Lee v. Demopolis City School System
Cases that cite this one
12 later published cases cite this decision.
- United States v. Desoto Parish School Board (5th Cir. 1978)
- Donald Price and Melvin E. Price, Minors v. The Denison Independent School District (5th Cir. 1983)
- United States v. Marengo County Commission (11th Cir. 1984)
- Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board (District Court, M.D. Louisiana 1982)
- Jeremiah Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Board, Jimmy Andrews v. Monroe City School Board, United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant (5th Cir. 1981)
- United States v. City of Monroe (District Court, W.D. Louisiana 1980)
- United States v. The State of Mississippi (Laurel Municipal Separate School District) (5th Cir. 1978)
- Lee v. Tuscaloosa City School System (5th Cir. 1978)
- Lee v. MARENGO CTY. BD. OF ED. (United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama 1978)
- Lee v. Marengo County Board of Education (United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama 1978)
- Lee v. Tuscaloosa City School System (5th Cir. 1978)
- Lee v. Demopolis City School System (5th Cir. 1977)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Demopolis is a medium-sized town in Western Alabama which, until 1969, operated a dual school system. As a result of a court-ordered desegregation plan, all students in grades 7-12 were assigned to one junior and one senior high school. These higher grades have operated since on a desegregated basis. There had, before the order, been three all-white schools and one' all-black one which served all grades. The order converted the former black school and one of the former white ones to elementary schools serving two geographic zones. Under this plan, it has worked out that the black school, Eastside, remains essentially all black. For the school year 1970-71, it was 95% black, climbing back a percentage point or so at a time to 100% by 1974-75, but falling back to 98% for 1975-76. The other elementary school, formerly white, remained overwhelmingly so: percentages of black students there ranged from a low of nine in 1970-71 to a high of thirteen in 1974-75 and 1975-76. These schools are about two-and-one-quarter miles apart by road, a drive of under ten minutes, and are
This finding of the district court cannot stand. It is clearly erroneous. See Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,-U.S. -, -, 97 S.Ct. 2766, 53 L.Ed.2d 851 (1977). The district court had obviously hoped that its milder, earlier orders would have effect to desegregate the elementary schools of Demopolis. They have entirely failed. We do not here contemplate a system including two or three essentially one-race schools resulting from geographic or demographic accidents and surviving as minor anomalies in a broadly integrated program, despite earnest planning and honest effort to eliminate them and those like them, because practical considerations of hazard, distance or expense all but forbid their elimination. Cf. Carr v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 377 F.Supp. 1123 (M.D.Ala. 1974), aff’d, 511 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986, 96 S.Ct. 394, 46 L.Ed.2d 303 (1975); Stout v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 537 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1976). This is a case where, in a small city spanned by mostly walking distances, and after eight years, elementary school desegregation has never begun. Nor do we think the procedure carefully laid down by the Supreme Court in Brinkman, supra, for considering such cases as this and the remedies to be granted in future cases applies here.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.