USCA4 Appeal: 23-1935 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 1 of 16

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-1935

MOUNTAIN VALLEY PIPELINE, LLC,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

0.32 ACRES OF LAND, OWNED BY GRACE MINOR TERRY, Roanoke County Tax Map Parcel No. 102.00-01-01.02-0000 and Being MVP Parcel No. VA-RO-5149 (AR RO- 279.01),

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Elizabeth K. Dillon, Chief U.S. District Judge. (7:21–cv–00099–EKD)

Argued: October 31, 2024 Decided: January 27, 2025

Before GREGORY, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Harris joined.

ARGUED: Joseph Very Sherman, POOLE BROOKE PLUMLEE PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Wade Wallihan Massie, PENN, STUART & ESKRIDGE, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Seth M. Land, PENN, STUART & ESKRIDGE, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 23-1935 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 2 of 16

WYNN, Circuit Judge:

Mountain Valley Pipeline (“MVP”) needed an access road to deliver heavy

equipment to a section of its pipeline in southwestern Virginia. Acting under federal law,

MVP condemned a 0.32-acre access easement on the northwest corner of Grace Terry’s

land, near the summit of Poor Mountain. This taking was proper; the only remaining issue

is how much MVP must pay Terry in just compensation. Terry appeals the district court’s

exclusion of two pieces of evidence she offered on that issue.

First, Terry sought to testify at trial that the access easement significantly devalued

her land. In support, she contended that the access easement now blocked the best hiking

trail on her property, and noted that her neighbors recently sold their properties at below-

market rates after MVP condemned portions of their property. However, the district court

prohibited Terry from testifying as to damages, finding that Terry’s opinion had “no basis”

and was “inadmissible.” Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 0.32 Acres of Land Owned by

Terry, No. 7:21-cv-99,

, at *8 (W.D. Va. Sept. 7, 2022). We hold that

Terry’s factual bases qualified her to testify as a lay opinion witness, so we vacate the

district court’s entry of summary judgment and reverse the exclusion of some of Terry’s

testimony.

Second, Terry submitted an expert report on the issue of just compensation. The

district court, believing that it possessed increased discretion to exclude expert evidence in

eminent domain cases, applied a heightened admissibility standard and determined

contested facts at the evidentiary stage. It then excluded the expert report and granted MVP

summary judgment. But in Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 9.89 Acres, No. 23-2129, slip

2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1935 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 3 of 16

op. (4th Cir. Jan. 27, 2025), also issued today, we hold that courts should apply the standard

rules of evidence to expert testimony in eminent domain proceedings. We therefore vacate

the exclusion of Terry’s expert report and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Grace Terry owns more than 500 acres 1 of unimproved land on top of Poor

Mountain, Virginia (the “Terry Parcel”). In 2007, she voluntarily deeded a conservation

easement over the entirety of her parcel to the Virginia Outdoors Foundation (the

“conservation easement”). The conservation easement prohibits subdivision, limits

construction to only one homesite, and restricts the location of that homesite.

Honeysuckle Road, a public thoroughfare, cuts through Terry’s land. It sees little

traffic as it leads only to a gated police communications tower. An old logging road,

impassable by car, branches off Honeysuckle Road through the northwest corner of the

parcel toward the top of the mountain.

In October 2017, MVP initiated a condemnation action against Terry under the

Natural Gas Act,

et seq., for a 0.32-acre access road easement (the “access

easement”) along the old logging road. 2 MVP intends to use the easement to bring heavy

equipment to the pipeline, which does not itself traverse the Terry Parcel. The access

easement will be at most thirty feet wide temporarily during the road’s construction (for a

1 According to Terry’s expert, the parcel is approximately 558 acres. MVP’s expert measured the parcel at 590 acres. 2 MVP settled separately with the Virginia Outdoors Foundation. 3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1935 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 4 of 16

total of 0.085 acres of temporary-only easement), and at most twenty feet wide permanently

(for a total of 0.235 acres).

In early 2018, the district court granted MVP partial summary judgment and a

preliminary injunction granting immediate possession of the access easement. See

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. Easements to Construct, Operate & Maintain a Nat. Gas

Pipeline over Tracts of Land in Giles Cnty., No. 7:17-cv-492,

(W.D. Va.

Jan. 31, 2018) (granting partial summary judgment); Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v.

Easements to Construct, Operate & Maintain, No. 7:17-cv-492 (W.D. Va. Mar. 7, 2018),

ECF No. 613 (order granting immediate possession). We affirmed the summary-judgment

decision, Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres of Land,

(4th Cir.

2019), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Givens v. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC,

(2019). The remaining issue was the amount MVP must pay Terry in just

compensation. Terry introduced multiple pieces of evidence on the matter of just

compensation, two of which are at issue in this appeal. 3

First, Terry sought to testify that the access road diminished the value of her land

by $333,000, or approximately one-third of what she asserted was its $1,000,000 pre-taking

value. During a deposition, Terry stated from her own knowledge of the property that the

access easement is situated on the old logging road, which provides hiking access to an

important overlook. She also stated that her opinion on damages was informed by the value

of two recent sales of nearby properties encumbered by pipeline easements (“Sale One”

3 Terry also submitted expert reports by Linda DeVito and Larry Florin, but she does not appeal their exclusion. 4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1935 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 5 of 16

and “Sale Two”). The property conveyed in Sale One was purchased after MVP filed its

condemnation complaint but before MVP was granted possession of the easement. The

property at issue in Sale Two, purchased by the same buyer in Sale One, was conveyed

after MVP had taken possession of its easement. Terry finally considered an expert

appraisal performed on her land when the conservation easement was deeded in 2007,

which calculated that the conservation easement devalued her property by 30%. Terry

argued that the access easement would devalue her property by an equal percentage

because it also eliminated some uses of the property.

Second, Terry submitted an expert appraisal by Dennis Gruelle (the “Gruelle

Report”). In calculating the pre-taking value of the land, Gruelle factored in the preexisting

impact of the conservation easement and determined that the highest and best use of the

land—i.e., the use by which the court should measure its market value—was for premium

single-family residence with a home constructed on the northwest corner of the property.

Gruelle further concluded that, after the taking, the property would no longer be suitable

for premium residential use. The access easement runs through the northwest corner of the

Terry Parcel, which is the area that Gruelle recommended for a homesite. According to

Gruelle, “[t]he best portions of the property featured privacy, views, and natural settings[,]

and all three desirable features are lost due to the project.” J.A. 118. Gruelle posited that

discerning buyers seeking premium residential acreage would no longer be interested in

the property. As a result, he determined that the Terry Parcel was now only suitable for

recreational uses such as hunting.

5 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1935 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 6 of 16

To place a dollar value on diminution in value caused by the access easement,

Gruelle used the sales comparison approach. To establish the pre-taking value, he collected

data on the sales of four nearby properties suitable for single-family residential use, and

calculated the pre-taking value as $865,000. To determine the post-taking value, he

collected three sales of nearby properties suitable for recreational use. He then compared

the sales prices of the pre-taking and post-taking sales and concluded that the access road

devalued the Terry Parcel by $305,000, or about 35%.

In response, MVP submitted an expert report by Samuel Long, who used the sales

comparison approach to estimate a before-taking value of $973,500 and an after-taking

value of $963,419, meaning he set Terry’s damages for the permanent easement at only

$10,081, or about 1%. 4 MVP also submitted a rebuttal report which alleged several

shortcomings in the Gruelle Report.

MVP moved to exclude Terry’s testimony and the Gruelle Report. After a hearing,

the district court excluded Terry’s testimony as to damages. It found that Sales One and

Two were not a reliable basis for Terry’s opinion because it found that the buyers didn’t

have knowledge of the easements, and the properties were ultimately encumbered by a

pipeline easement rather than an access easement. The court also found that Terry stated

no rational basis for her opinion that the conservation easement and the access easement

damaged the property equally. The court permitted Terry to testify as to pre-taking value.

Long calculated Terry’s total damages as $10,114, after adding in $33 as 4

compensation for the temporary easement. 6 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1935 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 7 of 16

The court also excluded the Gruelle Report under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

Just as it did in 9.89 Acres, No. 23-2129, slip op. at 7, the district court reasoned that Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1(h)—which instructs courts to “tr[y] all issues” other than (in

some cases) that of just compensation—means that “[t]he gatekeeping role of the district

court is particularly pronounced in condemnation proceedings under Rule 71.1.” 0.32 Acres

of Land,

, at *4 (quoting United States v. 33.92356 Acres of Land,

(1st Cir. 2009)). Applying this heightened evidentiary rule to the Gruelle Report,

the court found the report defective for failing to consider the impact of Honeysuckle Road

and the old logging road; relying on incomparable sales; considering the effects of takings

on other properties; and incorrectly assuming that the entire width of MVP’s temporary

easement was permanent.

Although it excluded all of Terry’s evidence as to post-taking value, the court denied

MVP summary judgment in part because it concluded that an issue of fact existed as to the

pre-taking value of the Terry Parcel. MVP subsequently stipulated to Terry’s own pre-

taking valuation of the parcel ($1 million). It then again moved for summary judgment,

asking the court to apply its expert’s damage calculation of 1% to the stipulated pre-taking

value. The court agreed and granted summary judgment, resulting in a just compensation

award of $10,409. 5

5 This number includes the damage done to the land the easement sits on ($358), damage done to the rest of Terry’s property (1% x $999,642 = $9,996), and five years of rent on the temporary easement ($55). 7 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1935 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 8 of 16

II.

We review evidentiary determinations for an abuse of discretion. Westberry v.

Gislaved Gummi AB,

(4th Cir. 1999). “A district court abuses its

discretion if its conclusion is guided by erroneous legal principles or rests upon a clearly

erroneous factual finding.”

(citation omitted).

A.

The district court abused its discretion by preventing Terry, the landowner, from

testifying as to damages.

The threshold for admissibility of landowner testimony in takings cases is low.

“Courts indulge a common-law presumption that a property owner is competent to testify

on the value of his own property.” Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway,

(4th Cir. 2007). Landowner testimony is generally admitted as lay opinion

testimony under Rule 701 and is sometimes justified by the landowner’s special knowledge

of their land. 6 See id.; United States v. Sowards,

(10th Cir. 1966). However,

“[t]o be admissible, a landowner’s valuation opinion must rely on a valid foundation, not

speculation or conjecture.” Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 0.47 Acres of Land,

, 815 (4th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). Compare Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v.

18.27 Acres of Land in Levy Cnty., Nos. 1:16-cv-93, 1:16-cv-95,

, at *8

(N.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2019) (admitting testimony from landowner who complained about

6 Under Rule 701, lay opinion testimony is admissible if it is rationally based on the perception of the witness, helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and not Rule 702 expert testimony. Fed. R. Evid. 701. 8 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1935 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 9 of 16

disruption and loss of privacy from easement, where testimony went beyond “simply

pull[ing] a figure out of thin air with no basis whatsoever” even though it was a “close

question” whether bases were sufficient to support damages calculation), aff’d,

(11th Cir. 2020), with Williams v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC,

(11th Cir. 2018) (noting “general rule that homeowners may testify as to the value of their

homes” but excluding landowner opinion that toxins rendered her property valueless as

“pure speculation” because she also cited recent sale for value of a similarly situated

house), and Rover Pipeline, LLC v. 10.055 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Ashland Cnty.,

No. 5:17-CV-239,

, at *5–6 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 28, 2018) (excluding

landowner testimony speculating without evidence that property will never again grow

Christmas trees, despite contrary testimony of landowner’s own expert).

Terry presented three bases for her opinion, two of which supported admissible

testimony. First, the court incorrectly disregarded Terry’s argument that her personal

knowledge of her land was a basis for her opinion on damages. When explaining why the

access road interfered with the best location for a house on her property, Terry explained:

Well, the problem is, as I see it, is that that spot, that exact spot [of the access easement] was already there for [a buyer] to put a house close by, and then that is their place where they hike to and take their friends and say, “Look at this from here,” you know, “Look at this. Isn’t this glorious?” You can see Spring Hollow Reservoir. In the snow, it’s just a dot of blue, so . . . that ability to be able to hike up and enjoy that beautiful part of the property and have the way to get to it is, you know, gone[.]

J.A. 253. This is precisely the kind of personal knowledge which justifies the presumption

that landowners are qualified to testify to the value of their land. E.g., United States v.

68.94 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Kent Cnty.,

(3d Cir. 1990)

9 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1935 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 10 of 16

(“The Federal Rules of Evidence generally permit landowners to give opinion evidence as

to the value of their land due to the special knowledge of property which is presumed to

arise out of ownership.”); see also 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 23.03, Lexis (updated

Nov. 2024) (“The owner is deemed to have sufficient knowledge of the price paid, the rents

or other income received, and the possibilities of the land for use, to render an opinion as

to the value of the land.”). The district court should have let Terry testify on this basis.

Second, it was admissible for Terry to compare the damage caused by the access

road to the damage caused by the pipeline easements in Sales One and Two. Landowners

may base their valuation opinion on comparable property sales. See 0.47 Acres of Land,

853 F. App’x at 815 (“[Landowner’s] decades of familiarity with his property enabled him

to form an opinion of its value based on comparable property sales.”). Terry is deeply

familiar with her property—it has been in her family since the 1840s. Terry’s testimony on

these comparable sales was particularly salient because she explained that she knew the

seller in Sale One and that he “unloaded” his property for a loss because “it had a pipeline

proposed to go through it.” J.A. 236, 238–39. And as we held in 9.89 Acres, the court’s

conclusion that the buyer in Sales One and Two didn’t have knowledge of the easements,

and that the Sales were therefore unreliable, was not well-supported. See 9.89 Acres, No.

23-2129, slip op. at 15–17 (companion case holding that the district court abused its

discretion by excluding expert’s reliance on these sales).

Nonetheless, the district court found that Sales One and Two were not comparable

because they were encumbered by pipeline easements, not access easements. But the

comparability of sales goes to weight, not admissibility, and is a matter for the fact finder.

10 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1935 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 11 of 16

Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 76 Acres, More or Less, in Balt. & Hartford Cntys.,

, 229–30 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding challenge to comparability of sales did

not present a “true Daubert challenge” to methodology, so inclusion should be affirmed);

see United States v. 320.0 Acres, More or Less, in Monroe,

(5th Cir.

1979) (“[T]he extent to which dissimilarities are reflected in market value is a question of

the evidentiary weight of the comparable sales, which is a question for the jury.”). The

district court’s contrary approach would run smack-dab into practical issues (how

comparable is comparable enough for admissibility?) and would undermine the

longstanding rule that landowners are presumptively qualified to testify as to the value of

their land. See United States v. 10,031.98 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Las

Animas Cnty.,

, 639–40 (10th Cir. 1988) (reversing exclusion of landowner

testimony as to comparable sales, because “[i]t would totally emasculate the rule that an

owner is always qualified to testify as to the value of his property to turn around and require

a threshold basis for that testimony before it may be admitted”). Accordingly, the district

court erred when it refused to allow Terry to testify regarding her personal knowledge of

the land as well as the comparable sales.

By contrast, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the 2007

expert appraisal of the conservation easement was not an admissible basis for Terry’s

opinion because “there is no rational basis for Terry’s opinion that the conservation

easement and MVP’s access easement affect the property equally.” 0.32 Acres of Land,

, at *8. A review of the record confirms that Terry’s reliance on the 2007

appraisal was speculative. Terry justified basing her valuation opinion on this expert

11 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1935 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 12 of 16

appraisal because both easements “eliminat[e] some uses of the property,” and therefore,

she reasoned, they devalue the property at the same rate. J.A. 248. But a conservation

easement over the entire property is of a different character than an access easement on

part of the property, and Terry repeatedly failed to explain why those easements would

devalue the property at the same rate. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its

discretion by excluding this basis for Terry’s testimony on the 2007 appraisal. 7

B.

Turning to the district court’s exclusion of the Gruelle Report under Rule 702, we

conclude that it applied “erroneous legal principles.” Westberry,

. In

reaching this conclusion, we are guided by our analysis in 9.89 Acres, which we also issue

today.

As we explain in 9.89 Acres, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1 does not change

the court’s standard Federal Rule of Evidence 702 analysis, which is designed to ensure

that an expert’s methodology is reliable. See 9.89 Acres, No. 23-2129, slip op. at 10, 15.

Rule 702 requires courts to exclude an expert report where the expert’s methodology is not

based on sufficient facts or data. However, the court should not resolve contested factual

issues at the admissibility stage. 9.89 Acres, No. 23-2129, slip op. at 15; see Bresler v.

Wilmington Tr. Co.,

(4th Cir. 2017) (“Questions regarding the factual

We previously (in an unpublished case) reserved the question of whether 7

landowners may ever rely on expert testimony to form their lay opinion. 0.47 Acres of Land, 853 F. App’x at 814 (“We need not determine whether landowner lay opinion testimony may ever encompass specialized or technical knowledge within the scope of Rule 702[.]”). Because Terry did not reasonably rely on the 2007 appraisal, we need not answer that question here either. 12 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1935 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 13 of 16

underpinnings of the expert witness’ opinion affect the weight and credibility of the

witness’ assessment, not its admissibility.” (cleaned up)).

Here, rather than conducting a traditional analysis under Rule 702, the court stated

that “[t]he gatekeeping role of the district court is particularly pronounced in condemnation

proceedings under Rule 71.1.” 0.32 Acres of Land,

, at *4. The court

therefore identified contested factual issues in the Gruelle Report, disagreed with Gruelle’s

view of those contested facts, and determined that these “errors and omissions” rendered

the Report entirely inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence. Id. at *5. This was the wrong

approach. “Rather, the court must first apply [the] Rules [of Evidence] to determine the

universe of evidence that it will then use to ‘tr[y] all issues’ under Rule 71.1(h)(1).” 9.89

Acres, No. 23-2129, slip op. at 9. Thus, the correct inquiry at the admissibility stage is more

modest than the one undertaken by the district court below: it should ask only whether the

expert’s methodology was reliable and was based on sufficient facts or data, keeping in

mind that the expert “need not be precisely informed about all details of the issues raised

in order to offer an opinion.” Kopf v. Skyrm,

(4th Cir. 1993) (citation

omitted).

Resisting this conclusion, MVP argues that this case is like U.S. Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission v. Freeman,

(4th Cir. 2015). There, we affirmed the

district court’s exclusion of evidence from an expert put forward by the plaintiff agency

where, among “an alarming number of errors and analytical fallacies in [the expert]’s

reports, . . . . the district court found a ‘mind-boggling’ number of errors and unexplained

discrepancies in [the expert]’s database.”

at 466–67. “For example, looking at a subset

13 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1935 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 14 of 16

of 41 individuals for whom the [agency was] seeking back pay, 29 had at least one error or

omission. Seven were missing from the database altogether.”

.

This case is not like Freeman. In that case, the expert’s errors were clear-cut and put

the report “outside the range where experts might reasonably differ.”

(quoting Kumho

Tire Co. v. Carmichael,

(1999)). Here, by contrast, many of the purported

errors were not at all obvious. Indeed, it is not even clear that the court decided the factual

disputes correctly, “thus illustrating the dangers of resolving factual disputes at the

evidentiary stage.” 9.89 Acres, No. 23-2129, slip op. at 15.

First, the court faulted Gruelle for failing to consider the negative impact

Honeysuckle Road and the old logging road had on the Terry Parcel’s pre-taking value. Yet

the Gruelle Report mentions Honeysuckle Road several times. Furthermore, Terry stated

in her deposition that these roads increase the value of her property—Honeysuckle Road

because it has little traffic and provides car access to otherwise inaccessible areas, and the

old logging road because it provides foot access to a scenic overlook. It is therefore not at

all clear that these roads devalue her property.

Second, the court took issue with the comparability of Gruelle’s pre-taking and post-

taking sales. As discussed above, however, the comparability of sales is a question for the

fact finder. E.g., E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. 7.74 Acres in Wythe Cnty.,

(4th Cir. 2007) (holding that challenge to experts’ proposed comparable sales did not

present a “true Daubert challenge” to methodology, so inclusion should be affirmed).

Third, the court found that Gruelle inappropriately considered the effect that takings

on other properties would have on the view from Terry’s property. It is true that, in general,

14 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1935 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 15 of 16

courts cannot consider the impact of takings of other properties, so Gruelle should be

prevented from testifying on this basis. See Campbell v. United States,

(1924). However, this illegitimate consideration—contained in one sentence in a 41-page

report, with no indication that it affected the rest of the reasoning—does not render the

entire report unreliable and therefore inadmissible.

Finally, the court noted that Gruelle inaccurately assumed MVP’s 30-foot-wide

temporary easement was permanent, when in fact the permanent easement is only 20 feet

wide. But, as noted above, the difference between the two easements was small—0.085

acres. And, in any event, Gruelle’s analysis is entirely focused on the use of the access road

(to carry heavy machinery to the pipeline) rather than the size of the road. So, again, it is

unclear that this apparent factual error impacted his analysis.

In sum, the “errors” identified by the district court did not indicate that Gruelle’s

methodology was unreliable, that he did not rely on sufficient facts, or that he was not

qualified as an appraiser. This is not a case where the testimony was “mere guess or

speculation” based on “no evidence.” United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 1.72 Acres

of Land in Tenn.,

(6th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. L.E. Cooke

Co.,

(6th Cir. 1993)) (affirming exclusion of “purely speculative” expert

report). We vacate the exclusion of Gruelle’s expert report because the district court’s

factual analysis reveals no fatal methodological defects under Rule 702. 8

8 Terry moved the district court to reopen discovery so that Gruelle could cure the purported defects in his report, and she asks us to reverse the district court’s denial of that motion. We need not reach this question because we vacate the Gruelle Report’s exclusion. 15 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1935 Doc: 40 Filed: 01/27/2025 Pg: 16 of 16

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s exclusion of most of

Terry’s testimony as to the post-taking value of her property and vacate the district court’s

exclusion of the Gruelle Report. We remand this matter to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion and with our decision in 9.89 Acres.

VACATED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED

16