USCA4 Appeal: 24-4662 Doc: 39 Filed: 10/17/2025 Pg: 1 of 5

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4662

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KENSHAUN THOMPSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Patricia Tolliver Giles, District Judge. (1:24-cr-00137-PTG-1)

Submitted: July 25, 2025 Decided: October 17, 2025

Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Sicilia C. Englert, LAW OFFICE OF SICILIA C. ENGLERT, LLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Erik S. Siebert, United States Attorney, Rebecca C. Fisher, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Daniel J. Honold, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Kenshaun Thompson was convicted by a jury of three counts of possession of stolen

mail, in violation of

. The district court sentenced Thompson to three

days in jail and two years of supervised release. On appeal, Thompson pursues two

challenges to his convictions. First, Thompson argues that the district court abused its

discretion when it excluded evidence of a Government witness’s prior conviction for

Virginia petit larceny. Second, Thompson attacks the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his convictions. We reject both challenges and thus affirm.

Thompson first contends that the district court abused its discretion and contravened

Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2) when it excluded evidence of Government witness Adam Bekele’s

conviction for Virginia petit larceny. See Burgess v. Goldstein,

(4th Cir.

2021) (“We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of

discretion.”). Rule 609(a)(2) provides that evidence of a witness’s prior criminal

conviction “must be admitted if the court can readily determine that establishing the

elements of the crime required proving—or the witness’s admitting—a dishonest act or

false statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2).

Assuming that the district court erred in excluding Bekele’s petit larceny conviction,

we conclude that any error was harmless. See United States v. Brizuela,

(4th Cir. 2020) (explaining that we will not vacate conviction based on erroneous

evidentiary ruling if error is harmless). Thompson planned to introduce Bekele’s

conviction to show that he was a dishonest thief. But the jury heard Bekele admit that he

was a thief who repeatedly stole mail. The jury also heard that Bekele had lied to law

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enforcement officers during the investigation of the petit larceny offense and initially lied

to the investigating agent in this case. Finally, the jury heard that Bekele pleaded guilty to

conspiracy to steal mail; that his plea agreement prevented him from being charged with

other crimes, such as stealing mail and unlawful possession of a mail key; and that he hoped

to receive a lower sentence based on his testimony against Thompson.

Given the similar impeachment evidence introduced against Bekele at trial, there is

no likelihood that the presentation of Bekele’s petit larceny conviction would have swayed

the jury’s verdict. See

(“[A]n error is harmless if we can say with fair assurance, after

pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the

judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Thompson next contends that insufficient evidence supports his convictions for

possession of stolen mail. We generally review de novo the denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P.

29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. United States v. Savage,

(4th

Cir. 2018). But “[w]hen a defendant raises specific grounds in a Rule 29 motion, grounds

that are not specifically raised are [forfeited] on appeal unless a manifest miscarriage of

justice has occurred.” United States v. Duroseau,

(4th Cir. 2022)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he ‘manifest miscarriage’ language [is] simply a

formulation of the plain-error test’s application to insufficiency claims.” United States v.

Delgado,

, 331 n.9 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc); see United States v. Everett,

(4th Cir.) (reviewing unpreserved evidentiary sufficiency challenge for

plain error), cert. denied,

(2024).

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In making his Rule 29 motion, Thompson sought an acquittal only as to the charge

of unlawful possession of a mail key—of which the jury ultimately acquitted him—and did

not move for an acquittal on the three charges of possession of stolen mail. We thus review

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Thompson’s possession of stolen mail

convictions for plain error only. See Everett,

.

Thompson was convicted of violating

, which makes it unlawful

to knowingly possess stolen mail. To obtain a conviction under

, the

Government must prove: “(1) that the defendant possessed stolen mail; (2) that the

defendant knew the mail was stolen; and (3) that the mail was, in fact, stolen.” Randhawa

v. Ashcroft,

(9th Cir. 2002). Thompson maintains that the

Government failed to prove that he knew that he possessed stolen mail.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we discern no

plain evidentiary insufficiency here. See Savage,

(explaining that, when

defendant challenges sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction, we view evidence

in light most favorable to Government). At trial, the Government presented evidence that

Thompson, Bekele, and a mutual friend agreed to steal mail from the post office in West

Springfield, Virginia. To that end, Thompson asked Bekele on certain nights if he wanted

to “go out to Springfield that night,” which meant steal mail from the post office in West

Springfield, Virginia. J.A. 243. 1

1 “J.A.” refers to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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On October 24, 25, and 26, 2023, Bekele travelled to the West Springfield Post

Office and used a special key to steal large amounts of mail from a post office box there.

Bekele then drove to the Skyline Towers apartment complex in Fairfax, Virginia, where he

rented an apartment. Once outside the Skyline Towers apartment complex, Bekele placed

the stolen mail in a black duffle bag and handed the bag to Thompson, who was present at

the apartment complex despite not living there. On October 24, Bekele handed Thompson

several loose pieces of stolen mail along with the black duffle bag. Such evidence is

sufficient on plain-error review to sustain Thompson’s convictions. 2 See Savage,

(explaining that we will sustain the jury’s verdict if “it is supported by substantial

evidence, which is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

2 Thompson’s arguments in favor of his evidentiary sufficiency challenge are unconvincing. For instance, Thompson’s assertion that he was merely a messenger or driver improperly views the evidence in the light most favorable to him, not the Government. Insofar as Thompson emphasizes that Bekele and their mutual friend were stealing mail before Thompson became involved, that fact does not undermine the evidence of Thompson’s guilt once he joined the scheme. And to the extent that Thompson argues that Bekele’s credibility was thoroughly impeached, our review for evidentiary sufficiency does not encompass witness credibility. See Savage,

.

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