USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 1 of 24

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-1547

JOHN SCOTT MORETTI,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

DETECTIVE HELGA THORSDOTTIR,

Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Patricia Tolliver Giles, District Judge. (1:23-cv-00020-PTG-IDD)

Argued: May 6, 2025 Decided: October 15, 2025

Before KING, THACKER, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in which Judge Thacker and Judge Berner joined. Judge Thacker wrote a concurring opinion, in which Judge Berner joined.

ARGUED: Alan Michael Mygatt-Thauber, PALADIN LAW OFFICE PLLC, Silverdale, Washington, for Appellant. Tara Jeannine Mooney, PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Prince William, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Joshua Erlich, Katherine L. Herrmann, THE ERLICH LAW OFFICE, PLLC, Arlington, Virginia, for Appellant. Deborah K. Siegel, PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Prince William, Virginia, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 2 of 24

KING, Circuit Judge:

By his operative Amended Complaint, initiated in the Eastern District of Virginia

in February 2023, John Scott Moretti alleges state and federal malicious prosecution claims

against Detective Helga Thorsdottir of the Prince William County Police Department. See

Moretti v. Thorsdottir, No. 1:23-cv-00020 (E.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2023), ECF No. 10 (the

“Complaint”). For reasons stated from the bench during a hearing on April 27, 2023, and

as memorialized in a written order entered that day, the district court dismissed the

Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Moretti v. Thorsdottir, No. 1:23-cv-

00020 (E.D. Va. Apr. 27, 2023), ECF No. 17 (the “Dismissal Order”).

In this appeal by Moretti from the Dismissal Order, the critical question is whether

the Complaint plausibly alleges a lack of probable cause for Moretti’s arrest and

prosecution to support his malicious prosecution claims. As explained herein, we agree

with the district court that it does not do so, and therefore affirm the dismissal.

I.

A.

We begin by reciting the facts alleged in the Complaint, which we accept as true

and view in the light most favorable to Moretti. See Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley,

(4th Cir. 2018) (“Because the district court dismissed the Complaint

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we accept and recite the

alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[].”). In reciting these facts, we also

2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 3 of 24

evaluate the exhibits to the Complaint. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus.,

Inc.,

(4th Cir. 2011) (“In deciding whether a complaint will survive a

motion to dismiss, a court evaluates the complaint in its entirety, as well as documents

attached or incorporated into the complaint.”).

1.

In June 2018, the Prince William County Police Department (the “Department”)

received a referral from Child Protective Services (“CPS”) concerning allegations of sexual

abuse of a minor child referred to herein as “Jane Doe.” 1 According to the report of

Detective Alfaro, who was assigned to the case at the time, CPS emphasized comments

made by Doe in an online chat to a suicide hotline expressing that she was sexually abused

by “her father’s friend” between the ages of 8 to 12 and that the alleged offender was now

“living in her home again.” See Complaint ¶ 26(a)-(b) (emphasis omitted). Alfaro’s report

mentioned Doe’s correspondence with the suicide hotline, but did not include a transcript

thereof. The Department soon moved the case to inactive status after Doe refused to

discuss the allegations or identify her alleged abuser in a police interview.

In September 2019, Doe was committed to a residential treatment facility after she

attempted suicide. While in treatment, Doe advised a therapist that she was sexually

abused by a man named “Scott Moretti” when she was between the ages of 8 to 12. See

1 We refer to the juvenile accuser as “Jane Doe” to protect her privacy, consistent with our precedent. See, e.g., Doe v. Sidar,

(4th Cir. 2024) (explaining that use of “fictitious names” is favored “when necessary to protect the privacy” of minors (internal quotation marks omitted)).

3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 4 of 24

Complaint Ex. C, at 1. The therapist reported Doe’s disclosure to the National Center for

Missing and Exploited Children, who in turn contacted the Department.

Detective Thorsdottir was assigned to the case on September 16, 2019, and promptly

reviewed the 2018 investigation report prepared by Detective Alfaro. On September 23,

2019, Thorsdottir conducted a child forensic interview with Doe. Doe’s therapist was also

present and was permitted to speak to and interact with Doe throughout the interview.

According to Thorsdottir’s report, Doe named Moretti as her abuser and detailed multiple

instances of sexual abuse and threats that occurred years earlier while Doe was at Moretti’s

home to play with Moretti’s daughter. 2 Doe specifically recounted an instance where

Moretti “put [a gun] up to [her] head” and forced her to engage in a sex act. See Complaint

Ex. C, at 3. On another occasion when Doe was approximately 9 years old, Moretti showed

her a camera he had purchased for his daughter’s birthday, and he took pictures of Doe

after he “instructed” Doe to take off her clothes. Id. at 4. Doe recounted that the final

incident of sexual abuse occurred when she was “12 and in the 6th grade.” Id.

In total, Detective Thorsdottir’s interview with Doe lasted more than five hours. At

the conclusion of the interview, Thorsdottir had obtained six handwritten and signed

statements that were completed by Doe while in residential treatment following the 2019

suicide attempt. Those statements detailed various instances of sexual abuse. One

statement indicated that Moretti had taken sexually explicit pictures of Doe. Moretti

2 We observe that substantial portions of the copy of Detective Thorsdottir’s report, as attached as an exhibit to the Complaint, have been redacted.

4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 5 of 24

alleges, however, that Doe’s therapist shared “inconsistencies between Doe’s description

of two specific incidences of sexual abuse” between what Doe shared in therapy and in the

police interview, and that Thorsdottir failed to document these discrepancies in her report.

See Complaint ¶¶ 46-50.

On September 30, 2019, Detective Thorsdottir interviewed Doe’s parents. Doe’s

parents stated that the family moved into the neighborhood when Doe was in 2nd grade,

and that Doe and Moretti’s daughter quickly became friends. Doe’s parents shared with

Thorsdottir that Doe would “spend a lot of time” at Moretti’s home, including “spending

the night,” but stated that they themselves had no contact with Moretti. See Complaint Ex.

C, at 6. Doe’s parents also indicated that Moretti had engaged in behavior that Thorsdottir

described in her report as “peculiar,” such as parking unnecessarily in front of their house

and staring at the house when Doe was home. Id. Doe’s parents advised Thorsdottir that

Doe had ceased being close to Moretti’s daughter around the 7th grade.

On October 14, 2019, Detective Thorsdottir contacted Ms. Combs, a clinical

therapist referenced in the Department’s 2018 report, who treated Doe after her 2018

suicide attempt. Combs shared with Thorsdottir that, in April 2018, Doe disclosed that she

was sexually abused by a “father of a friend” when she moved into a new neighborhood

when she was approximately 8 years old. See Complaint Ex. C, at 9. According to Combs,

Doe shared that the abuse began shortly after Doe moved to the area and made her first

friend. Doe informed Combs that her new friendship with her neighbor was very important

to her and that Doe would try to visit her friend when the friend’s father was not home.

5 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 6 of 24

Thorsdottir had previously discovered that Moretti worked for the federal government and

that he often travelled for work.

Shortly thereafter, Detective Thorsdottir began surveillance of Moretti’s home and

sought approval from her Department colleague, Ms. Tyrell, to seek warrants for a search

of Moretti’s residence and person. Tyrell expressed concern about seeking the search

warrants due to her belief that additional information was needed, specifically about the

circumstances under which Doe had identified Moretti and Doe’s previous disclosure of

the abuser as “a friend of her father that lived in the home.” See Complaint ¶ 63(a)-(e).

Tyrell recommended that further investigation be conducted prior to seeking any search

warrants.

On November 11, 2019, Detective Thorsdottir interviewed Moretti, who fully

cooperated with the investigation. During the interview, Moretti denied having ever

abused Doe but admitted that he had a daughter approximately the same age as Doe, that

the two girls were friends, and that Doe had visited his home. That same day, Thorsdottir

obtained from a Virginia magistrate two search warrants: (1) for Moretti’s person, listing

the criminal offense for which evidence was being sought as forcible sodomy, in

contravention of Virginia Code Section 18.2-67.1; and (2) for Moretti’s residence, listing

the criminal offense for which evidence was being sought as possession of child

pornography, in contravention of Virginia Code Section 18.2-374.1. Pursuant to those

warrants, officers located and seized a handgun in Moretti’s home. Cellphones, laptops,

tablets, documents, SD cards, and thumb drives were also seized during the searches. A

forensic search of Moretti’s electronic devices for evidence of child pornography was

6 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 7 of 24

completed in April 2020, but no information relevant to Thorsdottir’s investigation was

found. Photographs of Doe were submitted to the National Center for Missing and

Exploited Children to determine if the organization was aware of the existence of any

sexually explicit material of Doe. Those results were also negative.

2.

On May 5, 2020, Detective Thorsdottir filed a criminal complaint with a local Prince

William County magistrate seeking warrants for Moretti’s arrest. The magistrate found

that probable cause existed and issued an arrest warrant for the offenses identified in

Thorsdottir’s criminal complaint: (1) forcible sodomy, in violation of Virginia Code

Section 18.2-67.1; and (2) indecent liberties with a child, in violation of Virginia Code

Section 18.2-370. Moretti was arrested the same day. On August 3, 2020, a grand jury in

Prince William County indicted Moretti for, inter alia, forcible sodomy and indecent

liberties with a child.

On January 29, 2021, the Commonwealth Attorney’s Office produced discovery to

Moretti’s defense counsel, including Detective Alfaro’s report of his 2018 investigation.

That was the first time Moretti’s counsel learned that Doe had previously described her

abuser as her “father’s friend.” See Complaint ¶ 98. On May 28, 2021, Assistant

Commonwealth Attorney Lowe provided Moretti’s counsel with the 2018 CPS report,

indicating that she had “just received it” from Detective Thorsdottir. Id. at ¶ 105. The CPS

Report did not include a transcript of Doe’s online chat with the suicide hotline, and

Moretti’s counsel later secured the transcript by issuing a subpoena to the mental health

organization with whom Doe interacted.

7 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 8 of 24

The suicide hotline transcript revealed that Doe provided additional details about

her abuser that were not documented in Detective Alfaro’s 2018 report. Specifically, Doe

told the hotline operator (1) that her abuser was Doe’s father’s best friend; (2) her abuser

was the best man at Doe’s parents’ wedding; (3) her abuser had moved away but was

returning to the area in July 2018; and (4) her abuser had attended a wedding reception

with Doe and her family in 2015. 3

On January 4, 2022, ACA Lowe moved to nolle prosequi the Commonwealth’s case

against Moretti, and an order granting the motion was entered that same day. 4 In a letter

to the court, Ms. Lowe explained that “[t]hese messages clearly show the victim naming

another individual besides the defendant as her abuser in detail in June of 2018.” See

Complaint Ex. I, at 1. The letter also stated that “[t]he victim is no longer willing to go

forward with the prosecution.” Id.

B.

This civil action was initiated by Moretti in the Circuit Court for Prince William

County before its removal to the Eastern District of Virginia on January 6, 2023. The

Complaint alleged a malicious prosecution claim under Virginia common law and a Fourth

3 The suicide hotline transcript was not an exhibit to the Complaint and is therefore not part of the record on appeal. Our description of that transcript is drawn from the Complaint. 4 An entry of nolle prosequi “generally does not act as an acquittal.” See Commonwealth v. Garrett,

(Va. 2008). Rather, “[u]nder Virginia procedure[,] a nolle prosequi is a discontinuance which discharges the accused from liability on the indictment to which the nolle prosequi is entered.” See Miller v. Commonwealth,

(Va. 1977).

8 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 9 of 24

Amendment malicious prosecution claim under

. In March 2023,

Detective Thorsdottir filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, contending that Moretti

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and claiming qualified immunity.

On April 27, 2023, the district court conducted a hearing on Detective Thorsdottir’s

motion to dismiss. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court orally granted Thorsdottir’s

motion from the bench and dismissed the Complaint in its entirety. On both the state and

federal claims, the court determined that Moretti had failed to plead sufficient facts to

plausibly allege that Thorsdottir’s investigation lacked probable cause. For similar reasons,

the court ruled that Thorsdottir did not violate Moretti’s constitutional right to be free from

unreasonable seizure and therefore that Thorsdottir was entitled to qualified immunity on

the § 1983 claim.

Moretti has timely noticed this appeal from the resultant Dismissal Order, and we

possess jurisdiction pursuant to

.

II.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim. See Mylan Lab’ys., Inc. v. Matkari,

, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). Again, in conducting this review, we accept the

complaint’s factual allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. See Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley,

(4th Cir. 2018). We

may also consider any exhibits attached to the complaint where they are integral to the

complaint’s allegations and no party in the litigation has challenged their authenticity. See

9 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 10 of 24

Sec’y of State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd.,

, 705 (4th Cir. 2007).

We are not obliged, however, to accept as true the allegations of the complaint that conflict

with its exhibits. See S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. OpenBand at

Broadlands, LLC,

(4th Cir. 2013) (“[I]n the event of conflict between

the bare allegations of the complaint and any exhibit attached [to the complaint,] . . . the

exhibit prevails.” (internal quotations marks omitted)).

III.

On appeal, Moretti challenges the dismissal of his federal and state malicious

prosecution claims. 5 Although our analysis of the dismissal of these claims ultimately

turns on the issue of probable cause, we address each of them in turn.

A.

The district court dismissed Moretti’s federal malicious prosecution claim by

concluding that, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the

Complaint failed to plausibly allege that Detective Thorsdottir lacked probable cause in

seeking an arrest warrant and pursuing his prosecution. A federal malicious prosecution

5 Moretti also challenges on appeal the district court’s attendant determination that Detective Thorsdottir is entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability. As discussed herein, because we are readily satisfied that the Complaint does not allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment and thus is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), we need not address the court’s qualified immunity ruling. See Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ.,

, 306 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining plaintiff must allege violation of clearly established statutory or constitutional right to overcome officer’s assertion of affirmative defense of qualified immunity).

10 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 11 of 24

claim under

is properly understood as a claim for unreasonable seizure

in contravention of the Fourth Amendment. See Evans v. Chalmers,

(4th Cir. 2012). “The Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement officers from making

unreasonable seizures, and seizure of an individual effected without probable cause is

unreasonable.” See Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem,

(4th Cir. 1996)

(emphasis added). As a result, the central issue in this appeal is whether the facts, as alleged

in the Complaint and the exhibits attached thereto, plausibly allege a lack of probable

cause.

To that end, probable cause does not command that a law enforcement officer know

with perfect certainty that a crime has been committed. See United States v. Gray,

(4th Cir. 1998) (“While probable cause requires more than bare suspicion, it

requires less than that evidence necessary to convict.” (internal quotations omitted)). That

is, probable cause requires “only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal

activity. . . .” See Illinois v. Gates,

(1983) (internal quotations omitted).

This inquiry is governed by a “‘totality-of-the circumstances’ approach,” which employs

“an objective standard of probability that reasonable and prudent persons apply in everyday

life.” See Smith v. Munday,

(4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Gray,

). When analyzing an allegation of a lack of probable cause, a court “should only

consider the information the officers had at the time they sought the warrant.”

In this appeal, Moretti alleges that his seizure was unreasonable and unsupported by

probable cause because it flowed from an inaccurate warrant affidavit. To state a claim on

this theory, Moretti was obliged to plausibly allege that Detective Thorsdottir either

11 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 12 of 24

(1) deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth made material false statements to

obtain the arrest warrant; or (2) that she omitted from the affidavit “material facts with the

intent to make, or with reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit

misleading.” See Miller v. Prince George’s Cnty.,

(4th Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

1.

We will first assess whether the Complaint plausibly alleges that Detective

Thorsdottir acted deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth in submitting false

statements to obtain a warrant for Moretti’s arrest. To successfully plead that a police

officer acted with “reckless disregard,” the plaintiff must plausibly allege that the officer

acted with a “high degree of awareness” of a statement’s probable falsity, meaning that the

officer “must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had

obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information [s]he reported.” See Miller,

(internal quotation marks omitted).

We are satisfied that the allegations of the Complaint and its exhibits — including

Detective Alfaro’s 2018 report and the report of Detective Thorsdottir — do not plausibly

allege that Thorsdottir acted with a “high degree of awareness” that Doe’s identification of

Moretti as her abuser was probably false. Several facts support this crucial determination.

First, and most importantly, Doe identified her abuser as “Scott Moretti” in

residential treatment prior to the Department’s re-opening of the criminal case, and Doe

confirmed that identification in her September 2019 forensic interview with Thorsdottir.

See Torchinsky v. Siwinski,

(4th Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine

12 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 13 of 24

how a police officer could obtain better evidence of probable cause than an identification

by name of assailants provided by a victim . . . .”). Not only that, but Doe provided

Thorsdottir with detailed descriptions of her sexual abuse by her friend’s father in her

forensic interview, at least one of which was directly corroborated by statements Doe

previously drafted while in residential treatment. See Complaint ¶ 56 (“One of Doe’s

handwritten statements alleged the existence of pornographic pictures of Doe taken by Mr.

Moretti.”).

Second, though Moretti contends that Detective Thorsdottir’s investigation did not

yield any evidence that Moretti sexually abused Doe, the Complaint and its exhibits

demonstrate otherwise. To be sure, it was through Thorsdottir’s investigation that she

learned several facts supporting the warrant application, including (1) Doe’s family resided

close to Moretti’s home, (2) Doe became close friends with Moretti’s daughter upon

moving into the neighborhood when Doe was in 2nd grade, (3) Doe occasionally spent the

night at Moretti’s home with Moretti’s daughter, and (4) the timeline of Doe’s friendship

with Moretti’s daughter aligned with the timeline of abuse detailed by Doe in her forensic

interview.

Third, Detective Thorsdottir reviewed evidence collected by the Department in 2018

at the outset of her 2019 investigation, and she later contacted the clinical therapist

referenced by the 2018 report. The clinical therapist, Ms. Combs, confirmed that Doe told

her that she was sexually abused by the father of a friend, that the friendship was very

important to her, and that she tried to visit her friend when her friend’s father was not home.

That information was relayed to Combs in 2018 — prior to Thorsdottir’s investigation —

13 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 14 of 24

and it corroborated much of the information that Thorsdottir obtained in her interviews of

Doe and Doe’s parents, along with Thorsdottir’s own discovery that Moretti had travelled

frequently for work. Finally, a handgun was located in Moretti’s home during execution

of the search warrant, which was consistent with Doe’s description of a handgun being

used during one instance of sexual abuse. Put simply, it is impossible to imagine that the

facts available to Thorsdottir at the time of her investigation did not create probable cause

by demonstrating at least a “probability” of criminal activity. See Gates,

.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Moretti argues on appeal that the district court erred

in ruling that the Complaint did not plausibly allege a lack of probable case because

Thorsdottir provided in her warrant application that probable cause existed based on two facts alone: (1) that Jane Doe named Mr. Moretti as the perpetrator during [the forensic interview]; and (2) that a firearm was found in Mr. Moretti’s residence during the execution of a search warrant.

See Br. of Appellant 19-20. Moretti further contends that the firearm found has no bearing

on probable cause because Moretti was a law enforcement officer and nearly 50% of

Virginians own a firearm. Id. at 21. Accordingly, Moretti maintains that Doe’s

identification of him as the perpetrator is the only evidence remaining to support Detective

Thorsdottir’s affidavit, and this identification by itself does not support a finding of

probable cause.

We are unable to agree with Moretti. To be sure, the arrest warrant application, as

an exhibit to the Complaint, recites that Doe described an incident when Moretti threatened

her with a gun during an occasion of sexual abuse. The application then specified that a

search warrant for Moretti’s residence yielded multiple firearms. Taking these allegations

14 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 15 of 24

together — along with the information that was available to Detective Thorsdottir during

her investigation, such as Doe’s earlier identifications of her abuser to her therapists and

the information provided by Doe’s parents regarding Doe’s friendship with Moretti’s

daughter — we cannot say that Doe’s identification of Moretti as her abuser was unreliable,

or that Thorsdottir had a “high degree of awareness” that Moretti was probably not Doe’s

abuser. See Gates,

(“We have also recognized that affidavits are normally

drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical

requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleading have no

proper place in this area.” (internal quotations omitted)).

In these circumstances, we agree with the district court that the Complaint has not

plausibly alleged that Thorsdottir acted deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth

in submitting false information to obtain a warrant for Moretti’s arrest.

2.

We turn next to the second question posed by Moretti’s federal malicious

prosecution claim: whether Moretti plausibly alleges that Detective Thorsdottir omitted

material facts in her arrest warrant affidavit that would negate probable cause. See United

States v. Colkley,

(4th Cir. 1990) (establishing that a defendant can

attack an affidavit “when affiants omit material facts with the intent to make, or in reckless

disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading” (internal quotations

omitted)). For an omitted fact to be “material,” the “omission must do more than

potentially affect the probable cause determination: it must be ‘necessary to the [neutral

15 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 16 of 24

and disinterested magistrate’s] finding of probable cause.’”

at 301 (quoting Franks v.

Delaware,

(1978)).

To successfully allege that Detective Thorsdottir acted with reckless disregard with

respect to the omission of material facts, the Complaint had to plausibly allege that

Thorsdottir “failed to inform the judicial officer of facts [she] knew would negate probable

cause.” See Miller,

(internal quotations omitted). However, her omission

of facts by mere negligence or “innocent mistake” could not provide a basis for a

constitutional violation.

at 627-28 (quoting Franks,

).

In that respect, Moretti argues that several facts were omitted from the arrest

affidavit that would have negated a probable cause finding by the magistrate. Most

notably, Moretti claims that Detective Thorsdottir withheld the CPS report that prompted

the Department’s initial 2018 investigation, as well as the transcript of Doe’s suicide

hotline chat containing a description of her abuser that, indisputably, could not possibly

have referred to Moretti. At the court hearing on Thorsdottir’s motion to dismiss, however,

Moretti’s counsel conceded that there is no evidence that Thorsdottir had the suicide hotline

transcript at the time she sought the arrest warrant:

COURT: [J]ust to be clear, you’re not alleging that the transcript was in Detective Thorsdottir’s possession?

[COUNSEL]: No. We don’t have any reason to believe that. The e-mail trail that we’ve received seems to indicate otherwise.

16 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 17 of 24

J.A. 179. 6 Indeed, the Complaint fails to allege that Thorsdottir withheld that information

in seeking the arrest warrant. Rather, it merely alleges that the information from the CPS

report was withheld during the course of the prosecution. See Complaint ¶ 103 (“Despite

having this exculpatory evidence which had been expressly requested by the defense, Det.

Thorsdottir did not turn over the entirety of Det. Alfaro’s investigative file to the

Commonwealth Attorney’s Office responsible for the prosecution of Mr. Moretti.”).

Moretti has therefore failed to plausibly allege that the suicide hotline chat transcript

negates probable cause for seeking and obtaining an arrest warrant.

The remaining omissions emphasized by Moretti focus heavily on the initial

identification of the perpetrator as Doe’s “father’s friend” who had since moved away,

returned to the area, and was now present in Doe’s home again. See Complaint, ¶ 93.

Moretti also alleges that the search warrants secured by Detective Thorsdottir did not yield

any evidence of child pornography, and that none of the information Thorsdottir discovered

in her investigation matched the description of the perpetrator in the initial 2018 tip.

Moretti’s theory of the case presumes a degree of certainty that is inconsistent with

the probable cause standard. The exhibits to the Complaint indicate that Moretti had been

named as Doe’s abuser at least two separate times: in the 2019 tip from Doe’s residential

therapist, and by Doe repeatedly in her September 2019 forensic interview with Detective

6 Citations to “J.A. ___” refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

17 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 18 of 24

Thorsdottir. 7 Moreover, the exhibits to the Complaint contradict Moretti’s arguments and

establish that Thorsdottir’s investigation did yield information that corroborated these

identifications. Most notable in that respect is Thorsdottir’s interview of Ms. Combs, the

clinical therapist who treated Doe in 2018 and who is referenced in the Department’s initial

2018 report. Combs relayed to Thorsdottir that Doe told her she was sexually abused by a

“father of a friend” when she moved to a new neighborhood when 8 years old. According

to Combs, Doe also stated that her abuser’s daughter’s friendship was very important to

her, as she was Doe’s first friend in the neighborhood. As a result, Doe would try to time

her visits when the friend’s father was not home.

In addition to those identifications, Detective Thorsdottir’s interviews with Moretti

and Doe’s parents confirmed that Doe and Moretti’s daughter were close friends during the

relevant timeframe and that the two young girls spent a significant amount of time together.

Doe’s family’s home and Moretti’s home were located in close proximity, and Thorsdottir

had learned from her surveillance and online investigations that Moretti travelled often for

work. In light of these discoveries from several different sources over approximately seven

months, we cannot say that the initial identification of the perpetrator as Doe’s “father’s

friend” approximately a year earlier, or any of the other facts alleged in the Complaint are

7 The Court recognizes Moretti’s contentions regarding Doe’s therapist being present and interacting with Doe throughout the interview. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore that Doe specifically identified the same abuser that she named in residential treatment — the tip that prompted Detective Thorsdottir’s investigation in the first place — or the timelines and details of the sexual assault that were corroborated throughout Thorsdottir’s investigation.

18 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 19 of 24

sufficient to negate probable cause. It is well-established that “[r]easonable law

enforcement officers are not required to ‘exhaust every potentially exculpatory lead or

resolve every doubt about a suspect’s guilt before probable cause is established.’” See

Wadkins v. Arnold,

(4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Torchinsky,

). The probable cause bar is a low one, and the facts alleged by Moretti and the exhibits

to the Complaint establish that Thorsdottir’s investigation satisfied that standard.

Because Detective Thorsdottir’s actions were supported by probable cause, Moretti

cannot state a claim of a Fourth Amendment violation. Therefore, we are constrained to

affirm the district court’s dismissal of the federal malicious prosecution claim.

B.

The Complaint also raises a malicious prosecution claim under the common law of

Virginia. Under this theory of liability, the Complaint was obliged to plausibly allege “that

the prosecution was (1) malicious; (2) instituted by or with the cooperation of the

defendant; (3) without probable cause; and (4) terminated in a manner not unfavorable to

the plaintiff.” See Lewis v. Kei,

(Va. 2011). Because an essential

element of a Virginia malicious prosecution claim is a lack of probable cause, and for the

reasons discussed heretofore with respect to Moretti’s federal malicious prosecution claim,

Moretti has failed to state a claim of malicious prosecution under Virginia law. We must

also affirm the district court’s dismissal of the common law malicious prosecution claim.

19 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 20 of 24

IV.

Pursuant to the foregoing, we reject Moretti’s appellate contentions and affirm the

judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED

20 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 21 of 24

THACKER, Circuit Judge, with whom Judge BERNER joins, concurring:

I readily concur in the well reasoned majority opinion. I write separately simply to

clarify two points.

First, I want to set the record straight with regard to certain of the government’s

responses during oral argument as to why the case was dismissed. Specifically, the

government appeared to lay the blame for the dismissal squarely and solely on the victim:

Judge Thacker: Well, I assume the state thinks at least that they could not prove [the case] because they dismissed it.

Govt: That’s actually, I don’t believe that’s the reason why the case was nolle prossed. The case was nolle prossed according to my understanding and what you see in Exhibit I, which was attached to the amended complaint, the prosecutor nolle prossed the case because of her unwillingness to move forward with the case.

Judge Thacker: Because of the victim’s unwillingness to move forward with the case?

Govt: Yes, your honor. Jane Doe no longer wanted to move forward with the case.

Oral Argument at 22:48–23:16, United States v. Moretti, No. 23-1547 (4th Cir. May 6,

2025), https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments. In fact, the

first paragraph of Exhibit I to which the prosecutor referred states:

. . . I have been made aware of the falsity of an argument that I made during the motions regarding the victims [sic] medical records . . . I previously believed that in 2018, the victim had not named another individual as her abuser for the pending charges. . . . and argued as such. These messages clearly show the victim naming another individual besides the defendant as her abuser in detail in June of 2018.

J.A. 88.

21 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 22 of 24

To be sure, the exhibit also indicates that the victim no longer wished to proceed.

(“The victim is no longer willing to go forward with the prosecution.”) But, in my

view, the government attorney clearly sought to leave the impression during oral argument

that it was solely the victim’s decision to not pursue the case -- even when I suggested that

the case was dismissed because the government could not prove it. That posture is not only

unfair to the victim and to Appellant, it is inaccurate. As the Prince William

Commonwealth’s Attorney herself said, “Sometimes as a case progresses and more

information is learned, that information is favorable to the defense. That is what happened

in this case. When we became aware of that new information, we discussed it with the

victim and based upon our discussions, we concluded that we were unable to prove the

case beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tom Jackman, Charges Dropped Against Former

State Department Official Arrested on Child Molestation Charges, The Washington Post

(March 22, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2020/05/07/former-top-

state-department-official-arrested-child-molestation-charges/ [https://perma.cc/AJ33-

3HAV] (emphasis supplied).

Next, the opinion in this case uses the term “child pornography.” That is

understandable inasmuch as that is the terminology used in the Virginia statute at issue.

But, that terminology is universally out of favor. And for good reason. That term implies

consent, and pornography is largely legal when it involves consenting adults. Children, of

course, cannot consent to sexual activity or their exploitation, and pornography is

criminalized when children are the subjects. Referring to child sexual abuse material as

pornography minimizes the actual crime and the impact it has on children.

22 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 23 of 24

For this reason, the current practice among professional organizations that work on

behalf of child victims of sexual exploitation is to use the term “child sexual abuse

material” and they strongly urge others to do so as well. E.g., What Is Child Sexual Abuse

Material, RAINN (Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network) (Aug. 25, 2022),

https://rainn.org/news/what-child-sexual-abuse-material-csam [https://perma.cc/N7KW-

KHQD]. In fact, the Department of Justice itself has explained that although the term

“child pornography” appears in some federal and state statutes (as it does here), the term

“‘child sexual abuse material’ is preferred, as it better reflects the abuse that is depicted in

the images and videos and the resulting trauma to the child.” Child Sexual Abuse Material,

U.S. Dep’t of Just. 1 (June 2023), https://www.justice.gov/d9/2023-

06/child_sexual_abuse_material_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/LM7F-EYNW]. And although

not yet adopted by Congress, the Department of Justice has made legislative proposals that

suggest that the term “child pornography” be replaced throughout the United States Code

with “child sexual abuse material.” Id. at 15. Moreover, the Department of Justice has

noted that in 2016, “an international working group, comprising a collection of countries

and international organizations working to combat child exploitation, formally recognized

“child sexual abuse material” as the preferred term.” Id. at 1.

Therefore, regardless of the inaction of Congress in this regard, I would follow the

lead of child advocates around the globe and acknowledge the alleged crime here for what

it is—the sexual abuse of a child. Toward that end, I would use the preferred terminology

“child sexual abuse material.” See, e.g. United Staes v. Kuehner,

, 322 n.1

23 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1547 Doc: 40 Filed: 10/15/2025 Pg: 24 of 24

(4th Cir. 2025); United States v. Krueger,

, 462 n.1 (4th Cir. 2025); United

States v. Ray,

, 131 n.1 (4th Cir. 2025).

24