USCA4 Appeal: 24-4333 Doc: 55 Filed: 11/03/2025 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4333

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TANZILUDIN BANGURAH,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, Senior District Judge. (1:23-cr-00121-AJT-2)

Submitted: October 30, 2025 Decided: November 3, 2025

Before RUSHING and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Charles M. Henter, HENTERLAW PLC, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Gavin R. Tisdale, Assistant United States Attorney, Philip Samuel Alito, Jacqueline Romy Bechara, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4333 Doc: 55 Filed: 11/03/2025 Pg: 2 of 4

PER CURIAM:

Tanziludin Bangurah pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to

conspiracy to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl, in violation of

,

846. The district court sentenced Bangurah below the statutory minimum to 18 months’

imprisonment. See

(f). On appeal, Bangurah’s counsel has filed a brief

pursuant to Anders v. California,

(1967), questioning whether Bangurah’s

guilty plea and the appellate waiver in Bangurah’s plea agreement are valid, whether the

Government complied with the plea agreement, and whether the sentence is procedurally

and substantively reasonable. Bangurah has filed a pro se supplemental brief, challenging

the charges against him and generally arguing that his appellate counsel was ineffective for

filing an Anders brief. The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal based on the

appeal waiver in Bangurah’s plea agreement. We affirm in part and dismiss in part.

Bangurah’s waiver of appellate rights does not prevent our review of the validity of

the plea itself. See United States v. McCoy,

(4th Cir. 2018). We review

the adequacy of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 plea colloquy for plain error. See United States v.

Williams,

(4th Cir. 2016) (stating standard of review); see also

Henderson v. United States,

(2013) (describing plain error standard).

Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy in which it

informs the defendant of, and determines that the defendant understands, the rights he is

relinquishing by pleading guilty, the nature of the charge to which he is pleading, the

applicable maximum and mandatory minimum penalties he faces, and, if applicable, the

terms of any plea agreement waiving the right to appeal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United

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States v. DeFusco,

(4th Cir. 1991). The district court also must ensure

that the plea was voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or promises not contained

in the plea agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and “that there is a factual basis for the

plea,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). Here, the district court conducted a thorough and

complete Rule 11 hearing. We therefore conclude that Bangurah entered his plea

knowingly and voluntarily and that a factual basis supported the plea.

With respect to Bangurah’s waiver of his appellate rights, “[w]e review an appellate

waiver de novo to determine whether the waiver is enforceable” and “will enforce the

waiver if it is valid and if the issue being appealed falls within the scope of the waiver.”

United States v. Boutcher,

, 608 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks

omitted). An appellate waiver is valid if the defendant enters it “knowingly and

intelligently, a determination that we make by considering the totality of the

circumstances.”

“Generally though, if a district court questions a defendant regarding

the waiver of appellate rights during the Rule 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the

defendant understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid.” McCoy,

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Our review of the record confirms that Bangurah knowingly and intelligently

waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence except in a limited set of

circumstances. We therefore conclude that the waiver is valid and enforceable and that the

sentencing issues counsel raises in the Anders brief fall squarely within the scope of the

waiver. Counsel also questions whether the Government complied with the terms of the

plea agreement, a claim which falls outside the scope of the plea agreement. See United

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States v. Bowe,

(4th Cir. 2001) (“[A] party’s waiver of the right to seek

appellate review is not enforceable where the opposing party breaches a plea agreement.”).

However, there is no indication in the record that the Government breached the plea

agreement. Bangurah’s claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance is also

excepted from the waiver. Because the record before us does not conclusively establish

that Bangurah’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance, Bangurah’s “ineffective

assistance claim should be raised, if at all, in a

motion.” United States v.

Kemp,

, 546 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore grant the Government’s motion to

dismiss in part, dismiss the appeal of all issues within the scope of the appellate waiver,

and affirm the remainder of the judgment. This court requires that counsel inform

Bangurah, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for

further review. If Bangurah requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such

a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw

from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on

Bangurah.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART

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