In this bankruptcy case involving the dis-chargeability of a claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523, the primary question is whether a finding of actual fraud and of the applicabili *77 ty of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) necessarily precludes a finding that the same conduct also amounts to “willful and malicious conduct” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). In a comprehensive opinion, Stokes v. Ferris, 150 B.R. 388 (W.D.Tex. 1992), the district court, in an appeal from the bankruptcy court, answered the question in the affirmative, holding that the same conduct can give rise to a cause of action under both section 523(a)(2)(A) and section 523(a)(6). See id. at 392.

We affirm, essentially for the reasons stated, and the analysis made, by the district court. This holding is consistent with existing caselaw for, while we are aware of no case that holds that conduct under one of the provisions cannot also constitute conduct under the other, a number of courts have suggested that the same conduct can violate both provisions. See, e.g., Britton v. Price (In re Britton), 950 F.2d 602, 603-05 (9th Cir. 1991); Rubin v. West (In re Rubin), 875 F.2d 755, 758 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1989); Giangrasso v. Butler (In re Giangrasso), 145 B.R. 319, 321-24 (Bankr.9th Cir. 1992); Seay v. Greene (In re Greene), 150 B.R. 282, 285-87 (Bankr. S.D.Fla. 1993); Goins v. Day (In re Day), 137 B.R. 335, 341-42 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1992).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.