Having pressed a disability claim through the administrative process and beyond on the basis of a claimed knee injury, Mr. Geyen moved the district court to remand his appeal to the Secretary for consideration of newly produced evidence that he is mentally retarded. He complains to us of the denial of that motion. It is, however, the settled law of our Circuit that new evidence is not the requisite good cause for such a remand unless a proper explanation is given of why it was not submitted earlier. Chaney v. Sckweiker, 659 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1981). The explanation offered by Geyen — that he obtained new counsel after the administrative process concluded, counsel who sent him to a psychologist — is not the sort upon which we can hold the trial court in error. Such a rule would require that court to order a new beginning in such a matter whenever an applicant acquires a new lawyer with a new idea. We decline to adopt such a general rule.

We have examined Mr. Geyen’s other points for reversal and find them lacking in merit. As the magistrate’s careful report indicates, and as numerous examining physicians have noted, his “symptoms seem to outweigh his signs” and the overwhelming weight of the evidence indicates that he is not disabled.

AFFIRMED.