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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT


                                               No. 24-4290


        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        ROLAND VANCE WATSON,

                             Defendant - Appellant.



        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Statesville. Kenneth D. Bell, District Judge. (5:23-cr-00035-KDB-DCK-1)


        Submitted: September 3, 2025                                Decided: September 12, 2025


        Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.


        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.


        ON BRIEF: Charles R. Brewer, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth
        Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.


        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Ronald Vance Watson pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to

        production of child pornography (Count 2), in violation of 

(a), (e), and

        committing a felony involving a minor while being required to register as a sex offender

        (Count 6), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2260A. The district court sentenced him to a total

        of 460 months’ imprisonment and a life term of supervised release. On appeal, counsel

        has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 

 (1967), stating that there

        are no meritorious grounds for appeal and raising no specific issue for consideration.

        Although informed of his right to do so, Watson has not filed a pro se supplemental brief.

        We affirm.

               A guilty plea is valid if the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently

        pleaded guilty “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely

        consequences.” United States v. Fisher, 

 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation

        modified). Accordingly, before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a

        plea colloquy during which it must inform the defendant of, and determine that the

        defendant understands, the rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty, the charges to

        which he is pleading, and the maximum and mandatory minimum penalties he faces. Fed.

        R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The court also must ensure that the plea is voluntary and not the

        result of threats, force, or promises not contained in the plea agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P.

        11(b)(2), and that a factual basis supports the plea, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).

               Because Watson did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea, our review of the adequacy

        of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing is for plain error. United States v. King, 

,

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        760 (4th Cir. 2024) (stating standard of review and providing standard). We have reviewed

        the Rule 11 colloquy and conclude that, although the magistrate judge * made several

        omissions, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(D), (E), (H), (M), none of those omissions affected

        Watson’s substantial rights. See Greer v. United States, 

 (2021) (stating

        standard in Rule 11 context). Moreover, our review of the record confirms that Watson

        was competent to enter a plea, see United States v. Nicholson, 

 (4th Cir.

        2012) (stating that court “must ensure that the defendant is competent to enter the plea”

        (citation modified)), that he knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea, and that a

        factual basis adequately supports his plea.

               Turning to Watson’s sentence, we review a criminal “sentence[]—whether inside,

        just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-

        discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 

 (2007). We “must first ensure

        that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as . . . improperly

        calculating[] the [Sentencing] Guidelines range, . . . failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]

        § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to

        adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. at 51. If there is no significant procedural

        error, then we consider the sentence’s substantive reasonableness under “the totality of the

        circumstances.” Id.; see United States v. Provance, 

 (4th Cir. 2019).

        Where, as here, the sentence is within the advisory Guidelines range, we presume that the

        sentence is substantively reasonable. United States v. Henderson, 

, 297 (4th


               *
                   Watson consented to proceed before a magistrate judge.

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        Cir.), cert. denied, 

 (2024). “The presumption can only be rebutted by

        showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 

(a)

        factors.” 

 (citation modified).

               We conclude that the district court imposed a procedurally and substantively

        reasonable custodial sentence and that Watson has not rebutted the presumption of

        reasonableness afforded that sentence. Although the district court erred in imposing a life

        term of supervised release for Watson’s § 2260A conviction in Count 6, this error did not

        affect Watson’s substantial rights. United States v. Gifford, 

 (8th Cir.

        2021). Watson received two concurrent life terms of supervised release, so regardless of

        the error on Count 6, he still is subject to a life term of supervised release for Count 2, the

        § 2251 conviction. See United States v. Benton, 

 (4th Cir. 2022)

        (discussing concurrent sentence doctrine); United States v. Charles, 

 (4th

        Cir. 2019) (stating that concurrent sentence doctrine is “a species of harmless-error review

        where a defendant seeks to challenge the legality of a sentence that was imposed for a valid

        conviction, but where the challenged sentence runs concurrently with a valid sentence of

        an equal or greater duration”).

               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

        found no potentially meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district

        court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Watson, in writing, of the right

        to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Watson requests

        that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then



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        counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s

        motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Watson.

              We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                                AFFIRMED




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