Matthews v. Koolvent Metal Awning Co.
Opinion of the Court
Appealing from a decree adjudging the patent valid but not infringed, plaintiffs are here querying, “What shall it profit a patentee that his patent is declared valid if his claims are so precisely read, the rarfge of equivalence so narrowly confined, that piracy is rewarded for the cunningness of its dissimulation and the patentee is robbed of the fruits of his invention?”.
Complaining of the decree as another in that long and growing list of. judgments in patent infringement suits which, finding the patent valid but not infringed, keep the promise of the patent to the ear while they break it to the hope, they insist: that such a decree, while correct in cases of patents for narrow improvements,
Calling attention to the claims made for defendant’s awning in its advertising circular
To support the defense of anticipation, only two patents were introduced from the prior art. One-of these dealt with old style shuttered window blinds, the other with an improvement in ventilation, and it is quite plain that neither anticipated Matthews’ awning.
The evidence without substantial conflict establishes that Matthews was the inventor of the awning patented to him; that it was a real invention having both novelty and utility; and that while its field was small, in its field the patent was in its nature primary and not a mere combination for a narrow improvement. Designed to furnish shade from the sun without, as the awnings then in use did, confining pockets of hot air and thus to an extent neutralizing the benefits of the shade, the invention
Under these circumstances, more was required of Houseman and of defendant, his licensee, to escape the charge of infringement than merely giving different names and forms to members of his device which performed the same function as the equivalent members in plaintiffs’ awning. It is, of course, not meant to say that the patent Matthews applied for and got on aerated awnings, which while protecting from sun and rain would at the same time afford a free circulation of air, is so broad as to completely monopolize the whole field of such awnings and prevent anyone from entering it with devices which really operate differently, that is, produce a new result other than convenience and economy. It is meant to say, though, that it certainly is not keeping faith with the promise of the patent to permit defendant or any other person to avoid a charge of pirating the invention by a device as transparent as the one here of putting flanges on the slats of his awning, and of calling these members covers and pans instead of slats as Matthews’ patent calls them. •
In his application for patent, Matthews, stating that his invention relates to a new and improved awning which shall possess certain advantages over known forms of awning structures, proceeds with clarity and distinctness to describe it and to make clear its essential significance and scope.
What Houseman, the licensor, and defendant have done in constructing the infringing device so as to give it the appearance of noninfringement is merely to provide the slats with flanges while calling them pans and covers instead of slats. They have done this in the belief that since the upper and lower flanges do not meet but have air spaces between them, the selling claims that they furnish as free circulation of the air as Matthews’ patent does, will find support. They have done it, too, believing that, since they call these members pans and covers instead of slats, and the flanges have made this'awning some
We think it plain that defendant’s device infringes the Matthews’ patent, and that its use without plaintiffs’ permission and consent ought to be enjoined.
Much has been made of the fact that Houseman, himself, has a patent. It is even claimed that the grant of the patent to Houseman raises a presumption of noninfringement. It is well settled that the grant of the later patent to Houseman does not license him to use plaintiffs’ awning if Matthews’ patent was valid. In addition, this suit is not between the owner of the two patents. It is between the claims of Matthews’ patent and the user of a claimed infringing device. The fact that Houseman’s patent was granted and that there were patentable differences between Matthews’ and Houseman’s would not in anywise tend to prove noninfringement by the defendant in this case. The device patented to Houseman may be an improvement on Matthews’ earlier patent, but this would not allow a .licensee under him to infringe on Matthews. What is determinative here is whether the device claimed to be infringing comes functionally within the claims of the Matthews’ patent, that is, whether it does “the same.work in substantially the same manner and accomplishes substantially the same result although it may differ in name, form or shape”. We think it clear that it does.
In addition to other points in support of the judgment, appellee insists that the proceedings in the Patent Office have limited Matthews and estopped him from claiming what his patent gives him. We see no basis for the claim. There is nothing in the file wrapper showing any abandonment by Matthews of any part of the claims which were granted to him, nothing which would constitute a limitation of them.
Neither is there any merit in appellee’s claim that the Matthews’ patent is invalid because of prior public use. The district judge correctly disposed of this contention, and we approve the disposition he made. '
We are not concerned here with determining whether defendant’s device, which plaintiffs charge is an infringement of the Matthews’ patent, is exactly the same in appearance or in form, but merely whether it is substantially the same in function. In short, the decisive question here is, reading the claims of plaintiffs’ patent on the Koolvent awning and interpreting them fairly in accordance with their plan intent and coverage, does defendant’s device infringe? We think it does. The doctrine of equivalency has never been a mere dry bones doctrine. Put forward to do justice and prevent defrauding by dissimulation and deceit, it should be, it has been, applied to give its equitable purpose effect. Not at all recondite or difficult of understanding or application, it is the mere expression and application of the view that like things are alike and that they are not made unlike by formal and nonsubstantial changes, no matter how cunningly contrived the dissimulation, how clever the changes in form. We think it clear that defendant’s device is substantially identical in function with, and is an infringement of, claims three, four, five, nine and ten of the Matthews’ patent.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Grinnell Washing Machine v. E. E. Johnson Co., 247 U.S. 426, 38 S.Ct. 547, 62 L.Ed. 1196; Butex Gas Co. v. Southern Steel Co., 123 F.2d 954, 955; Edward v. Johnston Formation, D.C., 44 F.2d 607, affirmed 5 Cir., 56 F.2d 49 ; Hughes v. Magnolia, 5 Cir., 88 F.2d 817; Eastman Oil Well v. Sperry Sun, 5 Cir., 131 F.2d 884; Railroad Supply Co. v. Elyria, 244 U.S. 285, 37 S.Ct. 502, 61 L.Ed. 1136; White v. Gage, 5 Cir., 128 F.2d 500.
“Authorities concur that the substantial equivalent ■ of a thing, in the sense of the patent law, is the same as the thing itself; so that if two devices do the same work in substantially the same manner, and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, form, or shape. Curtis, Patents (4th ed.) sect. 310.” Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, at page 125, 24 L.Ed. 935.
“WHY KOOLVENT AWNINGS ARE COOLER AND PERMANENT”
“This illustration shows the scientific construction of KOOLVENT Ventilated Metal Awnings and how it aids the free circulation of air through the patented vents and louvers which carry off the solar heat-as it is produced. Constructed of a series of separated rust resisting special paint grip metal sheets with edges formed at right angles, and which overlap yet leave free open space for heat to escape. KOOLVENT Awnings screen out the direct sun rays, yet admit an abundance of indirect light without retarding the free passage of heat-laden air. This freedom from ‘heat pockets’ noticeably reduces temperatures.” Here appears drawing of awning
“The usual and well known awning is objectionable, especially in warm climates for the reason that the body of air entrapped beneath the awning will become heated by the sun’s rays and this heat will be transmitted to the interior of the Hülding, and as a result the purpose for which awnings are used is largely defeated. It is the purpose of the present invention to devise a practical awning which gball be immeasurably cooler than awnings now in use for it provides means whereby the air underneath the awning will be permitted to escape freely throughout the full of the area of the awning. This useful purpose is accomplished without impairing the utility of the awning as a sun shade and also as a protection against rain.”
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
The District Judge, I think, correctly held the claims 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10 of the Matthews patent, Re. 21,003, to be valid, but not infringed by the defendant’s awnings, which were made under license from the owners of the Houseman patent, Re. 20,925, and in strict conformity to claims 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 thereof. The deference due to the expert judgment of the Patent Office, under the evidence in this case, fairly requires both conclusions. Our disagreement relates only to the matter of infringement. The Patent Office conclusions ought to be followed as to that matter too. This is not to say that a real infringement of a senior patent can be justified because it appears to be authorized by a junior patent. It may often happen that
The reconciliation of these claims lies in this — each is expressly for a combination only, and such patents are to be narrowly construed. To interfere or to infringe, each element of the combination must be used or substituted by an equivalent “well known as such at the date of the patent.” Rowell v. Lindsay, 113 U.S. 97, 5 S.Ct. 507, 28 L.Ed. 906. “On the other hand if the substituted element was new, or performed substantially a different function, or was not known at the date of plaintiff’s patent as a proper substitute for the one omitted, he does not infringe.” 40 Am.Jur., Patents § 164, and cases cited in note 7. Both these patents grow out of the ancient plank top porch over the front door and windows of the humble home, where on two rails a lower series of planks slanting from the house were nailed, and the cracks between them covered by another series of planks. Though at first nailed down tight, it is common knowledge, at least to one raised in the country, that the weather will soon warp the planks, and turn thei-r edges up, so that each is a channel for water; and at the same time will open cracks between the upper and lower planks through which wind-driven rain may enter, or heated air escape. There could be no broad patent on
Certainly the Patent Office so held. In a close case we should follow their lead. In Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, on page 208, 14 S.Ct. 310, on page 319, 38 L.Ed. 12 we read: “The issuance of the patents to Gardiner & Downey, Berlew and Kissell, and Elder creates a prima facie presumption of a patentable difference from that of the Wright patent of 1879.” And in Boyd v. Janesville Hay Tool Co., 158 U.S. 260, 261, 15 S.Ct. 837, 39 L.Ed. 973, it is said: “As both applications were pending in the patent office at the same time, and as the respective letters were granted, it is obvious that it must have been the judgment of the officials that there was no occasion for an interference, and that there were features which distinguished one invention from the other. In American Nicolson Pavement Co. v. Elizabeth, 4 Fish. Pat.Cas. 189, Fed.Cas.No.312, Mr. Justice Strong said: “The grant of the letters patent was virtually a decision of the patent office that there is a substantial difference between the inventions. It raises the presumption that according to the-claims of the later patentees, this invention is not an infringement of the earlier patent.” This court might well follow the Supreme Court in thus recognizing the decision of the Patent Office here, thus deliberately made. Other courts have done so. Hoppenstand v. Mack Corporation, 3 Cir., 89 F.2d 360; Knowles v. 138 W. 42 Street Corporation, 2 Cir., 43 F.2d 929, 930; Beldom v. Garlock Pkg. Co., D.C., 24 F.2d 852, 953; Majestic Elec. App. Co. v. Hicks, 9 Cir., 24 F.2d 165, 166.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- MATTHEWS Et Al. v. KOOLVENT METAL AWNING CO.
- Cited By
- 31 cases
- Status
- Published