The judgment appealed from denied plaintiff’s claim 1 for overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees on the ground that he was, within the provisions of Subd. (14) of Sec. 13(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 213 (a) “an employee employed as a seaman”.

The District Judge, in a memorandum opinion correctly finding the facts 2 and as correctly canvassing and appraising the authorities cited by plaintiff and defendant, concluded that: “The plaintiff *165 is a deck hand on a tug boat performing the duties routinely and customarily prescribed for such employment. His duties require that he maintain and assist in the operation of the vessel. She is constantly in use upon navigable waters. This constitutes him a seaman; and he is no less a seaman because the vessel’s power is used to tow a dredge and to service her, then if utilized to tow oceangoing vessels into harbor.” So concluding, he denied the recovery sought.

Here, as he did below, plaintiff, citing many cases, 3 insists that, though, as he testified 4 without contradiction, he was employed as a deckhand on the tug Verna and not otherwise, he must, merely because the tug was the dredge Miami’s tender, be held to be not a seaman and exempt, but a dredgeman and not exempt.

The appellee, citing Levesque v. F. H. McGraw & Co., 2 Cir., 165 F.2d 585, Gale v. Union Bag & Paper Corp., 5 Cir., 116 F.2d 27, and Martin v. McAllister Light-erage Line, Inc., 2 Cir., 205 F.2d 623, and distinguishing the cases relied upon by appellants, urges upon us that to deny the exemption here would not be construction but nullification of the statute fixing the exemption.

We agree. A reading of the cases relied on for the opposite view, especially the decision of Judge Sibley, in Walling v. W. D. Haden & Co., perhaps the best considered of all of the opinions holding that the exemption does not extend to dredgemen, leaves us in no doubt that they cannot be read in support of it. Indeed w'e think that to read them as in effect deciding upon the undisputed facts of this case that the plaintiff, a deckhand on a tug, was not a seaman, would be to refuse to extend the exemption to “one plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit”. It would be too in direct contradiction of the spirit of the admonition in Phillips, Inc., v. Walling, 324 U.S. at page 492, 65 S.Ct. at page 808, so often appealed to by those who would use' it as a one way street to limit but not to give its proper scope to the exemption, “to abuse the interpretative process and to frustrate the announced will of the people.”

Giving the fullest effect to the Haden and Bay State dredging cases and other cases relied on, they decide no more than that persons working on dredges who are engaged in predominantly industrial work are not seamen within the exemption. The evidence, indeed plaintiff’s own testimony, establishes without contradiction or dispute that he did not work on the dredge at all, that he was not predominantly engaged in industrial work, and that his sole employment was as a deckhand on the tug, and his work entirely of the kind that deckhands do.

The judgment was right, and it is affirmed.