. As outlined by the district court, the twenty-two operating companies are as follows:

“New England Telephone and Telegraph Company, New York Telephone Company, New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, The Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, The Diamond State Telephone Company, The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Maryland, The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia, The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of West Virginia, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, South Central Bell Telephone Company, The Ohio Bell Telephone Company, Michigan Bell Telephone Company, Indiana Bell Telephone Company, *351Wiseonsin Telephone Company, Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Northwestern Bell Telephone Company, Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company, The Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company, The Southern New England Telephone Company, The Cincinnati and Suburban Bell Telephone Company (now Cincinnati Bell, Inc.), all of which are associated operating companies of the Bell System, and The Woodbury Telephone Company.”

. Four other defendants were named in the complaint, American Telephone & Telegraph Company, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company and Western Electric Company, Inc., but these parties have not challenged venue.

. Appellants also argue that, under Giusti v. Pyrotechnic Industries, 156 F.2d 351 (9th Cir., 1946), a corporation can be regarded as transacting business in a district in which a conspiracy in violation of the anti-trust laws has had an effect. See 1 J. Moore, Federal Practice, ¶ 0.144 [15] (1974). As pointed out by the district court, however, the conspiracy theory for establishing venue generally has been rejected. See e. g. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 74 S.Ct. 145, 98 L.Ed. 106 (1953). While Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the majority in Holland, briefly recognized petitioner’s argument that venue was established as a result of defendant’s involvement in the conspiracy, Mr. Justice Frankfurter in dissent elaborated on this point as follows;

“If we now had to decide whether a co-conspirator as such is an ‘agent’ for purposes of venue under 15 U.S.C. § 15, it cannot be doubted that we would have to conclude that the district judge was right in finding that the Georgia Commissioner could not be kept in the suit. Once it is clear that the Georgia defendant has the right to be let out, all discussion of the limits of mandamus becomes irrelevant and gratuitous. Obviously a judge cannot be mandamused to put a proposed defendant into a litigation when as a matter of unquestioned law he should be let out.”

Id. at 386, 74 S.Ct. at 150; H. L. Moore Drug Exchange, Inc. v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 384 F.2d 97 (2nd Cir., 1967); West Virginia v. Morton International, Inc., 264 F.Supp. 689 (D.Minn., 1967).

. Section 12, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970), provides in full as follows :

Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.

. Appellants also attempt to show that appellees transact business in Texas because of the nationwide advertising campaign conducted by the defendants in conjunction with AT & T. The evidence, however, demonstrates that the only nationwide advertising done by AT & T pertains to long distance communications. Any other advertising is done by the operating company and only in the locality where the particular operating company conducts its business. As noted by the district court, “national advertising which finds *352its way into a particular jurisdiction is insufficient to support a finding of transaction of business.” Albert Levine Assoc. v. Bertoni & Cotti, 309 F.Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y., 1970).