C. L. Forester and Wife, Kittie Belle Forester v. The Texas and Pacific Railway Company

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
C. L. Forester and Wife, Kittie Belle Forester v. The Texas and Pacific Railway Company, 338 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1965)

C. L. Forester and Wife, Kittie Belle Forester v. The Texas and Pacific Railway Company

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, in a Texas-based common law suit against the Railroad, sought recovery for injuries suffered while a passenger. The jury finding adversely to the plaintiff, judgment was for the defendant Railroad.

On appeal, the plaintiff makes two complaints. The first concerns instructions given and instructions refused, some of which related to the nature of the Carrier’s duty to exercise a high degree of care, another the exoneration of the Carrier if the injuries were caused by movements incidental to the operation of the train. The second complains of the prejudicial effect of defense counsel’s unsworn statements, in the presence of the jury, as to the reason for the Railroad’s inability to produce the “speed tape” which would have shown the speed of the train at the moment of plaintiff’s injury.

There is no basis for reversal in the first complaint. Looking at the entire charge, rather than isolated segments thereof, Odekirk v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 7 Cir., 1960, 274 F.2d 441, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 974, 80 S.Ct. 1060, 4 L.Ed.2d 1011; Cohen v. Evening Star, D.C.Cir., 1940, 72 U.S.App.D.C. 258, 113 F.2d 523, it is apparent that the jury was fairly instructed as to the defendant’s duty to exercise a high degree of care for the *971 safety of its passengers, and the incidental operation phase was adequately tied into the absence of negligence.

As to the second complaint, the defense counsel’s unsworn statement that the “speed tape” had been destroyed in the ordinary course of business, and that the plaintiff’s attorney knew of this prior to trial, was clearly inadmissible, and the trial Judge so held — explaining in detail, in the presence of the jury, why this was true. Assuming that the Judge erred in not further instructing the jury in more precise terms to disregard the remarks of the defense counsel, on the record as a whole we are convinced that no substantial prejudice was sustained as a result of this occurrence. And under the express language of F.R.Civ.P. 61, we are commanded to disregard such insubstantial errors.

Affirmed.

Reference

Full Case Name
C. L. FORESTER and Wife, Kittie Belle Forester, Appellants, v. the TEXAS AND PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellee
Cited By
5 cases
Status
Published