled to equitable tolling. We affirm.

Heath received her right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission on January 10, 2023, so she had until April 10 to file her complaint. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (providing 90-day deadline). Heath met that deadline, filing her

complaint on April 3. But she voluntarily dismissed that complaint on May 22 and refiled

on November 20, months after the expiration of the deadline.

In response to GoHealth’s motion to dismiss the second complaint as untimely,

Heath argued that she was entitled to equitable tolling because GoHealth had broken its

promise to engage in mediation if she voluntarily dismissed her complaint. See Watts-

Means v. Prince George’s Fam. Crisis Ctr.,

(4th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that

equitable tolling doctrine applies to Title VII’s 90-day filing requirement). In reply,

GoHealth submitted emails from its counsel to Heath’s counsel purportedly memorializing

* Heath also alleged that GoHealth violated North Carolina’s Equal Employment Practices Act,

-.422.3 (2024), but she does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of that claim on appeal. See Harris v. Town of S. Pines,

(4th Cir. 2024) (explaining that “[a] party waives an argument by failing to present it in its opening brief” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1540 Doc: 21 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 3 of 4

their verbal agreement that Heath would dismiss her complaint and proceed instead in

arbitration. While Heath dismissed her complaint, she did not file a demand for arbitration.

GoHealth’s counsel attested that he never agreed to engage in mediation in exchange for

the dismissal of the first complaint, and GoHealth argued that such a promise would have

been illogical because mediation often occurs when there is a pending complaint. Heath

also submitted emails, which showed that the parties discussed mediation but that

GoHealth was hesitant to participate because Heath’s demand was too steep. The district

court concluded that Heath had failed to show that she was prevented from timely filing

her Title VII claim due to wrongful conduct by GoHealth or extraordinary circumstances

beyond her control.

Initially, we conclude that the district court implicitly converted GoHealth’s motion

to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment by considering matters outside the

pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). But we conclude that its failure to explicitly convert

the motion was harmless because Heath had an opportunity to present evidence in response

to GoHealth’s motion. See Bosiger v. U.S. Airways,

(4th Cir. 2007)

(recognizing that “appellate courts may take the district court’s consideration of matters

outside the pleadings to trigger an implicit conversion of a [dismissal] motion to one [for

summary judgment]” and noting that “[b]oth parties had ample opportunity to present

evidence relevant to the [dispositive] question”). Accordingly, we apply the summary

judgment standard,

, reviewing the district court’s judgment de novo and

“view[ing] all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party,” Harris,

.

3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1540 Doc: 21 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 4 of 4

While Heath’s exhibits show that the parties discussed mediation, nowhere did

GoHealth promise to engage in mediation only if Heath voluntarily dismissed her first

complaint. Thus, Heath failed to show that she was prevented from timely filing her

Title VII claim due to wrongful conduct by GoHealth or extraordinary circumstances

beyond her control. See Warfaa v. Ali,

(4th Cir. 2021) (reiterating that

equitable tolling “must be reserved for those rare instances where—due to circumstances

external to the party’s own conduct—it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation

period against the party and gross injustice would result” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

4