USCA4 Appeal: 25-4050 Doc: 28 Filed: 10/31/2025 Pg: 1 of 6

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4050

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

FRANCISCO TORRELLAS, a/k/a Dream, a/k/a Daddy, a/k/a Pretty,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. (3:22-cr-00998-MGL-1)

Submitted: August 5, 2025 Decided: October 31, 2025

Before WILKINSON and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Kimberly H. Albro, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Brook B. Andrews, Acting United States Attorney, Elliott B. Daniels, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Francisco Torrellas appeals the 21-month sentence imposed following the

revocation of his supervised release. On appeal, Torrellas claims that the district court

misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines, failed to consider his nonfrivolous arguments for a

shorter sentence, and based its sentencing decision on an improper factor. 1 Finding no

reversible error, we affirm.

When considering a challenge to the district court’s application of the Sentencing

Guidelines, “we review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error.”

United States v. Lawson,

, 249 (4th Cir. 2025). If preserved, a procedural

sentencing error requires reversal unless the error is found to be harmless. United States

v. Lynn,

(4th Cir. 2010); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).

While on supervised release, Torrellas failed to comply with a sex offender

registration law,

(B)(3), that requires an offender to provide the

sex offender registry with user names, screen names, and other such “Internet identifier

information” used by the offender. As a result, the probation officer charged Torrellas with

a Grade B violation for committing new criminal conduct. In opposing the violation,

Torrellas asserted that his noncompliance was unintentional and, thus, not a violation of

1 Torrellas also asserts that the district court violated his right to due process by deeming waived any matters that he had failed to bring to the court’s attention. We discern no violation. It is this court, not the district court, that determines whether a claim is waived. United States v. Robinson,

(4th Cir. 2014). Thus, regardless of what the district court said, Torrellas retained the right to bring any claim on appeal, subject to the rules of preservation and waiver that this court applies in the first instance.

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the law. Without addressing the mental state required for a violation of

(B)(3), the district court overruled Torrellas’s objection, holding that his failure

to comply with the statute necessarily constituted a new law violation. On appeal, Torrellas

contends that the district court erred by treating

(B)(3) as a strict

liability statute.

Assuming, as Torrellas argues, that a violation of

(B)(3)

requires some proof of criminal intent, we conclude that the evidence in the record

established that Torrellas acted with the requisite mens rea. In State v. Latimore, the

Supreme Court of South Carolina held that, to establish criminal liability for a sex offender

who fails to register, the offender must have had actual notice of the registration

requirement.

(S.C. 2012). We see no reason why the same standard

would not apply to

(B)(3). And here, Torrellas was provided

with actual notice of the disclosure requirements, as he signed a form directing him to list

all Internet identifiers that he uses and advising him that failure to comply constitutes a

crime. Thus, to the extent the district court erred by failing to consider the mens rea

applicable to

(B)(3) offenses, we conclude that such error is

harmless.

Turning to Torrellas’s sentencing challenges, “[a] district court has broad discretion

when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States v.

Patterson,

(4th Cir. 2020). As long as the sentence “is within the

statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable,” we will affirm.

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“Where a defendant . . . presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a sentence

outside the [policy statement range], the sentencing [court] must address or consider those

arguments and explain why [it] has rejected them.” United States v. Powers,

,

137 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). At sentencing, defense counsel

requested a sentence below the policy statement range, noting that Torrellas was the sole

caretaker of his 14-year-old daughter and was responding well to mental health treatment.

On appeal, Torrellas asserts that the district court failed to address these points. On the

contrary, the court expressed sympathy for the plight of Torrellas’s daughter, while

emphasizing that Torrellas and his daughter’s mother—who was also incarcerated—had

created an unfortunate situation for their daughter by failing to follow the law. And while

commending Torrellas for endeavoring to improve himself, the court explained that his

rehabilitative efforts did not merit a downward variance sentence. We therefore conclude

that the court adequately responded to Torrellas’s sentencing arguments.

Finally, Torrellas contends that the district court erred by considering the need for

the revocation sentence to provide just punishment. Because Torrellas did not raise this

issue below, we review only for plain error. United States v. Fowler,

(4th Cir. 2020). To prevail under this standard, Torrellas “must show that an error

occurred, it was plain, it affected his substantial rights, and it seriously affects the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Olson,

, 273 (4th Cir. 2024).

In imposing sentence, the district court indicated that Torrellas needed to be

punished for his failure to comply with

(B)(3), which the court

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viewed as a serious violation of his supervised release. On appeal, Torrellas contends that

just punishment, see

(a)(2)(A), is not an appropriate consideration for a

revocation sentence.

Assuming arguendo that the district court erred, we conclude that such error is not

plain. The Supreme Court recently held that a district court imposing a revocation sentence

may not “account for the need to exact retribution for the defendant’s underlying crime

(per § 3553(a)(2)(A)).” Esteras v. United States,

(2025) (emphasis

added). 2 But the Court expressly declined to address the question at issue here, i.e.,

whether the need to exact retribution for the defendant’s supervision violation may be

considered.

at 2040 n.5. Nor has our court resolved this issue. As a result, it remains

an open question whether a revocation sentence may be based on the need to punish the

supervisee for his violation. So, even if we agreed with Torrellas that the court erred in

this regard, we could not find the error plain. See United States v. Walker,

(4th Cir. 2019) (explaining that error is plain if, “at the time of appellate consideration,

the settled law of the Supreme Court or this circuit establishes that an error has occurred”

(“internal quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, we affirm Torrellas’s revocation judgment. We deny as moot

Torrellas’s motion to expedite decision. We dispense with oral argument because the facts

2 This appeal was previously held in abeyance for Esteras.

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and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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