IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-30850

Summary Calendar

IN RE: DAVID ALAN DELANEY,

Debtor.

DAVID ALAN DELANEY, Appellee,

versus

DANNY CORLEY, JR., a/k/a BO CORLEY, Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana (CA-94-1550)

December 21, 1995

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Danny Corley appeals from the United States District Court's

judgment reversing the decision of the United States Bankruptcy

Court and remanding for further proceedings.

I.

* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published. On the evening of September 24, 1986, David Delaney shot Danny

Corley. In the ensuing state court tort action, the state court

rendered judgment in favor of Corley and awarded $1.4 million in

damages. The Louisiana Court of Appeals modified the judgment,

increasing the percentage of fault assigned to Delaney from 50% to

80%. See Corley v. Delaney,

(La. Ct. App. 1993),

writ denied,

(La. 1994).

After the state trial court rendered its judgment, Delaney

filed for bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy

Court for the Western District of Louisiana on October 9, 1992. On

January 12, 1993, Corley filed his Creditor's Complaint to

Determine Dischargeability, seeking a declaration that the state

court judgment was non-dischargeable under

(a)(6).

(a)(6) exempts from discharge any debt "for willful

and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the

property of another entity."

The bankruptcy court rendered judgment for Corley, concluding

that the "debtor clearly committed willful and malicious acts

against the plaintiff." To support its conclusion, the bankruptcy

court reasoned:

It is beyond peradventure that loading a twelve gauge, double barreled, sawed-off shotgun and pointing it toward the face of another unarmed person or against a windshield just beyond the face is wrongful and without just cause. The facts also support a finding that the acts were deliberate, intentional and led to the plaintiff's injuries. The debtor systematically went to his room and loaded the gun. He briefly put it down when reprimanded by his father. Even after his father advised him to relinquish it, he again picked up the weapon, put his finger on the trigger and headed outside to confront the plaintiff.

2 On appeal, the district court reversed the judgment of the

bankruptcy court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The district court reasoned:

We have no quarrel with the conclusions that the loading and pointing were intentional acts. But the factual findings do not address or evaluate the damage causing activity, viz: the discharge of the gun upon Delaney's tapping on the windshield. But for that act, no damage could have occurred. The shot gun must discharge to produce the injury suffered by Mr. Corley. Our reading of the record leads to a finding that the weapon discharge was inadvertent, unintended, and totally accidental. We are driven to that conclusion for many reasons, including the trial testimony of David Delaney at page 322; the trial testimony of William Meyers at page 51; and the deposition testimony of the victim himself at pages 34, 42, and 60. We are particularly interested in the victim's assertion that Mr. Delaney "tapped twice to get my attention, I guess to get my attention." page 60. Thus, we are left with the inescapable conclusion that there is no finding of fact to support the decision that the damage causing act of Mr. Delaney was willful and malicious. Hence, the decision of the bankruptcy court is reversed. This matter is returned to the bankruptcy court for further action not inconsistent with this opinion.

This timely appeal followed.

II.

Decisions entered by a district court sitting in bankruptcy

are not appealable to the court of appeals unless they are final.

(d); In re Aegis Specialty Marketing Inc. of

Alabama,

(5th Cir. 1995). "[W]here a district

court's remand entails significant further proceedings, such as

additional fact-finding, then the order should not be considered

final." Id.; see also In re Harrington,

(1st Cir.

1993) (holding that district court order remanding a case for

further proceedings is not final unless the district court order

3 "resolves all procedural and substantive issues necessary to

conclude the entire appeal").

In this case, the district court's order remanding the case to

the bankruptcy court entails significant further proceedings that

render the district court's order non-final. Although the district

court found, on its review of the record as it stood, that "the

weapon discharge was inadvertent, unintended, and totally

accidental," the district court did not rule out the possibility

that the bankruptcy court would reopen the proceedings to consider

additional evidence on remand. Given this possibility of

additional fact-finding, we are not persuaded that the district

court opinion "resolves all procedural and substantive issues

necessary to conclude" this litigation.

Appeal DISMISSED.

4