United States v. Shawn Bork

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

United States v. Shawn Bork

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-4264 Doc: 18 Filed: 11/24/2025 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4264

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SHAWN MICHAEL BORK,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief District Judge. (1:24-cr-00015-TSK-MJA-1)

Submitted: November 20, 2025 Decided: November 24, 2025

Before THACKER, HARRIS, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Andrew R. Cogar, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 25-4264 Doc: 18 Filed: 11/24/2025 Pg: 2 of 4

PER CURIAM:

Shawn Michael Bork pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to distribution of

methamphetamine, in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 841

(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). The district court

sentenced him to 180 months in prison. On appeal, counsel for Bork has filed a brief in

accordance with Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738

(1967), conceding that Bork’s plea

was knowing and voluntary and explaining that he has identified no meritorious issues

regarding Bork’s sentence. Bork has not filed a pro se supplemental brief, despite receiving

notice of his right to do so, and the Government has declined to file a response brief. We

affirm.

Because Bork did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea and did not

contemporaneously object to the sufficiency of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, we review

the adequacy of the Rule 11 hearing for plain error. United States v. King,

91 F.4th 756, 760

(4th Cir. 2024). A guilty plea is valid if the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and

intelligently pled guilty “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely

consequences.” United States v. Fisher,

711 F.3d 460, 464

(4th Cir. 2013) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see King,

91 F.4th at 760

.

For instance, before accepting a guilty plea, the court must conduct a plea colloquy

during which it must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant

understands, the rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty, the charge to which he is

pleading, and the maximum and any mandatory minimum penalties he faces. Fed. R. Crim.

P. 11(b)(1). The court also must ensure that the plea is voluntary and not the result of

threats, force, or promises not contained in the plea agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2),

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and that a factual basis supports the plea, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). We have reviewed the

transcript of Bork’s Rule 11 hearing and conclude that the magistrate judge—to whose

jurisdiction Bork consented, see

28 U.S.C. § 636

(c)—committed no error in accepting

Bork’s guilty plea, which was knowing and voluntary.

Next, we review a defendant’s sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion

standard.” Gall v. United States,

552 U.S. 38, 41

(2007). Under this standard, a sentence

is reviewed for both procedural and substantive reasonableness.

Id. at 51

. In determining

procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district court properly calculated the

defendant’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue

for an appropriate sentence, considered the

18 U.S.C. § 3553

(a) factors, and sufficiently

explained the selected sentence.

Id. at 49-51

.

If a sentence is free of “significant procedural error,” then we review it for

substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.”

Id. at 51

. “Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is

presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Louthian,

756 F.3d 295, 306

(4th Cir. 2014).

“Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable

when measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors.” Id.

In this case, the district court adopted the Guidelines range, which was correctly

calculated in Bork’s presentence report at 210-240 months in prison. The district court

afforded Bork an opportunity to allocute, listened to the parties’ arguments regarding an

appropriate sentence, and thoroughly explained the imposed downward variant sentence.

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Further, nothing in the record rebuts the presumption of substantive reasonableness

afforded to Bork’s below-Guidelines sentence.

Finally, we observe that the special conditions of supervised release contained in

the written judgment are consistent with the district court’s oral pronouncement of the

sentence. That is, each special condition imposed in the judgment was explicitly

announced by the district court judge at the sentencing hearing, to no objections. See

United States v. Rogers,

961 F.3d 291, 296-97

(4th Cir. 2020).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and have found no

meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court

requires that counsel inform Bork, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of

the United States for further review. If Bork requests that a petition be filed, but counsel

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on Bork.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

4

Reference

Status
Unpublished