U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1974

Brantley v. Union Bank & Trust Co.

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Decided August 5, 1974 · Ainsworth, Brown, Thornberry

498 F.2d 365; 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 1471 (Federal Reporter, Second Series)

Counsel

John B. Crawley, Troy, Ala., Joseph J. Levin, Jr., Charles F. Abernathy, Montgomery, Ala., for plaintiffs-appellants in No. 73-3625., John M. Milling, Jr., Charles P. Miller, Montgomery, Ala., for Union Bank Bldg., A. Ted Bozeman, Wayne P. Turner, Montgomery, Ala., for Goodwin & Lang-ford Inv., Cleveland Thornton, Tuskegee, Ala., Charles F. Abernathy, Joseph J. Levin, Jr., Montgomery, Ala., for plaintiffs-appellants in No. 73-3631., Frank M. Gleason, Rossville, Ga„ Samford, Torbert, Denson & Horsley, Opelika, Ala., for Town Finance., Philip H. Butler, Montgomery, Ala., for Frank Keeble., Hill, Hill, Stovall, Carter & Franco, Montgomery, Ala., for amicus curiae.

Cases that cite this one

7 later published cases cite this decision. The 6 that cite it most often are listed here.

Virdie L. Smith v. Brookshire Brothers, Inc. (5th Cir. 1975)
Interfirst Bank, Dallas, Texas v. Hanson (Iowa 1986)
Penney v. First National Bank of Boston (Mass. 1982)
Ann Anastasia v. The Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago, Etc. (7th Cir. 1976)
Jacobs v. Huie (District Court, N.D. Texas 1976)
Leon Reyes Calderon v. United Furniture Company (5th Cir. 1974)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

PER CURIAM:

The appellants in this ease seek to challenge the constitutionality of §§ 9-503, 9-504, Title 7A of the Alabama Code (§§ 9-503, 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code) on due process grounds.1 These statutes permit limited peaceful self-help repossession without prior notice or hearing by a private par*366ty acting under authority of a private agreement.

Our decision in this case is squarely controlled by our recent decision in James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206, p. 207, n. 5a [1974] in which we found such statutes to be free from Federal due process scrutiny for lack of requisite state action. The judgments of the district court dismissing the appellants’ complaints were correct.

Affirmed.

. Section 9-503 and 9-504 read in pertinent part:

§ 9 — 504 Secured party’s right to dispossession after default. — Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action.

§ 9 — 504 Secured party’s right to dispose of collateral after default; effect of disposition. — (1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.