United States v. Robert Walker Gupton, Jr.
Cases that cite this one
8 later published cases cite this decision.
- United States v. Peter R. Farrell and Paul A. Farrell (11th Cir. 1989)
- United States v. Charles Winfred Carpenter, Jr. (5th Cir. 1980)
- United States v. Nghia Le (11th Cir. 2001)
- United States v. Nghia Le (11th Cir. 2001)
- United States v. Julita De Parias, Jessie Ramirez, A/K/A Marzelo Romdom, A/K/A Norbey Duque Garcia and "Jessid" (11th Cir. 1986)
- United States v. Paul Deluca, Robert Kaye, James Danno, and John Lee (9th Cir. 1982)
- United States v. Jack Warledo, Johnson Warledo, Thomas Lee Ahaisse, Gary Larney and Meredith Malcolm Quinn (10th Cir. 1977)
- United States v. Bryson (United States District Court, Oklahoma Western 1975)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
Appellant was indicted under 18 U.S. C. § 1951 for threatening physical violence to the property of an airline in furtherance of a plan to obstruct interstate commerce by extortion. 1 Convicted and sentenced to the statutory maximum of 20 years, appellant appeals, alleging insufficient evidence and variance between the indictment and the proof. Because in this case the two issues merge, we treat them as one, and we affirm.
The indictment charges the appellant with “threaten [ing] physical violence . in furtherance of a plan to obstruct . . . commerce by extortion .” To attack his conviction he sets up the following logical construct: (A.) under the particular variant of the § 1951(a) crime charged, an indispensable element of the offense is a plan to obstruct commerce by extortion; (B.) the government’s proof went to something else, to wit, a plan to make money; (C.) therefore there was a variance and insufficient evidence. The validity of appellant’s construct depends upon an implied but unstated term. Since that term is wrong, the construct falls.
The unstated term is that the “plan to make money” proved by the government is something other than a plan to obstruct commerce by extortion. That proposition in turn rests upon the notion that a specific intent to obstruct commerce is a necessary element of a § 1951(a) plan. That is not the case. It is settled law that to prove a crime under the first clause of § 1951(a), 2 the government need not show that the accused set out with the specific conscious purpose or desire to obstruct commerce. United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 77 (CA3, 1972). We hold that a plan to obstruct by extortion, which the government must prove as a necessary element of a crime under the fourth clause of § 1951(a), need only be shown to be a plan to embark upon a course of extortionate behavior likely to have the natural effect of obstructing commerce. Since the government in the present case has amply proved such a plan, 3 the conviction appealed from is
Affirmed.
. The indictment charged him with saying: “Are you the manager? AVe want $200,-000. "Will call back in one hour from this minute. If we don’t get this money, your airplane will be blown out of the sky. If you don’t pay it, the next time it will be a million.”
. “AYhoever . . . obstructs . . . commerce ... by ... extortion . . . shall be fined ... or imprisoned ... or both.” lant had “mentioned something about wanting to go in on calling an airline and making a bomb threat.” Later, according to Size-more, appellant had specifically said “[t]hat he was going to call the airlines and make the threat.” Appellant went into some detail about what was to be done and Sizemore became convinced that appellant “was going to go through with it.” Sizemore went to the police, and when appellant’s plan eventuated in a telephoned threat, the police were waiting.
. AYitness Sizemore, a friend and business associate of appellant, testified that appel-
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.