USCA4 Appeal: 24-6925 Doc: 11 Filed: 11/04/2025 Pg: 1 of 5

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-6925

LYE HUAT ONG,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

CAROLYN J. SCRUGGS, Secretary of DPSCS,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Paula Xinis, District Judge. (1:24-cv-01662-PX)

Submitted: September 24, 2025 Decided: November 4, 2025

Before WILKINSON and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote a dissenting opinion.

Lye Huat Ong, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

5 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6925 Doc: 11 Filed: 11/04/2025 Pg: 2 of 5

PER CURIAM:

Lye Huat Ong, a Maryland state prisoner, filed a complaint under

against Carolyn Scruggs, Secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and

Correctional Services (“DPSCS”). Ong alleged that Scruggs unconstitutionally denied

Ong time credits under Md. Code Ann. Corr. Servs. § 3-707(a)(1) (2023), the Special

Project Credits for Housing statute, based on time in which he was “double celled.” The

district court dismissed Ong’s complaint under

(e)(2)(B)(ii),

1915A(b)(1), for failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, we vacate the district

court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

A federal court must dismiss an in forma pauperis action or appeal if it is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

(e)(2)(B). “The

overriding goal in policing in forma pauperis complaints is to ensure that the deferred

payment mechanism of § 1915(b) does not subsidize suits that prepaid administrative costs

would otherwise have deterred.” Nagy v. FMC Butner,

(4th Cir. 2004).

This court reviews de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2),

applying the same standards as those for reviewing a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal.

Martin v. Duffy,

(4th Cir. 2017). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (internal quotation

marks omitted). While the court must accept well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, it need not accept as true allegations that are

2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6925 Doc: 11 Filed: 11/04/2025 Pg: 3 of 5

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. Martin,

. To state plausible a claim pursuant to

, the complaint

must allege that the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of “rights, privileges or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States by a person acting under color

of law. West v. Atkins,

(1988).

Ong met this initial burden. In his complaint, Ong pleaded that when he was

sentenced he was eligible for time credits under § 3-707(a)(1), but that a subsequent

regulation,

.02.06.04(F)(3) (2025), later rendered him ineligible for the

credits because it classified his conviction as ineligible. Ong argued that because he had

committed the ineligible crime before the new regulation was passed, he was still eligible

for the time credits and had improperly been denied them. As Ong noted in his complaint,

Maryland courts have held

.02.06.04(F)(3), when applied to

complainants similarly situated to Ong, “alter[ed] their punishments by increasing the

lengths of their sentences” and violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States and

Maryland constitutions. Demby v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs.,

(Md. Ct. Spec. App, 2005), aff’d,

(Md. 2006). The Demby court

instructed:

an inmate serving a term of confinement for an offense committed prior to January 1, 2002[,] (i) may not be denied double-celling credits, for periods of time during which he or she was or is serving only an eligible sentence, for the sole reason that another sentence in his or her term of confinement is ineligible, and (ii) may not be denied double-celling credits on sentences for offenses that were eligible under the former regulation but are ineligible under the current regulation.

Id. at 199-200.

3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6925 Doc: 11 Filed: 11/04/2025 Pg: 4 of 5

Thus, when liberally construed, Ong’s complaint alleged that he suffered a

deprivation of “rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution”—specifically

the prohibition on ex post facto laws. We therefore find that the district court erred in

dismissing Ong’s complaint pursuant to

(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a

claim.

Accordingly, we deny Ong’s motion to reverse, but vacate the district court’s order

and remand for further proceedings. * We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

* We express no opinion on the ultimate merits of Ong’s claims.

4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6925 Doc: 11 Filed: 11/04/2025 Pg: 5 of 5

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I would affirm the judgment on the basis of the opinion of the district court.

5