Frank D. Pollard, convicted on two counts of impersonating an employee of the United States (18 U.S.C.A. § 912) appeals on the ground that the second count of his indictment was insufficient to charge an offense. We find the indictment to be sufficient and affirm.

In a previous conviction for the same offense, a panel of this Court reversed Pollard’s conviction and directed dismissal of the indictmént on a finding of insufficiency. United States v. Pollard, 5 Cir., 1973, 486 F.2d 190. The panel reversed the conviction since there had been no allegation in the indictment that appellant acted with the intent to defraud. An allegation of fraudulent intent has been recognized by this Circuit to be an essential element of the offense defined under § 912. Honea v. United States, 5 Cir., 1965, 344 F.2d 798; United States v. Randolph, 5 Cir., 1972, 460 F.2d 367.

The government avoided the same defect in Pollard’s second indictment, returned after this Court’s earlier dismissal. Pollard now contends that count II of his second indictment1 failed *1388to “identify the person or object that the government contends Pollard defrauded.” There can be no doubt that the Government in count II charges Pollard with defrauding the First National Bank of Montgomery through its branch manager Carthel D. Morse. Pollard agrees that count III, the other count under which he was convicted, was not defective. Except for an additional insertion of the bank manager’s name directly after the allegation “with intent to defraud” the two indictments are virtually identical.

Count II of the indictment clearly and sufficiently states all the essential elements which constitute an offense under § 912.

Affirmed.