We affirm on the opinion of the district court, 455 F.Supp. 78, with the following additional comments.

The evidence adequately supports the findings that Lee-Roy Towing was a special agent and not a general agent and that it was a real party in interest. We do not understand the court to have held that the presumption of 46 U.S.C. § 971 is irrebuttable; rather it held that the presumption had not been rebutted by appellant’s contention that Lee-Roy was a general agent. There is no merit to the contention that the overall purpose of the Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. § 911 et seq., and the Maritime Lien Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 971 et seq. requires that the lien for crew wages not be given its usual superiority in this case.

AFFIRMED.