Tony McKenna v. Bristol VA Police Officer Erickson

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Tony McKenna v. Bristol VA Police Officer Erickson

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1573 Doc: 33 Filed: 02/06/2025 Pg: 1 of 8

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-1573

TONY MCKENNA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BRISTOL VA POLICE OFFICER ALEXANDER ERICKSON; BRISTOL VA POLICE OFFICER JOSH GREEN; BRISTOL VA POLICE OFFICER CHARLES THOMAS, JR.,

Defendants - Appellants,

and

BRISTOL VA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; CITY OF BRISTOL; ASSISTANT COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY FOR THE CITY OF BRISTOL, TIM BOYER,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, Senior District Judge. (1:22-cv-00002-JPJ-PMS)

Submitted: January 16, 2025 Decided: February 6, 2025

Before GREGORY, WYNN, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. USCA4 Appeal: 23-1573 Doc: 33 Filed: 02/06/2025 Pg: 2 of 8

ON BRIEF: Jim H. Guynn, Jr., Christopher S. Dadak, John R. Fitzgerald, GUYNN WADDELL, P.C., Salem, Virginia, for Appellants. Tony McKenna, Appellee Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Tony McKenna filed a complaint and amended complaint under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

in state court against Bristol, Virginia, police officers Joshua Green, Alexander Erickson,

and Charles Thomas, Jr. (collectively, Appellants), and the Bristol Police Department, the

City of Bristol, and Tim Boyer (collectively, Defendants). After Appellants and

Defendants removed the action to the district court, the court dismissed several of

McKenna’s claims. Following discovery, Defendants and Appellants moved for summary

judgment on McKenna’s remaining claims, arguing in part that Appellants were entitled to

qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment in part, but denied

summary judgment on McKenna’s claims against Appellants for unlawful entry, false

arrest, and unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Ultimately, the district

court granted summary judgment for McKenna on these claims, subject to a jury

determination on damages. Appellants filed a notice of interlocutory appeal of that order.

On appeal, Appellants challenge the district court’s conclusion that they were not entitled

to qualified immunity for McKenna’s claims of unlawful entry, false arrest, and unlawful

search.

“Generally, a district court’s order denying summary judgment based on qualified

immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.” Yates v. Terry,

817 F.3d 877, 882

(4th Cir. 2016). However, “[o]ur jurisdiction over such an appeal

extends only to a denial of qualified immunity to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.”

Id.

(cleaned up). Thus, to the extent the ruling turns on issues of law, “an order rejecting

the defense of qualified immunity at either the dismissal stage or the summary judgment

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stage is a final judgment subject to immediate appeal.” Behrens v. Pelletier,

516 U.S. 299, 307

(1996) (cleaned up).

Qualified immunity protects “government officials performing discretionary

functions . . . insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982). Evaluating qualified immunity requires a

two-pronged inquiry: “whether a constitutional violation occurred and . . . whether the

right violated was clearly established” at the time of the violation. Henry v. Purnell,

652 F.3d 524, 531

(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Meyers v.

Balt. Cnty.,

713 F.3d 723, 731

(4th Cir. 2013). The latter prong will support immunity,

even if the officer violated an individual’s constitutional rights, “if a reasonable person in

the officer’s position could have failed to appreciate that his conduct would violate those

rights.” Meyers,

713 F.3d at 731

(internal quotation marks omitted).

“After defining the right, we ask whether it was clearly established at the time

[Appellants] acted.” Est. of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst,

810 F.3d 892, 907

(4th Cir. 2016). “[T]he Supreme Court has explained that a clearly established

right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood

that what he is doing violates that right.” Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley,

911 F.3d 674, 703-04

(4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). “In other words, existing precedent must have

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Tarashuk v. Givens,

53 F.4th 154

, 164 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This is not to say that

an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has

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previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the

unlawfulness must be apparent.” Armstrong,

810 F.3d at 907

(internal quotation marks

omitted).

Here, McKenna had a disagreement with a neighbor who took out a protective order

against McKenna. Appellants went to McKenna’s apartment to serve the protective order.

McKenna refused to provide the officers with identification; the officers stated that they

needed to identify McKenna in order to serve him with the protective order. Appellants

called the Assistant Commonwealth Attorney, Boyer, who advised them that McKenna

could be charged with obstruction of justice for refusing to comply with the officers’

requests for identification. Appellants then returned to McKenna’s apartment and he

continued to refuse to provide identification. When McKenna tried to close his door,

Thomas pushed the door open, stepped into the apartment, pulled McKenna into the

hallway, and placed McKenna under arrest for obstruction of justice. Appellants conducted

a search of McKenna pursuant to the arrest and transported McKenna to the police station.

A magistrate, however, refused to issue a warrant for obstruction of justice, and the officers

returned McKenna to his apartment.

Appellants challenge the district court’s conclusion that they were not entitled to

qualified immunity from liability for McKenna’s claims of unlawful entry, false arrest, and

unlawful search. Appellants argue that they had probable cause to believe that McKenna

obstructed justice when they arrested him because they reasonably believed they had the

duty to collect McKenna’s identifying information to serve him with the protective order.

Even if they did not have probable cause to arrest McKenna, however, Appellants argue

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that the district court erred in finding that the right was clearly established. Appellants

further argue that because the arrest was lawful, the search incident to the arrest was also

lawful. In addition, Appellants argue that Thomas is entitled to qualified immunity from

McKenna’s unlawful entry claim because he had reasonable grounds to believe that a

warrantless entry was justified based on McKenna’s history with, and recent disagreement

with, his neighbor.

“The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons

against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Hupp v. Cook,

931 F.3d 307, 318

(4th Cir.

2019) (cleaned up). The ultimate touchstone under the Fourth Amendment is

reasonableness, and “[t]hat standard generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant

before a law enforcement officer can enter a home without permission.” Lange v.

California,

594 U.S. 295

, 301 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). The warrant

requirement is subject to several exceptions, including for exigent circumstances in which

the situation presents “a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a

warrant” before making entry into a home.

Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

In addition, to prevail on a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must show that officers

seized him without probable cause. See Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem,

85 F.3d 178, 181

(4th Cir. 1996). “Probable cause to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within

the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable

caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed an

offense.” Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Balt. City,

866 F.3d 546, 555

(4th Cir.

2017) (cleaned up). We evaluate probable cause under an objective standard, considering

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the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the seizure and without

consideration of the subjective beliefs of the officers involved. See Smith v. Munday,

848 F.3d 248, 253

(4th Cir. 2017). The officer need not “resolve every doubt about a suspect’s

guilt before probable cause is established.” Torchinsky v. Siwinski,

942 F.2d 257, 264

(4th

Cir. 1991).

In addition, “[a] warrantless search by the police is valid if it falls within one of the

narrow and well-delineated exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirements,”

including the exception for “warrantless searches incident to arrest.” United States v.

Ferebee,

957 F.3d 406

, 418 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This

exception provides that when law enforcement officers have probable cause to make a

lawful arrest, they may―incident to that arrest and without a warrant―search the

arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate control.”

Id.

(internal quotation marks

omitted).

Our review of the record and the relevant legal authorities confirms that the district

court did not err in denying qualified immunity to Appellants on these claims. The court

properly determined that Thomas failed to establish any applicable exceptions to the

requirement that officers obtain a warrant before entering a citizen’s home. Moreover, as

the district court found, Appellants lacked probable cause to believe that McKenna

committed obstruction of justice justifying his arrest. Finally, because McKenna’s arrest

was not lawful, the search incident to his arrest was similarly unlawful.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to

Appellants. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

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adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid in the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

8

Reference

Status
Unpublished