United States v. Aaric Murray

– evidence that “a reasonable finder of

fact” could find “adequate and sufficient” to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt, United States v. Burgos,

94 F.3d 849, 862

(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). We consider

both direct and circumstantial evidence, United States v. Tresvant,

677 F.2d 1018, 1021

(4th Cir. 1982), and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government

and draw all reasonable inferences in the government’s favor, Moody,

Ultimately, we can reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence “only when the

prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Lawing,

703 F.3d 229, 240

(4th Cir. 2012)

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

There is no dispute that the government had to prove Murray and Johnson knew of

the firearms at issue to convict them of aiding and abetting the possession of firearms in

furtherance of a drug offense under § 924(c)(1). See Rosemond v. United States,

572 U.S. 65

, 77–78 (2014) (convicting a defendant of aiding and abetting the commission of a

firearm offense under

18 U.S.C. § 924

(c)(1) requires showing the defendant had “advance

knowledge” of the firearm); United States v. Herder,

594 F.3d 352, 358

(4th Cir. 2010)

(establishing constructive possession of contraband requires “proof the defendant had

knowledge of the presence of the contraband”). Murray and Johnson claim they had no

knowledge of the firearms in the mobile home – which were hidden from plain view by the

green bag – and that the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove they

7 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4328 Doc: 68 Filed: 10/22/2025 Pg: 8 of 17

knew of the guns’ presence. 3 We disagree. Like the district court, we conclude the

evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to find that both Murray and Johnson had

knowledge of the firearms and to convict them on Count Six.

Murray and Johnson emphasize on appeal, as they did before the district court, the

lack of direct evidence that they knew about the guns in the mobile home. Neither Murray

nor Johnson admitted to knowing about the firearms, and no evidence was introduced that

either spoke about the guns. No witness testified that Murray or Johnson purchased the

firearms, brought them into the mobile home, or carried or handled the firearms. No

fingerprint or DNA evidence connected either defendant to the firearms, and the

government presented no evidence about any owners, past or present, of the firearms. The

government also failed to preserve as evidence, and thus did not introduce at trial, either

3 As the district court instructed the jury, Count Six required the government to prove knowledge of the firearms in two contexts. First, the government had to prove that at least one of the defendants knowingly possessed the firearms in question. The government proceeded on a theory of constructive possession, which required proof that either Murray or Johnson (or both) knew about the guns in the mobile home and had dominion or control over them. See Herder,

594 F.3d at 358

; Moody,

. Second, to convict Murray or Johnson of “aiding and abetting” that possession “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime, see § 924(c)(1), the government had to establish (again) knowledge of the guns’ presence and also knowledge of the guns’ connection to, and possession in furtherance of, a drug trafficking crime. See Rosemond,

572 U.S. at 78

. On appeal, Murray and Johnson argue only that they lacked knowledge that the two firearms were present in the mobile home, and that the government failed to prove otherwise.

8 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4328 Doc: 68 Filed: 10/22/2025 Pg: 9 of 17

the green bag in which the firearms were found or the firearm holster observed on the table

in the front room.

We recognize that a jury could have viewed this lack of direct evidence as creating

a reasonable doubt about Murray and Johnson’s guilt on Count Six. But as we explained

in another case involving a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a

conviction for aiding and abetting a § 924(c) firearm offense, evidence showing a

defendant had the required knowledge of a firearm “need not be direct.” United States v.

Benson,

957 F.3d 218, 238

(4th Cir. 2020). Instead, such knowledge can be proven solely

through circumstantial evidence.

at 238–39. Here, Murray and Johnson’s “focus on

the types of evidence missing from the government’s presentation ignores what the

government did present []: other evidence on which the jury could have reasonably relied

in convicting” the defendants. Moody,

2 F.4th at 190

We start with Murray. The record shows that he had lived in the mobile home for

one to two months at the time of the events at issue in this case, and that he was the “primary

occupant.” While living there, Murray said that he was working on a drywall and painting

project to fix up the inside of the home.

We recite these facts because Murray’s status as an occupant of the mobile home is

relevant to his knowledge of the firearms found there. As we have repeatedly recognized,

when contraband is found in a defendant’s home, this fact generally “permits an inference”

that the defendant had constructive possession over that contraband. United States v.

Shorter,

328 F.3d 167, 172

(4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hicks,

64 F.4th 546, 553

(4th

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Cir. 2023); see also United States v. Kimbrough,

477 F.3d 144

, 147 n.5 (4th Cir. 2007)

(“[A] fact-finder could infer [the defendant]’s possession of [a] gun from its presence in

the basement in which he lived.”). 4

The fact that Murray was not the only occupant of the mobile home does not

preclude the jury from inferring he had knowledge of the firearms. To be sure, we have

recognized that “mere joint tenancy of a residence is insufficient to prescribe possession of

its contents to all the occupants.” United States v. Blue,

808 F.3d 226, 232

(4th Cir. 2015)

(cleaned up). In joint occupancy cases, therefore, we require “some additional nexus

linking the defendant to the contraband.”

(citation and quotation marks omitted). Here,

that nexus is satisfied by the evidence at trial showing Murray both had access to and had

been in the front room of the mobile home. See United States v. Hall,

858 F.3d 254

, 280–

81 (4th Cir. 2017). Murray acknowledges that some of his personal belongings were found

in the front room and concedes that this evidence indicates he was in that room at some

time.

Nor does the fact that the firearms were not themselves in plain view mean that the

jury could not infer Murray’s knowledge. See Shorter,

. As we suggested

in Shorter, there may be cases when the home in which contraband is discovered is “so

4 In our constructive possession cases, we frequently consider whether knowledge has been sufficiently proved by circumstantial evidence. We look to that caselaw here because, as earlier noted, knowledge of the presence of contraband is an essential element of constructive possession. See Moody,

. The same evidence that suffices to establish constructive possession, in other words, will suffice to prove the knowledge element at issue in this case.

10 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4328 Doc: 68 Filed: 10/22/2025 Pg: 11 of 17

large,” or the contraband is “so well hidden,” that a reasonable factfinder could not infer

that an occupant “was aware of the[] presence” of the contraband.

In this case,

however, the firearms were not hidden; on the contrary, the green bag in which they were

stored was visible to anyone in the front room. In fact, the green bag could be seen at

several points in the background of the body camera footage played at trial – a fact that

was specifically pointed out to the jury. Particularly given the evidence placing Murray in

the front room, this case is not one in which the contraband was hidden from or inaccessible

to the defendant. 5 The jury reasonably could have concluded that Murray was aware of

the green bag and its contents.

Murray contends that the evidence against him establishes only that he was present

in the mobile home and cites United States v. Blue,

957 F.2d 106, 108

(4th Cir. 1992), to

argue that his mere proximity to the firearms was insufficient to prove he knew of or

exercised control over them. In Blue,

957 F.2d 106

, the defendant, a passenger in a car,

was arrested after a gun was found hidden under his seat.

Id. at 107

. We reversed his

conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, holding that the evidence – which

consisted only of the location of the gun and the testimony of a police officer that he had

seen the defendant’s shoulder “dip” as though he was reaching under the seat – was

insufficient to find the defendant had constructively possessed the gun.

at 107–08.

5 Examples of such a case might include Blue, 808 F.3d at 233–34, where the contraband in question was “hidden in [a] footstool” in a bedroom to which no evidence connected the defendant, or Hall,

858 F.3d at 280

, where the contraband was “found inside [a] locked bedroom” and no evidence established that the defendant either had a key to or had ever been inside the room.

11 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4328 Doc: 68 Filed: 10/22/2025 Pg: 12 of 17

Murray’s case is unlike Blue,

957 F.2d 106

, in at least two ways. First, the defendant

in Blue was a passenger in the car, the firearm was hidden under the seat, and “no evidence

indicated that [he] had ever been in that car before.”

Id. at 108

. Here, in contrast, Murray

lived in the home where the firearms were found, and direct evidence linked him to the

location where the firearms were stored in a bag visible to anyone in the room. Our

precedents treat these situations differently – we allow an inference of constructive

possession when contraband is found in a defendant’s home, Shorter,

, but

not when someone is merely present as a passenger in a car where contraband is found,

Blue,

957 F.2d at 108

And importantly, the evidence supporting Murray’s conviction goes beyond mere

proximity to the firearms. In fact, the inference that Murray knew about the firearms is

bolstered by other evidence in this case. Recall that a firearm holster was found in plain

view on the table in the front room, in close proximity to where the firearms were stored.

We have recognized that a holster or ammunition found in plain view bolsters an inference

of knowledge of a firearm found nearby. See, e.g., Shorter,

; Moody,

2 F.4th at 193

Moreover, this was the same table on which the drug evidence was found, prompting

one of the deputies to describe it as a “drug-packaging station.” Given the substantial

evidence linking Murray to drug trafficking – which resulted in multiple drug convictions,

and which Murray does not dispute – the jury could have reasonably inferred that Murray

spent time at the table, making it even more likely he had seen the holster. And because

12 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4328 Doc: 68 Filed: 10/22/2025 Pg: 13 of 17

the table was close to where the firearms were stored, the jury also could have inferred that

Murray had seen the green bag.

To be clear, the jury was not required to draw any of the inferences described. See,

e.g., Shorter,

(explaining that contraband found in a defendant’s home

“permits an inference of constructive possession” (emphasis added)). But each was

reasonable, and thus permitted, from the evidence in the record.

We turn next to Johnson. The district court determined that a jury could find, based

on the government’s trial evidence, that Johnson was living in the mobile home, see

Johnson,

2023 WL 3166168

, at *2, 2 n.3, 4, and Johnson does not contest that ruling on

appeal. Instead, Johnson concedes that he was a “temporary occupant” or “unofficial

subtenant” of the mobile home and acknowledges he had been living there with Murray’s

permission for approximately a month at the time of the relevant events. Johnson’s

descriptions of his occupancy status are supported by trial testimony, with one deputy

testifying that Murray and Johnson were living in the home at the time, and another that

Johnson said he had been in Morgantown for about a month.

Because we agree that the jury could have found that Johnson was an occupant of

the mobile home, we start – as with Murray – with the general presumption that the jury

could also infer that Johnson constructively possessed, and thus knew of, the firearms

recovered from the home. See Shorter,

. But we recognize that some of

the facts differ between Murray and Johnson and consider those facts in turn.

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As noted above, there is direct evidence tying Murray to the front room of the mobile

home, where the guns were discovered. But there is no direct evidence linking Johnson to

that room. Pointing to this gap in the record, Johnson goes a step further, arguing that there

is no evidence at all – direct or circumstantial – from which a jury could infer he ever

entered the front room or knew about the holster, the green bag, or the guns inside the bag.

For two reasons, we disagree.

First, the jury could have found from the evidence presented at trial that the front

room of the mobile home was a common area or living room. During the trial, the jury

saw body camera footage of all the rooms in the mobile home, allowing jurors to form their

own impressions about the function of the room. Pictures of the front room introduced into

evidence showed a couch against one wall, as well as food and drink items on shelves.

There was no bed in the front room, unlike other rooms in the house. And one of the

deputies who testified at trial described the room as “a common area, living room.” J.A.

365. Considered together, this evidence is more than sufficient for the jury reasonably to

conclude that the front room of the mobile home was a common area or living room. And

if the jury made that determination, we agree with the district court that it also could have

inferred that Johnson, “as a resident of the home, spent time in the common area.” Johnson,

2023 WL 3166168

, at *4.

Second, much as with Murray, the jury heard significant evidence implicating

Johnson in drug trafficking and convicted him of multiple drug offenses. As the district

court explained, “the evidence that Johnson was involved in drug trafficking made it more

likely that [he] frequented the front room, which contained the table with the drug-

14 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4328 Doc: 68 Filed: 10/22/2025 Pg: 15 of 17

packaging paraphernalia.”

Id.

We agree that the jury reasonably could have made this

inference, given that the front room is where the evidence of drug distribution was found.

Either one of these reasonable inferences would allow the jury to find that Johnson

spent time in the front room of the mobile home. And once Johnson was connected to the

front room, the jury was permitted, although once again not required, to make all the same

reasonable inferences we described in our analysis of Murray’s case. 6

In response to the circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences available to the

jury, Murray and Johnson emphasize evidence in the record suggesting that many of the

items found in the mobile home belonged to previous owners or occupants of the home,

and not to them. For instance, the body camera footage of one of the deputies shows

children’s stuffed animals on a shelf in one room. During the search of the home, the

deputies found personal letters belonging to people other than Murray or Johnson. And

one of the deputies testified at trial that Murray told him the furniture and appliances in the

mobile home belonged to someone named “Robert Shaffer.” J.A. 351–52.

6 Like Murray, Johnson argues the evidence against him establishes only that he was present in the mobile home while the firearms were there and cites Blue,

957 F.2d at 108

, as support for overturning his conviction. Blue is inapposite in Johnson’s case for the same reasons as in Murray’s: First, Johnson’s status as an occupant of the mobile home permits an inference that he constructively possessed the firearms found there, see Shorter,