M. C. Kiser Co. v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co.
Cases that cite this one
9 later published cases cite this decision.
- United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) (Supreme Court of the United States 1973)
- Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern Railway Co. (Supreme Court of the United States 1963)
- Long Island Rail Road Company v. United States (District Court, E.D. New York 1961)
- Luckenbach Steamship Company v. United States (United States District Court for the District of Delaware 1959)
- Coastwise Line v. United States (United States District Court for the Northern District of California 1957)
- Amarillo-Borger Express, Inc. v. United States (District Court, N.D. Texas 1956)
- Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Pa. Super. Ct. 1948)
- Manhattan Transit Co. v. United States (District Court, D. Massachusetts 1938)
- Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v. United States (District Court, E.D. Virginia 1935)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The appellants brought their bill against the Central of Georgia Railway Company and the Ocean Steamship Company of Savannah, praying that the appellees be enjoined from increasing the rates on boots and shoes from Boston, Providence, and New York to Atlanta until the Interstate Commerce Commission should hear and determine the reasonableness and justice of the existing rates. The rate from said points of origin to Atlanta was 95 cents per hundred pounds. On August 1, 1916, the principal carriers participating in said traffic, including the appellees, filed and published in accordance with the Act to Regulate Commerce, a tariff to become effective September 15, 1916, increasing the rate on said commodity to $1.19 frorh Boston and Providence to Atlanta, and $1.14 from New York to Atlanta.
The bill was filed September 12, 1916, and on the same day a temporary restraining order was granted, and a rale to show cause why an interlocutory injunction should not be granted was issued, returnable September 22, 1916. Upon the hearing of the rule to show cause, the temporary restraining order was dissolved, and the interlocutory inj unction was refused. This appeal is from an order vacating the temporary restraining order and refusing to grant an interlocutory injunction.
We find that the reasons given by the District Judge in 236 Fed. 573, fully cover the points in the case and justify the conclusion reached.
The decree is affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.