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                                             PUBLISHED

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT


                                              No. 24-1912


        CITY OF MARTINSVILLE, VIRGINIA,

                            Plaintiff – Appellee,

                     v.

        EXPRESS SCRIPTS, INC.; OPTUMRX, INC.,

                            Defendants – Appellants.



        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
        Danville. Elizabeth K. Dillon, District Judge. (4:24-cv-00002-EKD)


        Argued: December 5, 2024                                   Decided: February 10, 2025


        Before WYNN, RICHARDSON, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges


        Motion for a stay granted by published order. Judge Richardson wrote the order, in which
        Judge Heytens joined. Judge Wynn wrote a dissenting opinion.


        ARGUED:       Christopher George Michel, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
        SULLIVAN, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Richard Johan Conrod, Jr.,
        CICALA LAW FIRM PLLC, Dripping Springs, Texas, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
        Jonathan G. Cooper, Michael J. Lyle, Eric C. Lyttle, Matthew K. Wasserman, QUINN
        EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, Washington, D.C.; Emily M. Scott,
        HIRSCHLER FLEISCHER, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant Express Scripts, Inc.
        Brian D. Boone, Charlotte, North Carolina, Matthew P. McGuire, ALSTON & BIRD, LLP,
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        Raleigh, North Carolina; Turner A. Broughton, WILLIAMS MULLEN, Richmond,
        Virginia, for Appellant OptumRx, Inc.

ORDER

        RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:

               People often say that you shouldn’t have too many cooks in the kitchen. Wise

        words, particularly around Christmas. But culinary clutter can’t compare to the havoc of

        multiple courts taking actions in the same case, on the same issues, at the same time. That’s

        what happened here. Fortunately, there is a rule against it.

               The City of Martinsville, Virginia, sued Express Scripts and OptumRx in state court.

        But the defendants preferred to plead their case in federal court. So they removed the case

        to the Western District of Virginia. That didn’t go the way the defendants hoped: The

        district court sided with the city and ordered that the case be sent back to state court. Yet

        that didn’t end the matter, for a state court may not proceed after a remand until the remand

        order is physically mailed to it. 

(c). And after the district court issued

        the remand order—but before the district court got to the post office—Express Scripts and

        OptumRx noted an immediate appeal challenging the order, as permitted by statute. §

        1447(d).

               Under Supreme Court precedent, that notice of appeal suspended the district court’s

        power to act, requiring that the district court halt all proceedings related to the appeal.

        Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 

 (2023); Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc.

        Co., 

 (1982). But the district court mailed the remand order anyway. In

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        doing so, it tried to cook when the kitchen was ours. Therefore, we recognize—as we

        must—that the district court lacked the authority to mail the remand order because it was

        automatically stayed under Coinbase from doing so.

        I.     Background

               In 2018, Martinsville, Virginia, sued several defendants, including Express Scripts

        and OptumRx. In Martinsville’s telling, the defendants committed public nuisance and

        hurt the city through their role in the opioid epidemic. The named defendants removed the

        case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 

(d), 1453(b).

        The district court then remanded it to Virginia, where the case remained until 2024. At

        that point, defendants again removed to federal court—this time under the federal-officer-

        removal statute, 

. Martinsville opposed this removal and moved to

        remand a second time. The district court granted the motion and issued a remand order.

               But that alone didn’t give the state court a green light. Before the state court could

        proceed, the clerk for the district court had to first mail it a copy of the order. § 1447(c)

        (“A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed … [t]he State court may thereupon

        proceed with such case.”). And Express Scripts beat the clerk to the punch, docketing an

        appeal of the remand order before the order was mailed. It then asked the district court to

        stay the order pending appeal, citing Coinbase. The district court refused. It read Coinbase

        narrowly to reach only its factual context of orders compelling arbitration.

               Thwarted below, Express Scripts and OptumRx moved this court for the same stay,

        again citing Coinbase. See Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(2). We agree with them. The district



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        court’s logic artificially restricts Coinbase. Under a fairer reading of Coinbase, the district

        court was automatically stayed from mailing the remand order.

        II.    Discussion

               Certain federal officers, and those acting under a federal officer, have a statutory

        right, when sued or prosecuted in state court for official acts, to remove those actions to

        federal district court. § 1442(a), -(1).1 If they do, but subsequently the district court finds

        removal improper and orders remand, federal law authorizes an immediate appeal of that

        decision. § 1447(d) (“[A]n order remanding a case to” state court “pursuant to § 1442”

        “shall be reviewable by appeal.”).

               Like all appeals, this implicates what the Supreme Court has called the “Griggs

        principle,” which kicks in upon the “filing of a notice of appeal.” Griggs, 

.

        The appeal then “divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case

        involved in the appeal.” Coinbase, 599 U.S. at 740–41. Without control, the district court



               1
                   In relevant part, the statute provides:

               (a) A civil action or criminal prosecution that is commenced in a State court
               and that is against or directed to any of the following may be removed by
               them to the district court of the United States for the district and division
               embracing the place wherein it is pending:
                  (1) The United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person
                  acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in
                  an official or individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of
                  such office or on account of any right, title or authority claimed under any
                  Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the
                  collection of the revenue.

        § 1442. The statute seeks to insulate federal officers from potential hostility in state court
        by providing them a federal forum. See Willingham v. Morgan, 

 (1969).
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        must refrain from further action on those aspects of the case involved in the appeal until

        the appeal is completed. See 

               How far Coinbase extends is an active subject in the federal appellate courts.

        Because it is directly relevant to this appeal, we start by summarizing the case. Coinbase,

        a cryptocurrency platform operator, was sued by some of its users. Id. at 739. In reply,

        Coinbase sought to enforce a mandatory arbitration provision in its user agreement against

        the plaintiff users. Id. at 738. But the district court denied its motion. Id. Coinbase noted

        an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s denial under the Federal Arbitration Act, 

(a), and it simultaneously moved in the district court to stay proceedings

        pending that appeal. Coinbase, 

. Despite the appeal, the district court

        denied Coinbase’s motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 

               The Supreme Court reversed. 

. Its conclusion flowed from an application

        of the “Griggs principle,” which states that an appeal “divests the district court of its control

        over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” 

 at 740 (quoting Griggs, 

). It then added three important clarifications to the Griggs principle that resolve this

        motion.

               First, it explained that when the question on appeal just is “whether the litigation

        may go forward in the district court,” then “the entire case is essentially ‘involved in the

        appeal.’” Id. at 741 (quotations omitted). That’s the question an arbitrability appeal

        presents. It asks whether the district court, rather than an arbitrator, had any power to be

        the factfinder in the case at all. Because that question was the whole ballgame, the district

        court was divested of control over more or less the whole case. Any other rule would

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        undercut the entire point of the appeal. Id. at 743 (“Absent an automatic stay of district

        court proceedings, Congress’s decision . . . to afford a right to an interlocutory appeal [of

        arbitrability] would be largely nullified” because “many of the asserted benefits of

        arbitration . . . would be irretrievably lost.”).2

               Second, the Court explained that this “automatic stay” is, well, automatic. As the

        name implies, and as other contexts confirm, an automatic stay is self-executing. See 

 (automatic stay in bankruptcy); Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(a) (automatic 30-day stay

        after orders); see also In re Gruntz, 

 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing the

        self-executing nature of bankruptcy automatic stays).          A district court is therefore

        immediately required to halt all proceedings covered by the Griggs principle when a proper

        notice of appeal is docketed, whether or not the parties ask it to. Rather than determine

        whether a discretionary stay is appropriate under the usual four-factor standard, see Nken

        v. Holder, 

 (2009), “the background Griggs principle applies regardless.”

        Coinbase, 

.

               Last, the Court made clear that because Griggs identifies a background principle, it

        applies even without congressional action.           “When Congress wants to authorize an

        interlocutory appeal and to automatically stay the district court proceedings during that


               2
                 Although Coinbase acknowledged that “the entire case is essentially involved in
        the appeal,” it left open whether the district court could continue working on aspects of the
        case unrelated to the appeal. Coinbase, 

 (quotation marks removed and
        emphasis added) (quoting Griggs, 

). It observed that “Coinbase concedes
        that the district court may still proceed with matters that are not involved in the appeal,
        such as the awarding of costs and attorney's fees.” 

 at 741 n.2. So even in situations (as
        here) where the appeal essentially encompasses the entire case, marginal aspects of the
        proceedings that are not implicated by the appeal might proceed. See 

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        appeal, Congress need not say anything about a stay. At least absent contrary indications,

        the background Griggs principle already requires an automatic stay.” 

 at 743–44.

        Congress can, of course, make an exception to this rule. See, e.g., 

(b)(1)

        (“Neither the application for, nor the granting of, an appeal under this paragraph shall stay

        proceedings in the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.”). But while Congress can

        specify when it doesn’t want an appeal to come with a stay, the default rule is that an appeal

        automatically stays all aspects of the case involved in the appeal. See Coinbase, 

 (listing statutes).

               From these three clarifications, it should be clear that the Griggs principle applies

        just as forcefully here as it did in Coinbase itself. Just as it did for denials of motions to

        compel arbitration, Congress expressly authorized interlocutory appeals when a district

        court finds federal-officer removal under § 1442(a) inappropriate and orders remand to the

        state court. 

(d). Nothing in § 1447(d) overrides the background Griggs

        principle. Cf. BP P.L.C. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 

 (2021)

        (“[F]or suits against federal officers or agencies removed pursuant to 

 . .

        . Congress has deemed it appropriate to allow appellate review before a district court may

        remand a case to state court.”) (emphasis added). And, just like a motion to compel

        arbitration, a remand order decides the foundational question: Which forum will hear the

        case?3 Necessarily, then, in both situations, essentially the whole case is “involved in the


               3
                Our holding here does not imply that the Griggs principle will sweep broadly in
        other interlocutory appeals. Interlocutory appeals taken from collateral orders, for
        example, will ordinarily come with narrow automatic stays because a collateral order must,
        (Continued)
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        appeal,” and the lower court loses dominion over not just the remand order but most

        everything else in the case besides. Coinbase, 

. Doing otherwise would

        “largely defeat[] the point of the appeal.” 

 (quotation omitted).

               But the district court proceeded anyway because it misread Coinbase. It saw

        Coinbase as limited to orders compelling arbitration.4 While Coinbase was a case about

        arbitration, this does not mean it was only a case about arbitration. Coinbase also was a

        case about a cryptocurrency platform. But its reasoning applies beyond cryptocurrency

        platforms. Distinctions require meaningful differences to matter; a decision’s rationale

        binds us even if some immaterial facts differ. See Payne v. Taslimi, 

 (4th

        Cir. 2021) (“If necessary to the outcome, a precedent’s reasoning must be followed.”); see

        also Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 

, 197 (2014). As

        Justice Gorsuch explained in Ramos v. Louisiana, “[i]t is usually a judicial decision’s

        reasoning—its ratio decidendi—that allows it to have life and effect in the disposition of

        future cases.” 

 (2020) (opinion of Gorsuch, J.); see also Youngstown Sheet

        & Tube v. Sawyer, 

, 635 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (separating ratio




        by definition, be “completely separate from the merits of the action.” Flanagan v. United
        States, 

 (1984) (quotation omitted). This means that little else other than
        the collateral order itself will be “involved in the appeal.” Coinbase, 

.
                4
                  Other courts have reached the same conclusion, albeit without any analysis. See
        Gov’t of P.R. v. Express Scripts, 

, 184 n.3 (1st Cir. 2024); Cnty. of
        Westchester v. Express Scripts, Inc., No. 24-1639, Dkt. 72 (2d Cir. Sept. 6, 2024) (“[T]he
        request to stay is denied because the Appellants are not entitled to an automatic stay
        pending appeal under Coinbase.”); Georgia v. Clark, No. 23-13368, 

, at *2 (11th Cir. Dec. 21, 2023) (“Coinbase was limited to arbitration
        proceedings, which are not at issue here.”).

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        decidendi from dictum); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 

 (1885) (summarizing

        the ratio decidendi in a series of cases).5

               The rationale of Coinbase applies here. In relying on Griggs, Coinbase did not

        discriminate between arbitration and other appeals. Indeed, it went out of its way to

        approvingly recognize that qualified immunity and double jeopardy were “analogous

        contexts” where the courts of appeals have long imposed automatic stays upon appeal.

        Coinbase, 

 & n.2. Whatever part of a case is “involved in the appeal,” big

        or small, it lies beyond the district court’s reach because two courts “should not attempt to

        assert jurisdiction over a case simultaneously.” Griggs, 

. So if the issue

        being appealed is whether the district court can send this case back, the district court cannot

        jump the gun before the appeal is resolved.

               Martinsville seeks to escape Coinbase in another way. In its view, Coinbase and

        the Griggs principle only halts proceedings that would continue in a federal district court

        after the appeal. Oral Arg. at 22:00. Thus, Martinsville seems to suggest, the Griggs

        principle has no impact because there was nothing more for the district court to do after it

        signed the remand order. But even if Martinsville is correct about the scope of Coinbase—

        a question we need not decide—Martinsville is mistaken to think it changes the outcome



               5
                Discerning holding from dicta is not always easy. Generally, however, a “[d]ictum
        is a ‘statement in a judicial opinion that could have been deleted without seriously
        impairing the analytical foundations of the holding.’” Payne, 

 (quoting
        Pittson Co. v. United States, 

 (4th Cir. 1999)); see Pierre N. Leval,
        Judging under the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta, 

, 1256 (2006).
        In other words, if language in an opinion is not required for the case’s disposition, it is
        nonbinding dicta.
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        here. The district court did not fully transfer control over the case until it mailed a copy of

        the remand order to the state court. See § 1447(c). So at the time of the appeal, the district

        court still had an action it needed to take before it could shunt the case elsewhere—the

        statutorily required mailing of the order. That is a proceeding in the district court to which

        Coinbase applies. And that resolves this motion.

                                        *             *              *

               Two courts at once is one court too many. Coinbase confirmed that Griggs was not

        a makeshift guideline with limited sweep but a general principle about the allocation of

        power among multiple courts with claims over the same case. The principle applies to

        appeals under the federal-officer-removal statute as it does elsewhere unless and until

        Congress tells us otherwise. So Express Scripts and OptumRx’s appeal divested the district

        court of authority over the issues involved in that appeal, and the district court had no

        power to mail its order to state court.6 On the pending appeal, we will address whether

        remand was proper. If we decide that it was—and only then—may the district court mail

        its remand order.7

                                                                                      SO ORDERED.




               6
                For this reason, Express Scripts and OptumRx’s motion is, strictly speaking,
        unnecessary. As explained, when Coinbase applies, a district court’s proceedings are
        automatically stayed whether or not a motion for a stay pending appeal is granted.
               7
                When a case is stayed pending appeal, the appellate court has a responsibility to
        promptly answer the question presented. This is especially true where the case involves
        another sovereign: here, the Commonwealth of Virginia. After expedited briefing and
        argument and a prompt order on this motion to stay, we will promptly turn to the merits.
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        WYNN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

               This action arises from the City of Martinsville suing Express Scripts for its alleged

        role in the opioid epidemic. Stripped of its amusing metaphors, the majority’s factual

        description of the matter amounts to this:

               1. Martinsville sued Express Scripts in state court.

               2. Express Scripts removed the case to federal court.

               3. But the federal court granted Martinsville’s motion to remand the case to state

                  court.

               4. Express Scripts immediately gave notice of appeal.

               5. But the federal court issued the remand order anyway.

               6. Nevertheless, the majority finds that under the Supreme Court’s decision in

                  Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 

 (2023), the notice of appeal, which was

                  filed “before the district court got to the post office,” automatically stayed the

                  district court’s remand order.

               7. In short, in the majority’s view, Coinbase has essentially abrogated Nken v.

                  Holder, 

 (2009), which recognized that a district court retains

                  discretion regarding whether to grant a stay.

               So, how does the majority opinion reach that result? It disingenuously extends the

        narrow holding on arbitrability appeals in Coinbase to broadly abrogate the well-settled

        holding in Nken v. Holder that district courts have discretion over whether to impose a stay.

        With respect, I would accept the Supreme Court’s holding in Coinbase for what it is, a

        narrow exception for arbitrability appeals, and nothing more.

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               To be sure, district courts have “ha[d] broad discretion to stay proceedings as an

        incident to [their] power to control [their] own docket[s],” Clinton v. Jones, 

 (1997), for as long as there have been district courts. When the First Congress provided

        that the federal courts “shall have power to issue . . . all other writs . . . which may be

        necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions,” one of those writs was the writ

        of supersedeas, which stays proceedings during an appeal. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,

        § 14, 

, 81–82. Because the decision to issue a writ of supersedeas depends on the

        circumstances of the case, it was considered a discretionary power of the federal courts. Ex

        parte Milwaukee R.R. Co., 

 (1867) (“[T]he writ of supersedeas

        is eminently proper in a case where the circumstances justify it, as we think they do in the

        present instance.”).

               Congress reaffirmed this principle through the Judiciary Act of 1891, which

        permitted some interlocutory appeals but required that “the proceedings in other respects

        in the court below shall not be stayed unless otherwise ordered by that court during the

        pendency of such appeal.” Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 7, 

, 828. Almost a

        century ago, the Supreme Court endorsed this principle when it observed that “[a] stay is

        not a matter of right” but “an exercise of judicial discretion” and that whether to issue one

        “depend[s] upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Virginian Ry. Co. v. United

        States, 

, 672–73 (1926). The Supreme Court reaffirmed this view as recently

        as 2009. Nken, 

 (quoting Virginian Ry. Co., 

).

               Of course, this background principle is not absolute. As one past Justice put it, “[t]he

        power of the federal courts to issue stay orders to maintain the status quo pending

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        appeal . . . is subject to Congress’ control.” United States v. United Mine Workers of Am.,

        

 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also Hor v. Gonzales, 

 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Congress could limit our authority to issue stays[.]”).

               But the statute at issue in Coinbase—the Federal Arbitration Act—says nothing to

        suggest that Congress intended to displace the longstanding baseline principle described

        above.1 To the contrary, the statutory text of the Federal Arbitration Act supports the

        opposite conclusion: the Act contains a provision requiring a stay during the pendency of

        arbitration. 

.

               To be sure, as the majority in this matter writes, when the question on appeal is

        “whether the litigation may go forward in the district court, then the entire case is

        essentially involved in the appeal.” Majority Op. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted)

        (quoting Coinbase, 

). But, as Justice Kennedy put it in a different context,

        “[t]his much is obvious, if not tautological.” Groh v. Ramirez, 

 (2004)




               1
                   The statute at issue in Coinbase states:

               An appeal may be taken from— . . . an order—
                     (A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title,
                     (B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to
                     proceed,
                     (C) denying an application under section 206 of this title to compel
                     arbitration,
                     (D) confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award, or
                     (E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award[.]

        

(a)(1).

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        (Kennedy, J., dissenting). And besides, that proposition is not all that the Supreme Court

        said. Coinbase reasoned:

               Because the question on appeal is whether the case belongs in arbitration or
               instead in the district court, the entire case is essentially “involved in the
               appeal.” As Judge Easterbrook cogently explained, when a party appeals the
               denial of a motion to compel arbitration, whether “the litigation may go
               forward in the district court is precisely what the court of appeals must
               decide.”

        

 (first quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 

        (1982) (per curiam); and then quoting Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Comput.

        Network, Inc., 

 (7th Cir. 1997)). This passage only concerned a dispute

        between litigating in a district court or through alternative dispute resolution.

               Additionally, the majority goes too far when it argues that the Supreme Court gave

        the Griggs principle the import and scope to apply to every interlocutory appeal of a

        dispositive issue. That’s because Griggs did nothing of the sort. Griggs—a per curiam

        opinion decided decades before Nken v. Holder without briefing or argument on the

        merits—merely clarified that a change in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure means

        that a notice of appeal is to be considered premature and a nullity when filed before the

        disposition of post-judgment motions. 459 U.S. 59–60. To interpret the change otherwise,

        Griggs explains, could lead to situations where a district court and court of appeals

        simultaneously exercise jurisdiction to alter, amend, or vacate the same judgment. Id.; see

        also, e.g., Wis. Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States, 

 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The rule

        summarized in Griggs is designed to prevent conflict among tribunals, as well as to prevent




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        the waste of time and money that occurs if the district court changes a judgment after an

        appeal has been briefed.”).

               The Supreme Court in Coinbase held that this rationale applies to arbitrability

        appeals because “continuation of proceedings in the district court ‘largely defeats the point

        of the appeal.’” 

 (quoting Bradford-Scott, 

). In effect,

        continuing to litigate in the court system renders the party’s statutory right to avoid doing

        so a nullity. Coinbase nowhere, as the majority claims, discarded two centuries of practice

        and established what is tantamount to a generally applicable substantive Canon in Favor of

        Automatic Stays.

               In that vein, nothing in the statute at issue in this case requires that district courts be

        stripped of their discretion to determine whether to impose a stay. That’s because

        “[s]tatutory texts are not just common law principles or aspirations to be shaped and

        applied as judges think reasonable. This tenet—adhere to the text—is neutral as a matter

        of politics and policy. The statutory text may be pro-business or pro-labor, pro-

        development or pro-environment, pro-bank or pro-consumer. Regardless, judges should

        follow clear text where it leads.” Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 

, 2135 (2016) (reviewing Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes

        (2014)).

               Ultimately, the question before this Court is: what limiting principle applies to

        Coinbase? In an effort to shape a generalizable rule, the majority elides Coinbase’s

        discussion on the particular burdens that the risk of continuing proceedings places on those

        appealing arbitrability and how those burdens undermine the Federal Arbitration Act. See

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        Coinbase, 599 U.S. at 741–43. The Supreme Court in Coinbase reasoned that if a district

        court continued “proceedings while the appeal on arbitrability was ongoing, then many of

        the asserted benefits of arbitration (efficiency, less expense, less intrusive discovery, and

        the like) would be irretrievably lost—even if the court of appeals later concluded that the

        case actually had belonged in arbitration all along.” 

. And this waste would mean

        that the right to an interlocutory arbitrability appeal “would be largely nullified.” 

               The majority believes this discussion to be dicta. At least three Justices have

        suggested otherwise. 

 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[I]t might well be that the

        concerns motivating today’s mandatory-general-stay rule do not extend beyond

        arbitration.”). Other courts, including at least three circuits, have understood Coinbase as

        being limited to arbitration as well.2 And for decades the Supreme Court has treated

        arbitration as exceptional. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 

, 339

        (2011) (“We have described this provision [of the Federal Arbitration Act] as reflecting . . .

        a ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration[.]’” (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.

        Mercury Constr. Corp., 

 (1983))).




               2
                See, e.g., Gov’t of P.R. v. Express Scripts, Inc., 

, 184 n.3 (1st Cir.
        2024); County of Westchester v. Express Scripts, Inc., No. 24-1639 (2d Cir. Sept. 6, 2024),
        ECF No. 72; Georgia v. Clark, No. 23-13368, 

, at *2 (11th
        Cir. Dec. 21, 2023); Wilhoite v. Hou, No. 23-cv-02333, 

, at *3–4 (S.D.
        Cal. June 6, 2024), appeal docketed sub nom. Wilhoite v. TuSimple Holdings, Inc., No. 24-
        3695 (9th Cir. June 13, 2024); Westchester County v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 

, 230 & n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2024), appeal docketed sub nom. Yates County v. Mylan
        Pharms., Inc., No. 24-1756 (2d Cir. July 1, 2024); Att’y Gen. of N.J. v. Dow Chem. Co.,
        No. 23-cv-2449 (RK) (JBD), 

, at *9–10 (D.N.J. July 9, 2024).

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               It is beyond question that the Supreme Court has the power to engage in policy

        choice. But that’s not an invitation for this Court to do the same. Regardless, we must only

        read a Supreme Court decision to abrogate others when it does so with clarity, and we

        should otherwise “leav[e] to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own

        decisions.” Agostini v. Felton, 

 (1997) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v.

        Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 

 (1989)).

               It is clear to me that the Supreme Court’s decision in Coinbase does not constitute

        a general withdrawal of the discretion that courts have exercised for centuries—rather, it

        merely represents a carve-out in favor of arbitration. And this Court’s practice has made

        clear that stays of a district court’s federal-officer-remand decision are discretionary. See,

        e.g., Cnty. Bd. of Arlington Cnty. v. Express Scripts Pharmacy, Inc., No. 20-1031 (4th Cir.

        Feb. 21, 2020), ECF No. 22; Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. BP P.L.C., No. 19-1644 (4th

        Cir. Oct. 1, 2019), ECF No. 116. Without clear direction from the Supreme Court, I see no

        reason to contravene the plain text of the statute and strip district courts of an inherent,

        discretionary power.

               Thus, I must, with great respect for my esteemed colleagues, dissent.




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