USCA4 Appeal: 24-6413 Doc: 12 Filed: 10/22/2025 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-6413

DENZEL CHANDLER,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

CHADWICK DOTSON, Director,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. David J. Novak, District Judge. (3:22-cv-00123-DJN-MRC)

Submitted: December 5, 2024 Decided: October 22, 2025

Before GREGORY and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Denzel Joshua Chandler, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-6413 Doc: 12 Filed: 10/22/2025 Pg: 2 of 4

PER CURIAM:

Denzel Chandler seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his Fed. R. Civ.

P. 60(b) motion for relief from the district court’s prior order dismissing as untimely his

petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge

issues a certificate of appealability.

(c)(1)(A). See generally United

States v. McRae,

, 400 & n.7 (4th Cir. 2015). A certificate of appealability

will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”

(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists could find the district court’s

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v. Davis,

(2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that

the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v.

Thaler,

(2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel,

(2000)).

In his Rule 60(b) motion, Chandler argued that his mental health conditions

amounted to an extraordinary circumstance that prevented him from timely filing the

§ 2254 petition and warranted equitable tolling. In some circumstances, a petitioner can

make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right by demonstrating that

reasonable jurists could debate whether equitable tolling was warranted. See Justus v.

Clarke,

(4th Cir. 2023). And “mental incompetence . . . may qualify

as an extraordinary circumstance that justifies equitable tolling and relief from a

judgment.”

(citation modified). Generally, however, “the federal courts will

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apply equitable tolling because of a petitioner’s mental condition only in cases of profound

mental incapacity.”

(citation modified). In the habeas context, “a petitioner’s

mental impairment is sufficiently profound if it renders him unable to comply with the

filing deadline,” either because he “cannot rationally or factually understand the need to

timely file” or because “his mental state renders him unable to prepare a habeas petition

and effectuate its filing.”

(citation modified).

In Justus v. Clarke, we concluded that the district court erred by declining to hold

an evidentiary hearing on the § 2254 petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion seeking equitable

tolling based on his mental illness. Id. at 116-17. In that case, the petitioner’s detailed

“allegations of his severe mental illness, if true, [were] sufficient to demonstrate that his

condition was the type of extraordinary circumstance that merited equitable tolling.” Id.

at 111 (citation modified); see also id. at 112 (describing some of petitioner’s allegations).

There was also “extensive evidence” documenting petitioner’s mental state, including trial

testimony, prison treatment records, and affidavits. Id. at 115; see id. at 102-03. We

therefore concluded that the petitioner “sufficiently alleged, and provided evidence

supporting, the severity and continuing nature of his mental illness to at least justify an

inquiry into whether and for how long his illness may have prevented him from filing his

habeas petition.” Id. at 117.

A petitioner does not necessarily need to provide allegations that are as detailed as

those in Justus v. Clarke, or provide the same extent of evidence present in that case, to

justify an inquiry into whether equitable tolling for mental impairment is warranted. Here,

however, Chandler’s Rule 60(b) motion did not provide any specific allegations describing

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the symptoms of his mental illnesses or how they impacted his ability to prepare a timely

§ 2254 petition or appreciate the statute of limitations. And the only evidence in the record

documenting Chandler’s mental illnesses, which include schizophrenia, indicates that

those illnesses are mild and do not interfere with his ability to function independently. On

this record, we conclude that reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s denial

of Chandler’s Rule 60(b) motion.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED

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