USCA4 Appeal: 22-4676 Doc: 37 Filed: 12/12/2025 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4676

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ANTOWANE DENNIS KOONTZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:22-cr-00051-TDS-1)

Submitted: December 1, 2025 Decided: December 12, 2025

Before WYNN, HEYTENS, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Antowane Dennis Koontz appeals the 137-month sentence imposed following his

guilty plea to distributing a quantity of heroin, in violation of

(a)(1),

(b)(1)(C). In arriving at the chosen sentence, the district court classified Koontz as a career

offender based on his prior North Carolina judgments for possession with intent to sell or

deliver cocaine and attempted second-degree rape. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 4B1.1(a) (2021) (stating defendant is career offender if instant offense is felony

controlled substance offense or crime of violence and defendant has at least two prior

felony convictions for either crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses). On

appeal, Koontz challenges his career offender designation. We affirm.

Koontz first argues that his prior judgment for possession with intent to sell or

deliver cocaine does not categorically qualify as a controlled substance offense because the

statute of his conviction,

(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2025

Sess.), criminalizes attempt offenses. In United States v. Campbell,

(4th

Cir. 2022), we held that the then-applicable Guidelines excluded attempt crimes from the

definition of “controlled substance offense.” * However, in United States v. Miller,

(4th Cir. 2023), we held that

(a)(1) does not punish attempt

offenses and, therefore, that a conviction under that statute was a categorical match with

those Guidelines’ definition of “controlled substance offense.”

. Because

* “The Sentencing Commission later amended the Guidelines to include within the definition of a ‘controlled substance offense’ an ‘attempt to commit any such offense.’” United States v. Nelson,

, 580 n.2 (4th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).

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Miller thus forecloses Koontz’s argument on appeal, we discern no error in the district

court’s conclusion that his prior judgment was a controlled substance offense.

Next, Koontz argues that the district court erred by finding that his 1999 conviction

for attempted second-degree rape was a crime of violence. Notably, Koontz does not

dispute that this conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under the 2021 Guidelines.

Instead, he contends that application of those Guidelines to his 1999 conviction violated

the Ex Post Facto Clause.

“We review de novo . . . whether the application of a Guidelines amendment

contravenes the Ex Post Facto Clause.” United States v. Lewis,

(4th Cir.

2010). “The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive laws that create a significant risk

of increased punishment for a crime.”

(citation modified). The Supreme Court

has held that “‘there is an ex post facto violation when a defendant is sentenced under

Guidelines promulgated after he committed his criminal acts and the new version provides

a higher applicable Guidelines sentencing range than the version in place at the time of the

offense.’” United States v. Abed,

(4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Peugh v. United

States,

(2013)).

Koontz argues that his 1999 rape conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence

prior to a 2016 amendment to the Guidelines and, thus, that the district court’s application

of the 2021 Guidelines retroactively increased the punishment for his rape offense. We are

unpersuaded. Koontz is not now being punished for the rape offense, but for the heroin

distribution charged in his offense of conviction. And because the relevant amendment to

the Guidelines was enacted well before Koontz committed the instant offense conduct,

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there “has been no after the fact increase in [his] punishment” for that conduct. United

States v. Porter,

(4th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the district court did not

violate the Ex Post Facto Clause in finding that Koontz’s 1999 conviction qualified as a

career offender predicate under the 2021 Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Etheridge,

(4th Cir. 1991) (holding that there is no ex post facto problem when

court enhances a sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act on basis of convictions

that occurred prior to Act’s passage).

Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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