Pakuja Vang v. Catawba Medical Center

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Pakuja Vang v. Catawba Medical Center

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1711      Doc: 8         Filed: 02/20/2025    Pg: 1 of 4




                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT


                                               No. 23-1711


        PAKUJA CRYSTAL VANG,

                             Plaintiff - Appellant,

                      v.

        CATAWBA MEDICAL CENTER; CATAWBA VALLEY FAMILY MEDICINE
        CLAREMONT; BETHANY MEDICAL CENTER; FRYE NEUROLOGY;
        EMERGEORTHO; EMERGEORTHO PHYSICAL THERAPY; LINCOLN
        FINANCIAL GROUP; NOVANT HEALTH MATTHEWS MEDICAL CENTER;
        CAROLINA EMG SPECIALISTS; LINCOLN INTERNAL MEDICINE; CONES
        INTERNAL MEDICINE; HICKORY SOCIAL SECURITY OFFICE;
        ORTHOCAROLINA; ORTHOCAROLINA ORTHOPEDIC; ATRIUM HEALTH
        WAKE FOREST BAPTIST, Rheumatology - Westchester; PRIVIA MEDICAL
        GROUP;        INOVASPINE;           INOVA           NEUROLOGY;
        ONEHEALTHMEDICALCARE;       ORTHO       VIRGINIA;      WALMART
        PHARMACY; BURKE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES; THE HEALTH PLAN;
        CAREFIRST; BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF NORTH CAROLINA;
        ANTHEM HEALTHKEEPERS; BRIGHT HEALTHCARE; HEALTHSMART
        PHARMACY; SPECORTHO; MOSES CONES SPORT MEDICINE CENTER;
        NEUROLOGY CENTER; WAKEMED RALEIGH CAMPUS, Adult Emergency
        Room; DES CENTRAL OFFICE, Location; UPS STORE; UNITED STATES
        POSTAL SERVICE; NC MEDICAL BOARD; NC WHISTLE PROTECTION
        LABOR,

                             Defendants - Appellees.



        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, Chief District Judge. (1:23-cv-00018-MR-WCM)


        Submitted: December 10, 2024                                  Decided: February 20, 2025
USCA4 Appeal: 23-1711      Doc: 8        Filed: 02/20/2025     Pg: 2 of 4




        Before WYNN, HARRIS, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.


        Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.


        Pakuja Crystal Vang, Appellant Pro Se.


        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.




                                                    2
USCA4 Appeal: 23-1711      Doc: 8         Filed: 02/20/2025      Pg: 3 of 4




        PER CURIAM:

               Pakuja Crystal Vang seeks to appeal the district court’s February 9, 2023,

        memorandum of decision and order dismissing with prejudice her civil complaint pursuant

        to 
28 U.S.C. § 1915
(e)(2)(B). 1 As explained below, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

               When the United States or its officer or agency is a party in a civil case, the notice

        of appeal must be filed no more than 60 days after the entry of the district court’s final

        judgment or order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal

        period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P.

        4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional

        requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 
551 U.S. 205, 214
 (2007).

               Here, the district court entered its dismissal order on February 9, 2023, so Vang had

        60 days from the entry of that order, or until April 10, 2023, to appeal it. 2 But Vang did

        not file her notice of appeal until June 20, 2023. Although Vang filed a postjudgment

        motion to amend the complaint about two weeks after the district court entered the


               1
                 In her notice of appeal, Yang designated a later, postjudgment district court order.
        But her informal brief addresses only the court’s February 9, 2023, dismissal, and we thus
        understand her to have appealed that decision. See Jackson v. Lightsey, 
775 F.3d 170, 176
        (4th Cir. 2014) (taking “functional approach” to identifying decision on appeal).
               2
                 The district court’s dismissal order also directed Vang to show cause why a
        prefiling review system should not be imposed against her. Despite that direction, the
        dismissal aspect of the district court’s order was final and appealable. Cf. Budinich v.
        Becton Dickinson & Co., 
486 U.S. 196, 202-03
 (1988) (“[A] decision on the merits is a
        ‘final decision’ for purposes of [28 U.S.C.] § 1291 whether or not there remains for
        adjudication a request for attorney’s fees attributable to the case.”); Bogney v. Jones, 
904 F.2d 272
, 273 n.1 (5th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that dismissal order was final and appealable
        despite pending sanctions motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11).

                                                     3
USCA4 Appeal: 23-1711      Doc: 8         Filed: 02/20/2025      Pg: 4 of 4




        dismissal order, that motion did not toll the appeal period. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)

        (specifying motions that toll appeal period); cf. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 
852 F.3d 1018
, 1023 n.1 (11th Cir. 2016) (ruling that a postjudgment motion for leave to amend

        the complaint tolled the appeal period because “it challenged the basis for the district

        court’s dismissal of the original complaint”). Because Vang did not timely appeal the

        dismissal order, we lack jurisdiction to review that order.

               Accordingly, we dismiss Vang’s appeal. We dispense with oral argument because

        the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court

        and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                      DISMISSED




                                                     4


Reference

Status
Unpublished