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                                             PUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT


                                              No. 24-1324


        GENOVEVO ALVAREZ RONQUILLO,

                            Petitioner,

                     v.

        PAMELA JO BONDI, Attorney General,

                            Respondent.


        On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.


        Argued: May 6, 2025                                           Decided: August 14, 2025


        Before RICHARDSON and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit
        Judge.


        Petition denied by published opinion. Senior Judge Floyd wrote the opinion in which Judge
        Richardson and Judge Heytens joined.


        ARGUED: Angelene G. Superable, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER,
        Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Kathryn M. McKinney, for Respondent. ON BRIEF:
        Erica Hashimoto, Director, John H. Peng, Supervising Attorney, Cassidy E. Jones, Student
        Counsel, Appellate Litigation Program, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER,
        Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Drew Ensign, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
        Stephen J. Flynn, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division,
        UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
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        FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge:

               This petition concerns whether a conviction under 

(a)(1)(A)

        qualifies as an “aggravated felony.” Because we agree with the Board of Immigration

        Appeals (BIA) that it does, we deny the petition for review.1



                                                     I.

               Petitioner Genovevo Alvarez Ronquillo is a native and citizen of Mexico and lawful

        permanent resident of the United States. Between 2018 and 2019, he purchased firearms

        in the United States and then, without a license, resold them in Mexico.

               As a result of his unlicensed firearms sales, Alvarez Ronquillo was convicted of

        violating 

(a)(1)(A) (among other statutes) and sentenced to 78 months in

        prison. Section 922(a)(1)(A) states: “It shall be unlawful for any person, except a licensed

        importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer, to engage in the business of importing,

        manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or in the course of such business to ship, transport,

        or receive any firearm in interstate or foreign commerce.”

               The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against

        Alvarez Ronquillo based on his § 922(a)(1)(A) conviction, alleging that he committed an



        1
          The immigration judge (IJ) in this case appeared remotely from his assigned post in Texas.
        Therefore, the proper venue for this petition may be the Fifth Circuit. See Herrera-Alcala
        v. Garland, 

, 243 (4th Cir. 2022) (“Venue … depends on the location of the
        [IJ].”). However, when, as here, neither party seeks a transfer, we need not analyze venue.
        See Annor v. Garland, 

, 825 n.1 (4th Cir. 2024) (declining to examine venue
        because the venue provision, 

(b)(2), “is nonjurisdictional” and neither party
        requests a transfer).

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        “aggravated felony.” Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), “[a]ny alien who

        is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.” 

(a)(2)(A)(iii); see Hsieh v. Bondi, 

 (4th Cir. 2025) (recognizing

        same). DHS specifically alleged that he committed the generic aggravated felony of “illicit

        trafficking in firearms.” See 

(a)(43)(C) (defining “aggravated felony” to

        include “illicit trafficking in firearms”).

               The IJ and (later) the BIA agreed that Alvarez Ronquillo committed an aggravated

        felony. They also denied his alternate grounds for relief and ordered his removal.

               Alvarez Ronquillo now petitions for review of the BIA’s order.2 He argues that his

        conviction is not an aggravated felony because § 922(a)(1)(A) is not a categorical match

        for the generic offense of “illicit trafficking in firearms.” In other words, he argues that §

        922(a)(1)(A) criminalizes a broader range of conduct than “illicit trafficking in firearms.”3



                                                      II.

               This petition presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de

        novo. Gonzalez v. Sessions, 

 (4th Cir. 2018); see Wambura, 980 F.3d at

        369 n.3 (“We review legal questions raised in petitions for review de novo.”).




        2
          When, as here, “the BIA issued its own detailed opinion” and did not “expressly adopt[]
        the IJ’s opinion,” “we focus our review on the BIA’s decision.” Wambura v. Barr, 

, 368 n.2 (4th Cir. 2020).
        3
          Alvarez Ronquillo raises a number of additional issues in his informal brief, but we
        summarily reject them as lacking merit.

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               As previewed, under the INA, “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony

        at any time after admission is deportable.” 

(a)(2)(A)(iii). The INA defines

        “aggravated felony” to include the generic offense of “illicit trafficking in firearms.” 

 §

        1101(a)(43)(C). At issue here is whether Alvarez Ronquillo’s § 922(a)(1)(A) conviction

        qualifies as “illicit trafficking in firearms.”

               To answer this question, we apply the “categorical approach.” Esquivel-Quintana

        v. Sessions, 

 (2017) (citing Kawashima v. Holder, 

        (2012)). “Under that approach, we ask whether ‘the … statute defining the crime of

        conviction’ categorically fits within the ‘generic’ federal definition of a corresponding

        aggravated felony.” 

 (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 

 (2013)).

               “In other words, we presume that the … conviction ‘rested upon … the least of th[e]

        acts’ criminalized by [§ 922(a)(1)(A)], and then we determine whether that conduct would

        fall within the federal definition of [‘illicit trafficking in firearms’].” Id. (quoting Johnson

        v. United States, 

 (2010) (We focus on the least of the criminalized acts

        so that noncitizens are “removable based on the nature of their convictions, not based on

        their actual conduct.”)). If such conduct falls within the definition, there is a categorial

        match, and the conviction is an aggravated felony. See 

               Of note, the parties agree that both statutes use the same definition of “firearms.”

        See 

(a)(3) (defining “firearm”). Therefore, Alvarez Ronquillo “makes a

        categorical overbreadth challenge only to the ‘illicit trafficking’ component of ‘illicit

        trafficking in firearms.’” Opening Br. 15 n.2.



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                                                    A.

               To begin the categorical approach, we turn to the text of the aggravated felony

        statute. See 

(a)(43)(C). This statute, however, does not define the generic

        offense of “illicit trafficking in firearms.” We therefore must rely on “the normal tools of

        statutory interpretation” to determine “‘what Congress probably meant.’”          Esquivel-

        Quintana, 

 (quoting Lopez v. Gonzales, 

 (2006)).

               “In construing a statute’s meaning, we ‘begin, as always, with the language of the

        statute.’” Lee v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 

 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Duncan v.

        Walker, 

, 172 (2001)). Our aim is to determine whether that language “has a

        plain and unambiguous meaning[.]” Id. (quoting Ignacio v. United States, 

 (4th Cir. 2012)). “If the plain language is unambiguous, we need look no further.” 

        “‘[A]bsent ambiguity or a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary,’” we simply

        give the statute its “plain meaning.” United States v. George, 

 (4th Cir.

        2020) (quoting United States v. Abdelshafi, 

 (4th Cir. 2010)).

               The government proposes that the plain meaning of “illicit trafficking in firearms”

        is “unlawful trading or dealing in firearms.” We agree. Alvarez Ronquillo objects to this

        definition for a host of reasons. We examine them below but find each unpersuasive.



                                                     i.

               First, Alvarez Ronquillo argues that the government’s interpretation parrots the

        BIA’s, and the BIA is not entitled to Skidmore deference. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,

        

 (1944) (Agency decisions “constitute a body of experience and informed

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        judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance” so long as they

        have the “power to persuade.”).4 In doing so, he claims that the BIA’s interpretation

        follows unpersuasive precedent, namely Chacon v. Wilkinson, 

 (9th Cir.

        2021) and In Matter of Davis, 

 (BIA 1992), abrogated on other grounds

        as recognized by, Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 

, 911–12 (9th Cir. 2004).

               For context, Chacon is the only other circuit-level opinion to address the question

        of whether a § 922(a)(1)(A) conviction qualifies as an “aggravated felony.” 

. In finding that the answer is “yes,” the Ninth Circuit relies on Matter of Davis. See

        

 at 1133–34. In Matter of Davis, the BIA analyzes a different generic aggravated felony

        (namely, “illicit trafficking in any controlled substance,” 

(a)(43)(B)), but,

        relevant here, the opinion concludes that “illicit trafficking” means “unlawful trading or

        dealing.” 20 I&N Dec. at 541 (“[W]e conclude that a drug-related aggravated felony

        includes any state, federal, or qualified foreign felony conviction involving the unlawful

        trading or dealing of any controlled substance[.]”).

               Ultimately, we find that we need not decide whether the BIA’s interpretation is

        entitled to Skidmore deference because we adopt the “unlawful trading or dealing in

        firearms” definition as our own. In other words, we adopt this definition because it is the




        4
          The parties agree that agencies are no longer entitled to Chevron deference. See Loper
        Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 

, 411–12 (2024) (overruling Chevron, U.S.A.,
        Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 

 (1984)).


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        correct one, not because it is owed deference. We outline the merits of this definition in

        the next section when considering Alvarez Ronquillo’s remaining arguments.



                                                      ii.

               Alvarez Ronquillo next claims that the government’s definition disregards the key

        qualifier that is “illicit trafficking in firearms.” Put differently, he argues that the meaning

        of “illicit trafficking” varies based on the type of object being trafficked, and the

        government fails to account for this.

               In making this argument, Alvarez Ronquillo concedes that the government’s

        interpretation aligns with dictionary definitions of both “illicit” and “trafficking” at the

        time of the aggravated felony statute’s enactment. Likewise, he concedes that “searching

        for the plain meaning of a statute’s text often starts with reading dictionaries published

        close in time to when it was enacted.” Lovo v. Miller, 

 (4th Cir. 2024)

        (quoting Davidson v. United Auto Credit Corp., 

 (4th Cir. 2023)); see

        also Abdelshafi, 

 (“A statute’s plain meaning is determined by reference to

        its words’ ‘ordinary meaning at the time of the statute’s enactment.’” (quoting United

        States v. Simmons, 

 (4th Cir. 2001))); George, 

 (“To glean

        a word’s ordinary meaning, courts often look to dictionaries[.]”).

               Both concessions are sound. Congress codified “illicit trafficking in firearms” as

        an aggravated felony in 1988. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 

, 

, 4469–70 (“‘aggravated felony’ means … any illicit trafficking in any

        firearms”). It later modified the statute to its current language in 1994. See Immigration

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        and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, 

, 

, 4320–21 (“‘aggravated felony’ means … illicit trafficking in firearms”).

               Dictionaries published around this time support defining “illicit trafficking” as

        “unlawful trading or dealing.” See, e.g., Illicit, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)

        (“Not permitted or allowed; prohibited; unlawful; as an illicit trade; illicit intercourse.”);

        Trafficking, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (“Trading or dealing in certain goods

        and commonly used in connection with illegal narcotic sales.”). The same holds true for

        today’s dictionaries. See, e.g., Illicit, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“Illegal or

        improper.”); Trafficking, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“The act of transporting,

        trading, or dealing, esp. in illegal goods or people.”).

               Alvarez Ronquillo counters that these concessions are not meaningful, however,

        because “illicit trafficking” alone “does not sufficiently address the nuanced differences

        between the trafficking of different objects.” Opening Br. 21. He centers this argument

        on the idea that dictionary definitions of “trafficking” focus on the trafficking of

        “commodities that inherently reflect some element of criminality,” e.g., illegal goods. 

. This is a problem, he argues, because firearms are not inherently criminal.

               We reject this argument. As an initial matter, dictionary definitions expressly

        acknowledge that “trafficking” can involve, but does not always involve, illegal goods.

        See, e.g., Trafficking, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“The act of transporting,

        trading, or dealing, esp. in illegal goods or people.”) (emphasis added); Trafficking,

        Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (“Trading or dealing in certain goods and commonly

        used in connection with illegal narcotic sales.”) (emphasis added).

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               This approach makes sense. After all, the trafficking of many objects, even those

        commonly associated with crime, is rarely inherently criminal—hence, the need for the

        qualifier “illicit.” Controlled substances, for example, can be sold by both dealers in alleys

        and pharmacists in grocery stores.

               Relatedly, it is a “normal rule of statutory interpretation that identical words used in

        different parts of the same statute are generally presumed to have the same meaning.” IBP,

        Inc. v. Alvarez, 

 (2005). The INA uses “illicit trafficking” in association

        with two different objects: controlled substances and firearms.            See 

(a)(43)(B)–(C). Alvarez Ronquillo’s unsubstantiated claim about the “inherent

        criminality” of some objects is not enough for us to disregard this rule and apply various

        meanings to “illicit trafficking.”

               Despite this internal INA guidance, Alvarez Ronquillo ultimately asks us to consult

        outside sources to uniquely define “illicit trafficking in firearms.” He highlights two

        sources in particular: (1) Section 2K2.1(b)(5) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, especially

        its 2006 commentary; and (2) the Stop Illegal Trafficking in Firearms Act, Pub. L. 117–

        159, § 12004, 

, 1327 (2022). His overall claim is that these sources

        “demonstrate” that “illicit trafficking in firearms” means the “deliberate transfer of

        firearms for unlawful use.” See Opening Br. 22–23, 27.

               Alvarez Ronquillo is correct that outside sources like a “closely related federal

        statute” can offer “further evidence” of the meaning of a “generic federal definition.” See

        Esquivel-Quintana, 

. But we are unconvinced that our reading of an

        immigration statute from 1988 should be controlled by sentencing guidance from 2006 or

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        a separate statutory scheme from 2022. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 

, 12 & n.9 (2004)

        (finding that one INA provision enacted “just nine months earlier” “strongly supports” the

        Court’s interpretation of a second INA provision).

               Our skepticism is only emphasized by the fact that neither source is referenced in

        the aggravated felony statute. “[M]any … aggravated felonies in the INA,” including this

        one, “are defined by cross-reference to other provisions of the United States Code.”

        Esquivel-Quintana, 

; see 

(a)(43)(C) (cross-referencing 

(a)(3) and § 841(c)). Therefore, “if Congress wanted to” meaningfully relate

        these authorities, it “knew how to do so.” Pugin v. Garland, 

 (2023).

               Ultimately, without any real evidence that these (or other) sources should define this

        aggravated felony, we rely on the “[s]urrounding provisions of the INA [to] guide our

        interpretation.” Esquivel-Quintana, 

. As outlined, the INA expressly

        provides that “illicit trafficking” can and should be used to define the “trafficking” of

        different objects. Compare 

(a)(43)(B), with 

 § 1101(a)(43)(C).



                                                     iii.

               In sum, we reject Alvarez Ronquillo’s arguments and agree with the government

        that the plain meaning of “illicit trafficking in firearms” is “unlawful trading or dealing in

        firearms.”   Because we are not confronted with “ambiguity or a clearly expressed




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        legislative intent to the contrary,” we give this generic aggravated felony statute its plain

        meaning. See George, 

 (quoting Abdelshafi, 

).5



                                                     B.

               With the meaning of our aggravated felony statute in place, we now compare this

        generic offense to Alvarez Ronquillo’s statute of conviction to determine if there is a

        categorical match. We conclude that there is.

               Again, the statute of conviction states: “It shall be unlawful for any person, except

        a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer, to engage in the business of

        importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or in the course of such business to ship,

        transport, or receive any firearm in interstate or foreign commerce.”          

(a)(1)(A). Surrounding provisions also provide that “engaged in the business” means:

               a person who devotes time, attention, and labor to dealing in firearms as a
               regular course of trade or business to predominantly earn a profit through the
               repetitive purchase and resale of firearms, but such term shall not include a
               person who makes occasional sales, exchanges, or purchases of firearms for
               the enhancement of a personal collection or for a hobby, or who sells all or
               part of his personal collection of firearms … [or] a person who makes
               occasional repairs of firearms, or who occasionally fits special barrels,
               stocks, or trigger mechanisms to firearms.

        

 §§ 921(a)(21)(C)–(D).




        5
          We also disregard Alvarez Ronquillo’s arguments about legislative history. See Ctr. for
        Env’t Health v. Regan, 

, 1038 n.12 (4th Cir. 2024) (“[L]egislative history is
        irrelevant to the interpretation of an unambiguous statute.” (quoting In re Moore, 

, 1478–79 (4th Cir. 1990)).

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               As the Third Circuit explains, this language creates a “regulatory/licensing offense.”

        Mayorga v. Att’y Gen., 

 (3d Cir. 2014). Nothing indicates to us that

        “unlawful trading or dealing in firearms” fails to cover this licensing offense. In fact, we

        agree with the Ninth Circuit that “[s]omeone engaged in the business of manufacturing,

        dealing, or importing firearms without a license … is necessarily engaged in the unlawful

        trading or dealing in firearms.” Chacon, 

.6

               Alvarez Ronquillo implicitly concedes this overlap. He argues that, if we adopt the

        government’s interpretation, it is only an exception to § 922(a)(1)(A) that makes the statute

        broader. This exception, dubbed the “proof of profit” exception, falls under § 921(a)(22).

        It holds: the statute’s intent-to-profit requirement “shall not be required as to a person who

        engages in the regular and repetitive purchase and disposition of firearms for criminal

        purposes or terrorism.” According to Alvarez Ronquillo, per this exception, a firearm

        dealer can be convicted under § 922(a)(1)(A) without receiving consideration, and “trading

        or dealing in firearms” “requires the exchange of consideration.” See Opening Br. 39.

               We reject this argument. Even assuming that: (1) “trading or dealing in firearms”

        requires an exchange of consideration; and (2) a dealer does not receive consideration when

        they provide firearms “for criminal purposes or terrorism,” consideration remains at play.

        To fall under the “proof of profit” exception, one must still “engage[] in the regular and

        repetitive purchase and disposition of firearms.” 

(a)(22) (emphasis added).



        6
          Like with the aggravated felony statute, we find § 922(a)(1)(A)’s plain language
        unambiguous and do not consider Alvarez Ronquillo’s arguments about legislative history.
        See supra Note 5.

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        As a result, a dealer must first complete “purchases” that almost certainly involve a

        traditional form of consideration. Nothing in the text of § 921(a)(22) instructs us to

        disregard these purchases. In fact, the exception instructs us to consider them.

               We therefore disagree that the “proof of profit” exception makes § 922(a)(1)(A) a

        broader offense than “unlawful trading or dealing in firearms.” We instead find that the

        two offenses are a categorical match. Because the offenses are a categorical match, we

        agree with the BIA that Alvarez Ronquillo committed an aggravated felony—specifically,

        the generic aggravated felony of “illicit trafficking in firearms.” 

(a)(43)(C).



                                                    III.

               Based on the foregoing, we deny the petition to review the BIA’s order.



                                                                                      DENIED.




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