USCA4 Appeal: 25-1196 Doc: 23 Filed: 07/28/2025 Pg: 1 of 2

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-1196

MARLA F. CRAWFORD, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS; PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge. (8:22-cv-02669-TDC)

Submitted: July 24, 2025 Decided: July 28, 2025

Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Marla Crawford, Appellant Pro Se. Briah Monae Gray, Edmund J. O’Meally, PESSIN KATZ LAW, P.A., Towson, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 25-1196 Doc: 23 Filed: 07/28/2025 Pg: 2 of 2

PER CURIAM: Marla F. Crawford seeks to appeal the district court’s order granting Defendants summary judgment on her claims brought pursuant to the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213. Defendant Prince George’s County Board of Education has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely.

In civil cases, parties have 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).

The district court entered its order on December 23, 2024, and the appeal period expired on January 22, 2025. Crawford filed the notice of appeal—which the district court also construed as a motion for leave to appeal—on February 21, 2025, after the 30-day appeal period expired but within the 30-day excusable neglect period. Because Crawford’s notice of appeal was filed within the excusable neglect period and she expressed a desire to preserve her appellate rights, we defer ruling on the motion to dismiss and remand the case to the district court for the court to determine whether Crawford has met the requirements necessary for an extension of the appeal period. The record, as supplemented, will then be returned to this court for further consideration.

REMANDED