U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1976

Cinema-Tex Enterprises, Inc., Cross-Appellee v. Santikos Theaters, Inc., Cross-Appellants

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · Decided July 23, 1976 · Wisdom, Ingraham, Grooms

535 F.2d 932; 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 7873 (Federal Reporter, Second Series)

Counsel

James R. Warncke, Emmett J. Rahm, San Antonio, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant, crossappellee., Bernard Ladon, Gilbert L. Mathews, San Antonio, Tex., for defendants-appellees, cross-appellees., John L. Hill, Atty. Gen. of Texas, Michael E. Stork, Austin, Tex., for State of Tex.

Cases that cite this one

10 later published cases cite this decision. The 9 that cite it most often are listed here.

General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distribution Co. (United States District Court for the Central District of California 1982)
Greensboro Lumber Co. v. Georgia Power Co. (United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 1986)
Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Company (5th Cir. 1982)
Unijax, Inc. v. Champion International, Inc. (District Court, S.D. New York 1981)
Lloyd L. Hayes, Hayes, Inc. v. T. G. Solomon, Gulf States Theatres, Inc. (5th Cir. 1979)
Admiral Theatre Corporation v. The Douglas Theatre Company (8th Cir. 1978)
Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co. (8th Cir. 1978)
Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co. (United States District Court, Nebraska 1977)
Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp. (5th Cir. 1976)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion

GROOMS, District Judge:

This suit asserts a violation of the Sherman Act, Title 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., and seeks treble damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15. The claim is based on a “split” agreement whereby it was agreed between various exhibitors of motion picture films, including both appellee and appellants, that they would meet among themselves to discuss which of them would have the exclusive right to negotiate with the distributors for up-coming first-run pictures.

This appeal challenges the action of the court below in directing a verdict for the defendant upon the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove injury and damages proximately resulting from the violation. The court prepared and entered a Memorandum and Order to set forth the basis for its decision. It included a holding that the split arrangement constituted a per se violation of the statute. Appellee cross-appeals from the court’s action so holding.

A review of the record convinces us that the court was correct in directing a verdict for the defendants for a failure of proof of injury and damages proximately resulting from the asserted violation.

We adopt the opinion of the court below, 414 F.Supp. 640, except as to its holding made the basis of the cross-appeal.

Certain conduct and agreements are held to be per se unreasonable restraints on commerce. A plaintiff must prove that the restraints proscribed by Title 15 U.S.C. § 1, are unreasonable, unless it be shown that they are per se unreasonable. Whether one or the other, he must prove injury and damages proximately attributable to a violation of the Act. Since the court directed a verdict for the defendants for a failure of such proof, we are of the opinion that the court went beyond the necessities of the case in its finding that the split agreement constituted a per se violation of the antitrust laws.

The case is AFFIRMED on the appeal but REVERSED on the cross-appeal.

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