Under the facts developed in this case the proper rules» to apply are the same as in Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 780, 44 L. Ed. 963, as follows: “The rule is that, after the renunciation of a continuing agreement by one party, the other party is at liberty to consider himself absolved from any future performance of it, retaining his right to sue for any damages he has suffered from the breach of it, but that an option should be allowed to the injured party either to sue immediately or to wait till the time when the act was to be done, still holding it as prospectively binding for the exercise of this option. The parties to a contract which is wholly executory have a right to the maintenance of the contractual relations up to the time for performance, as well as to a performance, of the contract when due. As to the question of damages, when the action is not premature, the plaintiff is entitled to compensation, based, as far as possible, on the ascertainment of what he would have suffered by the continued breach of the other party down to the time of complete performance, less any abatement by reason of circumstances of which he ought reasonably to have availed himself.” These were the principles applied by the trial judge. We therefore find no reversible error in the case... The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.