USCA4 Appeal: 24-6665 Doc: 62 Filed: 11/05/2025 Pg: 1 of 33

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-6665

GREGORY ALLEN BONNIE,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

WARDEN DUNBAR,

Respondent - Appellee.

-------------------------------------------------------

DUE PROCESS INSTITUTE; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS,

Amici Supporting Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. David C. Norton, District Judge. (4:23-cv-01215-DCN)

Argued: September 10, 2025 Decided: November 5, 2025

Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge Quattlebaum joined. Judge Wynn wrote a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Patricia Louise Richman, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Kimberly Varadi Hamlett, OFFICE OF USCA4 Appeal: 24-6665 Doc: 62 Filed: 11/05/2025 Pg: 2 of 33

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John L. Warren III, LAW OFFICE OF BILL NETTLES, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Adair F. Boroughs, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. Timothy W. Grinsell, HOPPIN GRINSELL LLP, New York, New York, for Amici Due Process Institute and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

To promote the release of prisoners who possess a reduced risk of recidivism and

thus reduce the federal prison population, Congress enacted Title I of the First Step Act of

2018 (“FSA”), which incentivizes qualified federal prisoners to participate in and complete

“recidivism reduction programs or productive activities” and thereby earn various benefits,

including generous jail-time credits.

. The FSA, however, denies the

particular benefit of jail-time credits to any prisoner “serving a sentence for a conviction

under” 68 specified laws, including

(c), which punishes “possession or use

of a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.”

§ 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxii); id. § 924(c).

Gregory Bonnie is serving a 144-month sentence in a federal prison camp in South

Carolina, 120 months of which is attributable to convictions for drug trafficking offenses,

which are not disqualifying crimes for FSA time credits, and 24 months of which is

attributable to a conviction under § 924(c), which is a disqualifying crime. The Bureau of

Prisons (“BOP”) denied Bonnie’s request for FSA time credits as to his 120-month

sentence, treating his multiple prison terms “as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment,”

as required by

(c), and finding him ineligible because that aggregate

sentence includes imprisonment for violating § 924(c).

In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under

, Bonnie

challenged the BOP’s decision, arguing that he is eligible to earn FSA time credits during

his service of the 120-month component of his sentence attributable to his convictions for

drug trafficking, even though he acknowledges that he cannot earn FSA time credits during

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his service of the 24-month component attributable to his § 924(c) conviction. The district

court denied his petition, concluding that Bonnie’s position is not supported by the texts of

the FSA and § 3584(c), and Bonnie appealed.

Because Bonnie’s multiple-term sentence includes a sentence for a disqualifying

conviction and is, by reason of § 3584(c), to be treated as a single aggregate sentence, we

conclude that Bonnie is ineligible for FSA time credits. We therefore affirm.

I

After Bonnie pleaded guilty in 2005 to drug trafficking, in violation of

and 846, and possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking

crime, in violation of

(c), the district court sentenced him on November 5,

2005, to 120 months’ imprisonment for his drug trafficking conviction and a consecutive

60 months’ imprisonment for his § 924(c) conviction, for a total of 180 months’

imprisonment. The court also required him to serve eight years of supervised release —

an eight-year term for his drug trafficking conviction and a concurrent five-year term for

his § 924(c) conviction.

Bonnie was released from prison in June 2017 and then began serving his terms of

supervised release.

While on supervised release, however, Bonnie again engaged in drug trafficking,

and he pleaded guilty to two drug trafficking crimes, as well as to violating the conditions

of his supervised release. On May 27, 2021, the district court sentenced him to 120 months’

imprisonment for his new drug trafficking convictions, revoked his November 5, 2005

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terms of supervised release, and sentenced him on the revocation to a consecutive term of

24 months’ imprisonment, for a total of 144 months’ imprisonment. The court committed

him to the custody of the BOP, which assigned him to serve his sentence at the Satellite

Prison Camp at FCI Williamsburg in Salters, South Carolina.

Several months later, while serving his sentence, Bonnie requested that the BOP

classify him as eligible to receive FSA time credits with respect to the 120-month portion

of his sentence, at the same time recognizing that the 24-month portion of his sentence for

violating supervised release on his 2005 convictions, including one under § 924(c), made

him ineligible for FSA time credits when serving that sentence. The BOP denied Bonnie’s

request, noting that “[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or

concurrently shall be treated for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of

imprisonment,” which, because he was sentenced in connection with his violation of

§ 924(c), required that Bonnie’s 144-month sentence be treated as ineligible for FSA time

credits. Bonnie thereafter exhausted his administrative remedies.

Bonnie filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus under

in the

district court, and the respondent Warden R.S. Dunbar filed a motion for summary

judgment, seeking dismissal of the petition. In a thorough 25-page opinion, the district

court granted Warden Dunbar’s motion and denied Bonnie’s petition. The court identified

the relevant question as whether the “24-month § 924(c) revocation sentence tainted the

separately imposed 120-month drug sentence such that Mr. Bonnie is ineligible to earn

FSA time credits for the entire 144-month sentence.” After conducting an analysis of

(d)(4)(D) and 3584(c), the district court concluded:

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In sum, the court finds that the plain text and statutory context of the FSA indicate Congress’s intention that an inmate convicted of multiple offenses, at least one of which is ineligible to earn time credits under the FSA, is ineligible to earn time credits under the FSA because the BOP is statutorily mandated to aggregate the sentence.

The court added, “Bonnie has offered no statute or caselaw to support a contrary

interpretation,” and it cited numerous decisions nationwide that have uniformly rejected

Bonnie’s interpretation.

From the district court’s judgment dated May 10, 2024, Bonnie filed this appeal.

II

Bonnie contends that, while he is concededly ineligible for FSA time credits when

serving his 24-month revocation sentence for violating § 924(c), he is nonetheless eligible

for the credits when serving his consecutive 120-month sentence for drug trafficking. As

he argues:

While Mr. Bonnie “is serving” the § 924(c) revocation sentence, he is ineligible to earn time credits under the plain language of the FSA. But after completion of that sentence, he will no longer be “serving a sentence” for an ineligible conviction.

He asserts that the statutory text is clear, directing the “BOP to calculate credits on any

permitted sentence, and consecutive sentences are different sentences.” (Emphasis added).

Thus, he argues that § 3632(d)(4)(D) disqualifies “a sentence” and that the components of

a multiple-term sentence are to be treated distinctly, each as “a sentence.” He therefore

concludes that the district court erred in disqualifying him from FSA time credits during

his entire 144-month sentence. To make that argument, he relies mainly on the portion of

the FSA’s text referring to a single disqualifying sentence — “if a prisoner is serving a

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sentence for a conviction,”

(d)(4)(D) (emphasis added) — which, he

argues, requires that each sentence be assessed and applied separately.

Bonnie’s argument presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review

de novo. See Rosemond v. Hudgins,

(4th Cir. 2024); United States v.

Thomas,

(4th Cir. 2022). And in construing a statute, we read it in the

context of its overall statutory scheme. See West Virginia v. EPA,

(2022). Thus, our focus is “to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.” King v. Burwell,

(2015) (cleaned up). With these principles in hand, we turn to the FSA.

Title I of the First Step Act of 2018, entitled “Recidivism Reduction,” requires the

Attorney General to develop a “risk and needs assessment system” to be used by the BOP

(1) to determine each federal prisoner’s “recidivism risk” and “risk of violent or serious

misconduct”; (2) to assign the prisoner to “appropriate evidence-based recidivism

reduction programs or productive activities”; and (3) to assess “when a prisoner is ready to

transfer into prerelease custody or supervised release.”

(a). And as an

incentive to induce prisoners to participate in and complete the programs, the FSA

authorizes the BOP to grant numerous benefits, including, among others, phone privileges,

additional visitation time, and, as relevant here, “time credits” to reduce prison time.

§ 3632(d). The FSA time credits, which are awarded in addition to good time credits

earned pursuant to § 3624, are generous, giving prisoners “10 days of time credits for every

30 days of successful participation” in the programs and an “additional 5 days of time

credits for every 30 days of successful participation” for prisoners assessed to be “at a

minimum or low risk for recidivating.” Id. § 3632(d)(4)(A).

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The FSA is thus designed to identify prisoners with a lower risk of recidivating and

to reward them with time credits for completing programming, and also to identify

prisoners with a higher risk, who are not similarly rewarded. In line with these purposes,

the FSA categorically disqualifies any prisoner from receiving time credits if the prisoner

is serving a sentence for a conviction on any of 68 disqualifying crimes, including, as

relevant to this appeal, a § 924(c) conviction.

(d)(4)(D)(xxii).

Specifically, § 3632(d)(4)(D) provides: “A prisoner is ineligible to receive time credits . . .

if the prisoner is serving a sentence for a conviction under . . . § 924(c).” Id. (emphasis

added).

Bonnie parses the language of § 3632(d)(4)(D) to argue that his disqualification is

limited to the time he is serving his disqualifying sentence and that he should receive FSA

time credits when serving time for his non-disqualifying sentence. He reasons that the

disqualifying language is linked to “a sentence” for a particular disqualifying crime,

allowing him to earn credits for service of “a sentence” on any non-disqualifying crimes.

He reasons further that the “a sentence” language limits the disqualification to the time

while he is serving the disqualifying sentence. As he summarizes, “The FSA’s text is clear.

It directs BOP to calculate credits on any permitted sentence, and consecutive sentences

are different sentences.” Thus, he claims that while he “is serving” the § 924(c) revocation

sentence, he is ineligible to earn time credits under the plain language of the FSA. But

after the completion of that sentence, he will no longer be “serving a sentence for an

ineligible conviction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted).

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At the outset, we note that the provision categorically disqualifies a prisoner, not a

sentence, from receiving FSA time credits, defining such prisoner as one who is serving a

sentence for a disqualifying crime. The text provides that the “prisoner is ineligible to

receive time credits under this paragraph if the prisoner is serving a sentence for a

conviction under [§ 924(c)].”

(d)(4)(D). Thus, when the only sentence

that a prisoner is serving is for conviction of a disqualifying crime, he is categorically

ineligible to receive FSA time credits because Congress has determined that the conduct

underlying the crime predicts a high risk of recidivism.

Bonnie does not disagree with this understanding. Rather, he focuses on when a

prisoner is serving multiple terms of imprisonment, whether consecutive or concurrent, and

argues that each sentence must be treated separately. He thus reasons that he can receive

FSA time credits when he is serving the sentence for the drug trafficking crime, even as he

agrees that he cannot receive such credits when serving the sentence for the § 924(c)

conviction. This argument, however, overlooks

(c), which precludes

treating multiple-term sentences separately for administrative purposes. That statute,

enacted as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, provides:

Multiple terms of imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or concurrently shall be treated for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment.

(c) (emphasis added). Both the BOP and the district court relied on the

mandate in that provision to reject Bonnie’s argument that his sentences should be assessed

individually. They concluded that because § 3584(c) requires that the BOP treat Bonnie’s

multiple sentences as components of a single aggregate sentence, his 144-month sentence,

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which, in part, is for a conviction under § 924(c), disqualified Bonnie. We agree, as the

language of § 3584(c) is clear.

Bonnie does not argue otherwise. Rather, he argues that § 3584(c) does not apply

at all because it is only applicable for “administrative purposes,” and, as he argues, the

BOP is not acting for administrative purposes in awarding FSA time credits. He maintains

that discretion is necessary for “administrative purposes” and explains that the award of

credits does not include a “broad delegation to the BOP to manage prisoners’ sentences”

so as to give it discretion. In this regard, he points to the FSA’s mandatory language that

the Attorney General must create the system for assessing prisoners, that the BOP must

assign prisoners to programs, and that the BOP must grant FSA time credits for prisoners

participating in and completing the programs.

This, however, reads “administrative purposes” far too narrowly. “Administration”

does not define only acts of discretion. Rather, it can cover any acts that execute

Congress’s will. After a court imposes a sentence, it must commit the defendant “to the

custody of the Bureau of Prisons until the expiration of the term imposed.”

(a). And the BOP is then charged with selecting the place to incarcerate the

defendant and carrying out the incarceration and supervising it, which includes detaining

him, providing treatments for various conditions, providing programs, giving access to

medical care as needed, and, of course, implementing the risk and needs assessment

system. See

§ 3621(b), (e), (f), (h), (i). While all these requirements for implementing

the sentence and supervising custody of the prisoner are mandatory, they also involve

judgment and decisionmaking to give effect to the court’s sentence. But, regardless of the

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level of discretion involved, all are administrative functions. Indeed, what the BOP does

goes to the very heart of what is administrative — “to manage or supervise the execution,

use, or conduct of” something, here, a sentence. “Administrate, administer,” Merriam-

Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 16 (11th ed. 2020); see also United States v. Wilson,

(1992) (noting that the BOP is tasked with “the responsibility for

administering the sentence[s]” of federal offenders (emphasis added)). And indeed, the

Wilson Court held that the BOP determines good time credits as an administrative matter:

Because the offender has a right to certain jail-time credit . . . and because the district court cannot determine the amount of the credit at sentencing, the [BOP] has no choice but to make the determination as an administrative matter when imprisoning the defendant.

(emphasis added); see also United States v. LaBonte,

, 758 n.4 (1997).

Finally, we note that § 3632, which includes the BOP’s management of the FSA time

credits, is contained in Title 18, Chapter 229 of the United States Code, which is

denominated “Postsentence Administration.” See INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights,

Inc.,

(1991) (recognizing that “the title of a statute or section can aid in”

textual interpretation); Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long,

(4th

Cir. 2012) (same).

We have no difficulty in concluding that the BOP’s implementation of the FSA time

credits system is “administrative,” as used in § 3584(c), and therefore that that provision

applies to Title I of the FSA.

Bonnie also argues that § 3584(c) should not apply to FSA time credits because

Congress did not explicitly quote the § 3584(c) language in the FSA while it did so in the

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Second Chance Act of 2007, which authorizes a home detention pilot program. He reasons

that because Congress chose to include such language in the Second Chance Act, its

omission from the FSA indicates Congress’s intent that § 3584(c) not apply to the FSA.

Thus, under Bonnie’s reading, § 3584(c) should be ignored unless it is explicitly quoted in

a statute to which it would otherwise apply, rendering § 3584(c) useless.

More indicative, however, is that a comparison of the FSA’s recidivism reduction

programs to the Second Chance Act of 2007’s home detention pilot program is quite inapt.

The Second Chance Act does not include a jail-time credit program based on a prisoner’s

conduct, as does the FSA. Indeed, sentences are not assessed and reduced with time credits

under the Second Chance Act, and the purpose and implementation of the home detention

program are not the same. Rather, it is a compassionate response program in which elderly

or terminally ill prisoners may be transferred to home confinement to complete their

sentences. See

(g).

Moreover, the original text of the Second Chance Act was drafted at a different time

— in 2007 — by a different Congress with different considerations in mind. And its

disqualifying language is of a different style. For instance, the Second Chance Act applies

to “an offender . . . who is serving a term of imprisonment that is not life imprisonment

based on conviction for an offense or offenses that do not include any crime of violence

. . . , sex offense . . . , or [other designated offenses].”

(g)(5)(A)(ii)

(emphasis added). On the other hand, the FSA, which was drafted in 2018, provides that

a “prisoner,” not an “offender,” is “ineligible if the prisoner is serving a sentence for a

conviction under any of the following provisions of law,” not for “offense or offenses.” 18

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(d)(4)(D) (emphasis added). And while the Second Chance Act explicitly

provides that multiple terms of imprisonment are to be treated as a single aggregate term,

quoting the exact language of § 3584(c), see

(g)(5)(C), it does so in light

of the fact that § 3584(c), as a regulation relating to sentences, might not otherwise be

applicable because the Second Chance Act does not assess or change sentences. Rather, it

leaves the offender’s sentence in place and only authorizes a different location to serve it.

The FSA, on the other hand, does change sentences, and therefore § 3584(c)’s regulation

of sentences for administrative purposes would clearly apply.

Finally, even were we to take both the Second Chance Act and the FSA to be

comparable, the fact that Congress chose in 2007 to quote § 3584(c) within the provisions

of the Second Chance Act and did not do so in 2018 in the FSA cannot fairly lead to the

conclusion that Congress therefore intended that § 3584(c) not apply to the FSA, when its

terms are clearly applicable.

Making a similar argument, Bonnie contends that the BOP’s treatment of sentences

under a 1976 bilateral treaty with Mexico “is instructive.” The Treaty on the Execution of

Penal Sentences provides for the transfer of Mexican nationals serving certain sentences in

the United States to serve out their sentences in Mexico, and vice versa. See U.S.-Mex.,

Nov. 25, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 7399, art. I. The Treaty, however, does not apply to any “offense

under the immigration or the purely military laws of a party.” Id. art. II(4). In

implementing the Treaty when multiple offenses are involved, the BOP lets a Mexican

national serve the sentence for an immigration violation in the United States and then

transfers the Mexican national to Mexico to fulfill the remainder of his sentences. See BOP

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Program Statement 5140.42 (April 10, 2015). This practice simply implements the terms

of the Treaty, however, and is hardly relevant to a program for awarding good time or FSA

time credits, where the BOP is administering the sentence and to which § 3584(c)’s

aggregation provision is clearly applicable. Moreover, apart from the disqualified offenses,

the BOP does indeed aggregate sentences in implementing the Treaty, as required by the

implementing statute. See

(c)(4). That hardly helps Bonnie’s argument

that the BOP should not treat multiple sentences as a single aggregate sentence under

§ 3584(c).

In short, we conclude that § 3584(c) applies when construing § 3632 and thus directs

the BOP to treat multiple sentences as a single aggregate sentence for administrative

purposes, including the computation of FSA time credits. Bonnie is thus “serving a

sentence” in connection with his § 924(c) conviction, defined by § 3584(c) to be his

aggregate 144-month sentence. As such, he is ineligible for FSA time credits under

§ 3632(d)(4)(D).

Our interpretation of § 3632(d)(4)(D) also conforms, we believe, to the overall

purpose of Title I of the FSA, which is designed to identify certain prisoners for early

release — prisoners whom Congress has determined to be at low risk for recidivism and

violence — and to provide them benefits, while detaining high-risk prisoners based on their

elevated threat to recidivate. In distinguishing prisoners who are serving sentences for

convictions of crimes predicting a high risk of recidivism from prisoners who are serving

sentences for convictions of crimes not predicting a high risk of recidivism, the statute lists

68 crimes, any one of which, Congress has found, disqualifies the prisoner. Because

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recidivism is predicted by the nature of the crime, the conduct inherent in the crime is

critical to the FSA’s operation. Thus, in a case where the defendant has been convicted of

a multi-term sentence, if the defendant is incarcerated for conduct disqualifying him for

FSA credits, whether supporting his entire sentence or only a part, that conduct predicts,

as Congress has determined, that he has a high risk of recidivism and therefore is

disqualified from receiving FSA time credits. And that high risk is not eliminated by the

fact that the prisoner also committed a nondisqualifying crime. In short, the fact that the

prisoner committed a disqualifying crime predicts a high risk of recidivism, which is the

whole underlying basis for the FSA’s denial of FSA time credits.

Bonnie nonetheless urges us to apply the rule of lenity against BOP’s aggregation

of his sentences. But that rule does not fit here. It only applies when courts “can make no

more than a guess as to what Congress intended” and there is a “grievous ambiguity or

uncertainty in the statute.” Muscarello v. United States,

, 138–39 (1998)

(cleaned up). And we conclude that there is no such degree of doubt. Section

3632(d)(4)(D) disqualifies any prisoner who is serving a sentence for a conviction under

§ 924(c), and for determining whether Bonnie’s multiple-term sentence is such a

disqualifying sentence, § 3584(c) directs the BOP to treat such a multiple-term sentence

“as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment.” And we also conclude that there is no

grievous ambiguity or uncertainty that would render the rule of lenity applicable.

Finally, we note that every court that has considered the issue has reached the

conclusion that we reach here today. See Giovinco v. Pullen,

(2d Cir.

2024) (holding that inmate serving concurrent sentences for eligible and ineligible offenses

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was ineligible for FSA time credits); Teed v. Warden Allenwood FCI Low, No. 23-1181,

, at *2 (3d Cir. July 17, 2023) (per curiam) (holding that BOP properly

aggregated multiple sentences for the administrative purpose of determining an inmate’s

FSA eligibility and term of imprisonment); Martinez v. Rosalez, No. 23-50406,

, at *4 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2024) (per curiam) (holding that inmate transferred under

bilateral treaty with Mexico was ineligible for FSA credit, where one of his multiple

sentences was ineligible under the FSA); Keeling v. Lemaster, No. 22-6126,

, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 22, 2023) (holding that prisoner’s § 924(c) conviction

rendered him ineligible for his aggregate sentence); Sok v. Eischen, No. 23-1025,

, at *1 (8th Cir. Aug. 17, 2023) (per curiam) (holding that BOP properly

aggregated multiple sentences under § 3584(c) for the purpose of calculating FSA time

credits). Were we to accept Bonnie’s interpretation, we would thus create an unfortunate

circuit split.

* * *

Because Bonnie is serving a revocation sentence for a conviction under

(c) as a component of his single, aggregate 144-month sentence, he is ineligible for

FSA time credits under

(d)(4)(D)(xxii). We therefore affirm the district

court’s judgment denying Bonnie’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

AFFIRMED

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WYNN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Can a prisoner “serve” a 24-month sentence for 144 months? Of course not. The

proposition refutes itself. That obvious “no” answer should resolve this case. Yet to the

extent inventive judicial minds might conjure some uncertainty, Congress wisely

anticipated that far-fetched possibility. The text and purpose of the First Step Act—to enact

criminal justice reform, particularly by incentivizing prisoners to participate in recidivism

reduction programs—makes clear that Gregory Bonnie is entitled to accrue First Step Act

time credits for the eligible portion of his sentence.

I.

In 2004, Bonnie pleaded guilty to a drug-distribution-conspiracy offense under

and a related firearms-possession offense under

(c). In 2005,

he received a 120-month sentence on the drug conviction and a consecutive 60-month

sentence on the firearms conviction, along with a total eight-year term of supervised

release. He earned good-time credits while serving his sentences, which allowed him to be

released on supervision in June 2017.

In January 2019, Bonnie was again indicted on drug-related charges. He pleaded

guilty to two of the charges and, in April 2021, was sentenced to the mandatory minimum

of 120 months on both, with the sentences to run concurrently. That same month, the

district court revoked Bonnie’s supervised release for his 2005 convictions in light of the

new criminal charges and imposed two revocation sentences of 24 months each, to be

served concurrently with each other but consecutively to the 2021 drug sentences. He is

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currently in prison serving these 2021 sentences. With good-time credits, Bonnie’s

anticipated release date falls in January 2029.

The question posed by this case is whether Bonnie is eligible to potentially be

released even sooner by taking advantage of an additional category of “time credits”

available under the First Step Act of 2018. 1 The district court concluded that he is not. Our

review is de novo. Valladares v. Ray,

, 80 (4th Cir. 2025).

II.

“The First Step Act established a system of mandatory time credits for incarcerated

individuals who participate in recidivism reduction programming, with limited

exceptions.”

. These “time credits can be applied toward earlier placement in pre-

release custody or supervised release.”

at 79 (citing

(d)(4)(C)).

Specifically, the First Step Act states that “[a] prisoner, except for an ineligible prisoner

under [§ 3632(d)(4)(D)], who successfully completes evidence-based recidivism reduction

programming or productive activities, shall earn time credits” as prescribed in the statute.

(d)(4)(A). Section § 3632(d)(4)(D) clarifies that “[a] prisoner is ineligible

to receive time credits . . . if the prisoner is serving a sentence for a conviction under any

of the following provisions of law,” including, as relevant here, § 924(c). Id.

§ 3632(d)(4)(D), (d)(4)(D)(xxii).

1 It is undisputed that a prisoner can earn both First Step Act time credits and good- time credits. See

(d)(6) (“The incentives described in this subsection [including First Step Act time credits] shall be in addition to any other rewards or incentives for which a prisoner may be eligible.”);

§ 3624(b) (describing good-time credits).

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It is undisputed in this case that Bonnie’s 24-month revocation sentence is ineligible

under § 3632(d)(4)(D) because the underlying 2005 case included a § 924(c) conviction. It

is also undisputed that his 120-month 2021 drug sentence would not, on its own, be

ineligible. The question is whether one ineligible conviction “taints” the total effective

sentence, such that Bonnie cannot earn First Step Act time credits during any of the 144

months he is currently serving. The district court joined a significant number of other courts

in concluding that it does. 2

With great respect for my colleagues on this panel and elsewhere on the bench, I

cannot agree. In my view, the text of the statute favors Bonnie’s interpretation. So I would

reverse and remand with instructions to grant Bonnie’s habeas petition and order the

Warden to allow Bonnie to earn First Step Act time credits while he is serving the eligible

120-month portion of his total effective sentence.

2 E.g., Giovinco v. Pullen,

(2d Cir. 2024), cert. denied,

(2025); Colotti v. Peters, No. 25-1191,

, at *2 (3d Cir. May 7, 2025) (per curiam); McNeill v. Ramos, No. 23-6488,

, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 3, 2023) (per curiam); Martinez v. Rosalez, No. 23-50406,

, at *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2024); Oiler v. LeMaster, No. 24-5033,

, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2025) (per curiam); Sok v. Eischen, No. 23-1025,

, at *1 (8th Cir. Aug. 17, 2023) (per curiam). But cf. Hill v. King, No. 23-CV-1365,

, at *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 7, 2024) (accepting the petitioner’s argument), report and recommendation rejected, No. 23-CV-1365,

, at *4, *6 (D. Minn. Apr. 7, 2025) (stating that if the court “were writing on a truly blank slate, it would likely accept the [magistrate judge]’s recommended disposition and grant [the] petition,” but that it felt constrained by circuit precedent and “the weight of the case law” to conclude otherwise); Grigsby v. Gutierrez, No. 22-16180,

, at *1 & n.2 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 2023) (per curiam) (declining to resolve the question).

19 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6665 Doc: 62 Filed: 11/05/2025 Pg: 20 of 33

A.

“When conducting statutory analysis, we must first determine whether the meaning

of the statute is ascertainable through the text alone. The plainness or ambiguity of statutory

language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which

that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Employing various

grammatical and structural canons of statutory interpretation helps guide our reading of the

text. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory

scheme is coherent and consistent.” Valladares, 130 F.4th at 80–81 (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

As noted, the First Step Act provides that “[a] prisoner, except for an ineligible

prisoner under [§ 3632(d)(4)(D)], who successfully completes evidence-based recidivism

reduction programming or productive activities, shall earn time credits.”

(d)(4)(A). But, per § 3632(d)(4)(D), “[a] prisoner is ineligible to receive [such] time

credits . . . if the prisoner is serving a sentence for a conviction under any of the

[enumerated] provisions of law.”

My colleagues make much of the fact that § 3632(d)(4)(D) speaks of “ineligible

prisoners,” asserting that “the provision categorically disqualifies a prisoner, not a

sentence.” Maj. Op. at 9. For support, they explain that “[t]he text provides that the

‘prisoner is ineligible to receive time credits under this paragraph if the prisoner is serving

a sentence for a conviction under [§ 924(c)].’” Maj. Op. at 9 (citing

(d)(4)(D)). Of course, the emphasis in that quotation of the statutory language is the

majority’s, not the statute’s. Indeed, the definition of an ineligible prisoner focuses on

20 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6665 Doc: 62 Filed: 11/05/2025 Pg: 21 of 33

whether he “is serving a sentence for a[n ineligible] conviction,” pointing us right back to

the question of what sentence is being served.

(d)(4)(D). Simply declaring

that the statute “categorically disqualifies a prisoner” does not make it so. Maj. Op. at 9.

And if, under the majority’s view, a prisoner as an individual is categorically

disqualified from earning time credits, does that categorical disqualification persist in

perpetuity? Surely a prisoner who serves a sentence for a disqualifying crime is not

disqualified from earning First Step Act credits for any future criminal sentences for the

rest of his life; rather, he is disqualified if he “is serving” that sentence.

Before the Second Circuit, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) “acknowledge[d] that the

most natural reading of § 3632(d)(4)(D), standing alone, might render ineligible only the

individual sentence applicable to the ineligible offense.” Giovinco v. Pullen,

(2d Cir. 2024), cert. denied,

(2025). I agree: to state the obvious, a

prisoner is only “serving” a sentence for as long as the sentence may be served. Bonnie,

therefore, will only “serve” his revocation sentence for 24 months; for the other 120 months

of his total effective sentence, he will not be “serving a sentence for a conviction under”

an ineligible statute.

The Warden argues, however, that the First Step Act was enacted against the

background of another statute,

, which was enacted in 1984. Specifically,

§ 3584(c) states that “[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or

concurrently shall be treated for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of

imprisonment.” So, the Warden reasons, the BOP must treat Bonnie’s consecutive

sentences “as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment”—and thus Bonnie is “serving a

21 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6665 Doc: 62 Filed: 11/05/2025 Pg: 22 of 33

sentence” for an ineligible conviction under the First Step Act for the entire 144 months.

Courts have generally adopted this view in rejecting similar challenges brought by other

prisoners.

That position, however, runs headlong into basic logic. A prisoner who receives

both a 24-month sentence and a 120-month sentence (whether consecutively or

concurrently) is not serving the 24-month sentence for the entirety of the period of

imprisonment, 3 regardless of whether the sentences are “aggregate[d]” “for administrative

purposes.”

(c). This is most apparent with a consecutive sentence like

Bonnie’s: even if the 24-month sentence is broken up into pieces throughout the aggregate

144-month sentence, at any given moment, Bonnie can legally only be serving one or the

other. But this logic holds true for a concurrent sentence, too, because—to state the

obvious—24 is less than 120. So, again, even if the 24 months are spread throughout the

120-month aggregate sentence, at any given moment of the concurrent sentences, the

prisoner is either serving both sentences (which he could only do for 24 months total) or

only the remaining 96 months of the longer sentence. How a sentence is treated for

administrative purposes might alter when a prisoner is serving one portion of his sentence

3 To be sure, the Dictionary Act provides that, “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise[,] . . . words used in the present tense include the future as well as the present.”

. So, although § 3632(d)(4)(D) refers to a prisoner who “is serving a sentence for” an ineligible conviction—using a form of the present tense—that reference might be read to include a prisoner who will serve a sentence for an ineligible conviction, such that if he has even one day left of the ineligible sentence, he is ineligible. I am persuaded, however, that this is a situation where “context indicates otherwise.” For one thing, the statute does not use the simple present tense, but instead uses the present progressive tense, indicating an action that is occurring now. And I think context otherwise supports that reading for all the reasons explained in this dissent.

22 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6665 Doc: 62 Filed: 11/05/2025 Pg: 23 of 33

or another, but it does not change the fundamental fact that, on each specific day, he is

either serving a particular sentence, or he is not. Put simply, it is impossible to “serve” a

24-month sentence for 144 months.

The majority rejects Bonnie’s argument that § 3584(c) applies only for

“administrative purposes” and that awarding FSA time credits does not fall within that

category. Maj. Op. at 10. It explains that the BOP is tasked with “selecting the place to

incarcerate the defendant and carrying out the incarceration and supervising it,” tasks

which are comprised of “administrative functions.” Maj. Op. at 10–11. But even if we

accept that premise for the moment, why should that mean that the eligibility provision in

§ 3632—enacted years later, in the context of a major recidivism-reduction effort by

Congress—could not specify that sentences should be viewed differently to effectuate the

goals of that program? Particularly when that result seems the most natural from the text

of the statute, I am not convinced that we should reject that straightforward reading in favor

of applying a more general preexisting provision. Cf. D.B. v. Cardall,

, 735–

36 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining the canon of statutory construction providing that the

specific terms of a statute defeat the general, absent indications of contrary legislative

intent).

Further, the Warden has not disputed Bonnie’s assertion—supported by a citation

to a BOP record—that BOP has the ability to “parse” prisoners’ sentences, and related

“period[s] of ineligibility and eligibility,” “down to the day.” J.A. 144; see J.A. 145. And

notably, First Step Act time credits are earned based on days of participation in applicable

programming. See

(d)(4)(A) (providing that “[a] prisoner shall earn 10

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days of time credits for every 30 days of successful participation in evidence-based

recidivism reduction programming or productive activities,” and that certain low-risk

offenders “shall earn an additional 5 days of time credits for every 30 days of successful

participation” in such programming); Gonzalez v. Herrera,

, 1082 (9th Cir.

2025) (“[E]arned time credits are an amount placed at a prisoner’s disposal—a store of

value (measured in days) that incarcerated individuals receive as a return for their

participation in qualified programs.”). There is thus no apparent reason why BOP could

not designate periods as eligible or ineligible for purposes of First Step Act time credits,

and then apply days of successful participation in relevant programming toward the 30-day

requirement during eligible periods.

B.

In addition to the basic logic of what it means to serve a sentence, the statutory

structure and the use of different language in another section of the First Step Act persuade

me that Bonnie has the stronger textual argument.

The structure of the statute supports reading it to favor greater eligibility. “The First

Step Act of 2018 may be the most significant criminal justice reform bill in a generation.”

Pulsifer v. United States,

(2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (cleaned up)

(quoting Brief for Sen. Richard J. Durbin et al. as Amici Curiae at 9, Terry v. United States,

(2021)); accord Gonzalez, 151 F.4th at 1078 (describing the First Step Act

as a “transformative law with far-reaching implications that have yet to all be realized”).

As relevant to this case, the First Step Act created “a system to incentivize incarcerated

individuals to complete programs intended to reduce their risk of recidivism,” with a

24 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6665 Doc: 62 Filed: 11/05/2025 Pg: 25 of 33

variety of incentives, including “the big one—time credits.” Gonzalez, 151 F.4th at 1078–

79.

Specifically, Title I of the First Step Act, which includes § 3632, is labeled

“Recidivism Reduction.” First Step Act of 2018,

,

, 5195. Section 3632 itself is labeled “[d]evelopment of risk and needs assessment

system” and requires the development of such a system to, among other things, “determine

the recidivism risk of each prisoner.”

(a)(1). It also mandates that this

system “provide incentives and rewards for prisoners to participate in and complete

evidence-based recidivism reduction programs,” including the time credits at issue here.

§ 3632(d).

Given the goal of reducing recidivism and incentivizing participation in recidivism

reduction programs, the structure of the statute supports reading it to favor greater

eligibility. See Gonzalez, 151 F.4th at 1088 (noting that, in light of the time-credits

provision’s purpose, “time credits should maintain utility as an incentive for prisoners to

continue programming, thereby reducing recidivism and the cost of managing the nation’s

incarcerated and supervised population,” but that the BOP’s “interpretation allows for

earned time credits to lose their worth as an incentive”).

We held as much in our recent decision in Valladares v. Ray. Rejecting an overly

stringent BOP interpretation of the time-credits provision, we explained that “Congress

passed the First Step Act to reform our criminal legal system and expand opportunities for

those who are incarcerated. But instead of granting [the petitioner] the opportunities for

which he was eligible, BOP adopted an untenable interpretation of the statute to bar [him],

25 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6665 Doc: 62 Filed: 11/05/2025 Pg: 26 of 33

and others similarly situated, from earning time credits for participation in recidivism

reduction programming. In contravention of Congress’ command, BOP’s interpretation

strips defendants of the incentive to participate in these programs to better themselves and

attain the skills they need to be productive members of society. That contradicts the text of

the First Step Act.” Valladares, 130 F.4th at 85; see also Gonzalez, 151 F.4th at 1078

(rejecting yet another harsh BOP interpretation of the time-credits provision).

The same is true here: the full context of the First Step Act emphasizes leniency,

and the structure of the particular section at issue emphasizes reducing recidivism. The

Warden’s stingy interpretation of the time-credits provision undermines both statutory

goals.

“The interpretive canon that Congress acts intentionally when it omits language

included elsewhere” also strongly supports Bonnie’s interpretation in this case. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec. v. MacLean,

, 392 (2015). The First Step Act modified a

preexisting home-detention program to include “eligible terminally ill offenders,” which it

defined in

(g)(5)(D) as “an offender in the custody of the [BOP] who

. . . is serving a term of imprisonment based on conviction for an offense or offenses that

do not include” certain enumerated crimes. First Step Act, § 603, 132 Stat. at 5238–39

(codified at

(g)(1)(A), (5)(D)) (emphasis added). This definition

explicitly removes from eligibility someone with multiple offenses if even one of them is

disqualifying. Thus, the same Congress that enacted the First Step Act time-credits

program knew how to limit eligibility in a program if a prisoner had any disqualifying

26 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6665 Doc: 62 Filed: 11/05/2025 Pg: 27 of 33

convictions—but chose not to use the same language in § 3632(d)(4)(D). 4 Because

“Congress knows how to write a law” limiting eligibility if a prisoner has any disqualifying

convictions—after all, “it did so with [§ 60541(g)(5)(D)]”—“Congress’s choice of words”

in § 3632(d)(4)(D) “necessarily indicates that earned time credits” are to be understood

differently. Gonzalez, 151 F.4th at 1084 (applying this rule in a different context); accord

Valladares, 130 F.4th at 83 (“Where ‘Congress includes particular language in one section

of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that

Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’”

(quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.,

(2002)).

And it bears noting that, although the majority opinion correctly states that the

Second Chance Act was enacted in 2007, Maj. Op. at 12, including the eligibility provision

for elderly offenders, the eligibility provision disqualifying certain terminally ill offenders

from taking advantage of the home-detention program was added through the First Step

Act of 2018—that is, the same law that created the recidivism reduction program at issue

here. So the same Congress that excluded from the home-detention program a terminally

ill offender who “is serving a term of imprisonment based on conviction for an offense or

offenses that do not include” certain enumerated crimes,

(g)(5)(D)

(emphasis added), chose to exclude from the recidivism-reduction credits program a

4 Notably, this highly compelling difference in language does not appear to have been discussed in any other case considering the question before us, limiting those cases’ persuasive force.

27 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6665 Doc: 62 Filed: 11/05/2025 Pg: 28 of 33

prisoner who “is serving a sentence for a conviction under” enumerated laws,

(d)(4)(D) (emphasis added).

Moreover, the First Step Act’s divergent definitions in § 60541(g)(5)(D) and

§ 3632(d)(4)(D) were enacted against the backdrop of a preexisting definition in

§ 60541(g)(5)(C). That provision explicitly defines “term of imprisonment” as used in that

section using the same definition as § 3584(c), stating that it “includes multiple terms of

imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or concurrently, which shall be treated as a

single, aggregate term of imprisonment for purposes of [§ 60541].”

(g)(5)(C). If, as the Warden argued below, “[t]here was no reason for Congress to

say anything within [§ 3632(d)(4)(D)] about how consecutive sentences were to be

regarded by the BOP, because Congress had already said everything it needed to say within

§ 3584(c),” then the same would presumably be true for § 60541(g)(5)(C), and the

definition provided in that statute was superfluous. J.A. 258 (quoting Walton v. Fikes, No.

22-CV-1998 (JWB/TNL),

, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 10, 2023), report and

recommendation adopted, No. CV 22-1998 (JWB/TNL),

(D. Minn.

Sept. 26, 2023)). Because “a competing interpretation would avoid superfluity,” “[t]he

canon against surplusage” may “be meaningful” here. Bufkin v. Collins,

(2025).

My colleagues urge that Congress included § 60541(g)(5)(C) to make explicit that

multiple terms of imprisonment are to be treated as a single aggregate term there, reasoning

that § 3584(c) might not otherwise apply to the home-detention program: “the Second

Chance Act does not assess or change sentences,” the majority explains, but rather

28 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6665 Doc: 62 Filed: 11/05/2025 Pg: 29 of 33

“authorizes a different location to serve” a sentence. Maj. Op. at 13. So, the logic goes,

there is no superfluity even without accepting Bonnie’s interpretation of the statute. That

distinction is irrelevant. The crux of the matter is that both programs look at crimes of

conviction to determine eligibility. While one program explicitly makes an ineligible

conviction a total disqualifier, the other program does not. So even if that interpretive

distinction were compelling, it could not overcome the fact that the First Step Act Congress

enacted two different eligibility provisions with divergent language excluding different

individuals from taking advantage of statutory benefits. We must not assume that Congress

did so haphazardly.

The distinction between § 60541(g)(5)(D) and § 3632(d)(4)(D) is further

strengthened by Congress’ use of different terminology. In enacting the First Step Act,

Congress used “term of imprisonment” in the definition of “prisoner” (“a person who has

been sentenced to a term of imprisonment pursuant to a conviction for a Federal criminal

offense,”

(4)) as well as in § 60541(g)(5)(D) (“[a prisoner who] is serving

a term of imprisonment based on conviction for an offense or offenses that do not include

[certain offenses]”). But it used “sentence” in the time-credit provision in § 3632(d)(4)(D)

(“the prisoner is serving a sentence for a conviction under [certain offenses]”). As Bonnie

argues, this suggests that “Congress expressly distinguished between ‘a sentence’ for a

particular conviction and the overall ‘term of imprisonment.’” Opening Br. at 17.

True, the Second Circuit correctly pointed out that Congress itself used the terms

interchangeably in 1984 when it enacted § 3584(c), noting that “[t]he heading of § 3584 is

‘Multiple sentences of imprisonment’ and the caption of § 3584(c) is ‘Treatment of

29 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6665 Doc: 62 Filed: 11/05/2025 Pg: 30 of 33

multiple sentence as an aggregate’ while § 3584(c) itself refers to ‘terms of

imprisonment.’” Giovinco,

n.2. And “[t]he title of a statute and the heading

of a section are tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute.”

Yates v. United States,

, 540 (2015) (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United

States,

(1998)).

Still, it is notable that these terms appear to be used differently across different

sections of the First Step Act of 2018, which of course was enacted decades later by a

different Congress. Typically, where a statute “has used one term in one place, and a

materially different term in another, the presumption is that the different term denotes a

different idea.” Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon,

, 457–58 (2022) (quoting A. Scalia

& B. Garner, Reading Law 170 (2012)). So the fact that § 3584(c) used the terms

interchangeably does not mean that the First Step Act—enacted 34 years later—also did.

Finally, the Second Circuit focused on the aggregation provision and “precedent

holding that the aggregation provision applies to other sentencing credit programs”—

specifically, “time-served credits (§ 3585), good-time credits (§ 3624), and residential

drug-abuse program credits (§ 3621).” Giovinco, 118 F.4th at 531–32. However, those

other programs are inapposite. Time-served credits are available to all prisoners, so there

is no need to evaluate the impact of different components of the sentence.

(b). Good-time credits are available to all prisoners serving “a term of imprisonment

of more than 1 year” unless their sentence is life, so aggregating sentences actually benefits

prisoners.

§ 3624(b)(1).

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Further, that provision explicitly uses the phrase “term of imprisonment,” like the

aggregation provision, and explicitly falls under BOP’s administrative control. Id.

(“[Credits are] subject to determination by the Bureau of Prisons that, during that year, the

prisoner has displayed exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations.”).

And the residential drug-abuse program uses discretionary language (the period of custody

“may be reduced by the [BOP]”) that leaves eligibility determinations to BOP. Id.

§ 3621(e)(2)(B). Thus, none of the case law interpreting any of those provisions is relevant

to the question at hand.

At bottom, Bonnie’s view of the statute is much more persuasive. The statutory

emphasis on promoting rehabilitation, the use of different language in the terminally-ill-

offender provision, and the basic logic of what it means to “serve a sentence” counsel in

favor of agreeing with Bonnie that he will only “serve” the ineligible sentence for 24

months out of the aggregate 144 months.

C.

While the text and structure of the relevant statutory provisions compel the

conclusion that Bonnie’s interpretation is the sound one, it bears noting the peculiar—if

not outright absurd—consequences that flow from the majority’s reading. Under that

interpretation, Bonnie would be barred from earning First Step Act credits for his

otherwise-eligible 120-month sentence, while serving a mere 24-month ineligible

revocation term. This disparity is so illogical that it strains credulity to suggest Congress

intended it.

31 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6665 Doc: 62 Filed: 11/05/2025 Pg: 32 of 33

And Bonnie’s case is hardly the outer limit of the absurdity: another court recently

found that a 2-month sentence for possession of a contraband cell phone in prison

disqualified an individual from earning First Step Act credits for the entirety of his separate

132-month sentence for drug conspiracy. See Hill v. King, No. 23-CV-1365,

, at *6 (D. Minn. Apr. 7, 2025). So, a minor two-month offense rendered ineligible

a sentence sixty-six times longer—precisely the kind of irrational result Congress could not

have intended.

Those examples are troubling enough. But the majority’s interpretation threatens

consequences still more untenable. Consider a case in which an individual is sentenced to

decades in prison for an eligible offense, and only days for an ineligible one.

Worse still, the majority invites manipulation that undermines the very purpose of

the First Step Act recidivism reduction program. One district court, for example, recently

increased the sentence it imposed to account for potential reductions in prison time served

due to earned First Step Act credits—which the Second Circuit rejected as a stand-alone

sentence justification. United States v. James,

, 40–43 (2d Cir. 2025). Now,

the majority opens the door to similar gamesmanship by prosecutors, who may pursue

minor ineligible charges to preclude defendants from obtaining recidivism reduction

credits for substantial portions of their sentences. It is inconceivable that the Congress

which drafted the First Step Act—legislation designed to encourage rehabilitation—

intended its core incentive to be so easily nullified.

32 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6665 Doc: 62 Filed: 11/05/2025 Pg: 33 of 33

III.

Great respect is due to the many judges—including my distinguished friends in the

majority—who have confronted this question and reached a different conclusion. But to be

sure, many of those judges did not have the benefit of counseled briefing for the petitioner,

and many considered the question under the now-displaced regime of Chevron deference.

In that pre-Loper Bright world, courts often yielded to agency interpretations that

strayed from statutory text. But when viewed anew—free of such deference and guided by

the words Congress actually enacted—the statute admits to one sensible reading: Bonnie’s

interpretation best accords with the text, structure, and purpose of the First Step Act.

For that reason, and with due respect to my colleagues, this opinion must part

company with the majority. I dissent.

33