UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit

No. 95-20222 Summary Calendar

EARNEST EDWARD DACUS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

MARVIN T. RUNYON, Postmaster General,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of Texas (CA-H-93-2309)

November 28, 1995 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:1

Appellant was employed by the Postal Service and was fired

after being indicted for a drug offense. He filed a claim with the EEOC and the Merit Systems Protection Board seeking reinstatement,

to no avail. Appellant then filed this suit alleging race

discrimination as the reason he was not reinstated. The Appellee

moved for summary judgment which the district court granted.

1 Local Rule 47.5 provides: “The publication of opinions that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession.” Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published. Appellant appeals. We affirm.

In this Court, Appellant first complains that the district

court’s consideration of prior EEOC proceedings relating to his

firing and attempted reinstatement deprived him of his right to

trial de novo under Title VII. His position is wrong as a matter

of law. The United States Supreme Court decision which recognizes

the right to de novo trial in federal Title VII actions also

declared that “[p]rior administrative findings made with respect to

an employment discrimination claim may, of course, be admitted as

evidence at a federal sector trial de novo,”. Chandler v.

Roudebush,

, 863 n.39. See also Fed. R. of Evid.

803(8)(c). Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co.,

(5th Cir.

1992). The documented proceedings were submitted in support of

Appellee’s motion for summary judgment and were properly

considered. There is no rule which makes summary judgment

procedures inapplicable in federal Title VII proceedings.

Appellant also complains that the district court deprived him

of discovery. The record shows, however, that the parties were

afforded by the pretrial order the period from October 15, 1993 to

October 14, 1994 for discovery. During this period, Appellant did

no discovery. He first sought discovery five days after the

discovery period ended. The Appellee objected and the district

court sustained the objection. We find no abuse of discretion in

that action.

AFFIRMED.

2