United States v. Johnathan McLendon

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

United States v. Johnathan McLendon

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-4183 Doc: 41 Filed: 10/21/2025 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4183

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOHNATHAN DION MCLENDON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge. (1:24-cr-00313-CCE-1)

Submitted: October 16, 2025 Decided: October 21, 2025

Before KING, AGEE, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Mark A. Jones, BELL, DAVIS & PITT, PA, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Stephen Thomas Inman, Julie Carol Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 25-4183 Doc: 41 Filed: 10/21/2025 Pg: 2 of 4

PER CURIAM:

Johnathan Dion McLendon appeals his conviction and the 96-month sentence

imposed following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in

violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 922

(g)(1), 924(a)(8). On appeal, counsel has filed a brief

pursuant to Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738

(1967), stating that there are no meritorious

grounds for appeal but questioning whether McLendon’s guilty plea was knowing and

voluntary and whether McLendon’s sentence is reasonable. Although notified of his right

to do so, McLendon has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. The Government has moved

to dismiss the appeal as barred by the appeal waiver included in McLendon’s plea

agreement, by which he waived “his right to a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence

on any ground (including any argument that the statute to which [he pled] guilty is

unconstitutional or that the admitted conduct does not fall within the scope of the statute),”

with limited exceptions not applicable here. We dismiss in part, affirm in part, and remand

with instructions to amend the written judgment.

We review the validity of an appeal waiver de novo. United States v. Boutcher,

998 F.3d 603, 608

(4th Cir. 2021). “When the government seeks to enforce an appeal waiver

and has not breached the plea agreement, we will enforce the waiver if it is valid and if the

issue being appealed falls within the scope of the waiver.”

Id.

(citation modified). “A

valid appeal waiver is one entered by the defendant knowingly and intelligently, a

determination that we make by considering the totality of the circumstances.”

Id.

(citation

modified).

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Our review of the record confirms that McLendon knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently executed the appeal waiver. We therefore dismiss the appeal as to all issues

within its scope, including the reasonableness of the sentence.

However, an appeal waiver does not prevent us from reviewing the validity of

McLendon’s guilty plea. See United States v. McCoy,

895 F.3d 358, 364

(4th Cir. 2018)

(analyzing validity of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing despite waiver). Because McLendon did

not move to withdraw his plea or otherwise object during the plea hearing, we review the

validity of his plea for plain error. United States v. Sanya,

774 F.3d 812, 815

(4th Cir.

2014).

A guilty plea is valid if the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently

pleads guilty “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely

consequences.” United States v. Fisher,

711 F.3d 460, 464

(4th Cir. 2013) (citation

modified). Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy

in which it informs the defendant of, and determines he understands, the rights he is

relinquishing by pleading guilty, the charges to which he is pleading, and the maximum

and any mandatory minimum penalties he faces. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The court also

must ensure that the plea is voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or promises not

contained in the plea agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and that there is a factual basis

for the plea, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).

Our review of the record confirms that the magistrate judge substantially complied

with Rule 11 and ensured that McLendon’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported

by an adequate factual basis. We therefore conclude that McLendon’s guilty plea is valid.

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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

found no meritorious grounds for appeal outside the scope of McLendon’s valid appeal

waiver. We therefore grant the Government’s motion to dismiss in part and dismiss the

appeal as to all issues covered by the waiver. We otherwise affirm. However, we remand

with instructions to amend the written judgment to reflect that McLendon pled guilty to

violating

18 U.S.C. §§ 922

(g)(1), 924(a)(8). *

This court requires that counsel inform McLendon, in writing, of the right to petition

the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If McLendon requests that a

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel

may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must

state that a copy thereof was served on McLendon. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, AND REMANDED

* Presently, the written judgment indicates that McLendon was subject to the enhanced penalties in

18 U.S.C. § 924

(e). Although McLendon was indicted under this provision, he pled guilty to the lesser-included offense of

18 U.S.C. §§ 922

(g)(1), 924(a)(8).

4

Reference

Status
Unpublished