In re: Hamza Tebib
In re: Hamza Tebib
Opinion
USCA4 Appeal: 25-2210 Doc: 12 Filed: 12/19/2025 Pg: 1 of 3
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-2210
In re: HAMZA TEBIB, individually and derivatively on behalf of his 2 business entities; OWL HOUSE CAFE, LLC; OHCGRILL, LLC,
Petitioners.
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. (5:25-cv-00358-D-KS)
Submitted: December 11, 2025 Decided: December 19, 2025
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Petition dismissed in part and denied in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Hamza Tebib, Petitioner Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 25-2210 Doc: 12 Filed: 12/19/2025 Pg: 2 of 3
PER CURIAM:
Hamza Tebib, Owl House Café, LLC, and OHCGrill, LLC (“Petitioners”), petition
for a writ of mandamus seeking an order directing the district court to (1) vacate its order
striking Petitioners’ original complaint; (2) reinstate the original complaint or allow
amendment without arbitrary restrictions; (3) address delays in screening their other
complaints; and (4) ensure impartial adjudication of their complaints.
The first issue is whether the companies may proceed pro se. “It has been the law
for the better part of two centuries . . . that a corporation may appear in the federal courts
only through licensed counsel.” Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory
Council,
506 U.S. 194, 201-02(1993). And this “rule applies equally to all artificial
entities,”
id. at 202, including limited liability companies, see In re Under Seal,
749 F.3d 276, 290 n.17 (4th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases). Accordingly, we conclude that Owl House
Café, LLC, and OHCGrill, LLC, may not proceed pro se and dismiss the mandamus
petition as to those entities.
We next consider whether Tebib, the remaining Petitioner, is entitled to mandamus
relief. Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy to be used only in extraordinary circumstances,
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,
542 U.S. 367, 380(2004); In re Murphy-Brown, LLC,
907 F.3d 788, 795(4th Cir. 2018), and “may not be used as a substitute for appeal,” In re Lockheed
Martin Corp.,
503 F.3d 351, 353(4th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, to the extent Tebib seeks
vacatur of the district court’s order and reinstatement of the original complaint, we
conclude that he is not entitled to mandamus relief.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-2210 Doc: 12 Filed: 12/19/2025 Pg: 3 of 3
Unreasonable delay in the district court may warrant mandamus relief, see In re
United States ex rel. Drummond,
886 F.3d 448, 450(5th Cir. 2018) (collecting cases), but
Tebib has not alleged undue delay related to the instant complaint. Similarly, although
mandamus may be used to seek a judge’s recusal, see In re Beard,
811 F.2d 818, 827(4th
Cir. 1987), Tebib has not clearly requested such relief. Accordingly, we conclude that
Tebib is not entitled to mandamus relief, and we deny the petition as to him.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
3
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished