IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 96-20224 Summary Calendar ____________________

THOMAS O. MAXTON, JR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; CRIS FLORES,

Respondents-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (94-MC-298) _________________________________________________________________ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . November 26, 1996 Before JOLLY, STEWART and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

On July 27, 1994, the Internal Revenue Service issued third-

party recordkeeper summonses to two financial institutions seeking

information relating to Thomas Maxton's tax liability. Maxton

filed a petition to quash the summonses. The government filed an

answer and a counterclaim that sought dismissal of Maxton's

* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. petition and enforcement of the summonses.1 Maxton did not file a

reply to the counterclaim. The district court denied the

taxpayer's petition and ordered compliance with the summonses.

Maxton first argues that the IRS has no probable cause to

issue the summons, and therefore enforcement of them would violate

his rights protected by the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, the

Supreme Court has held that the IRS "need not meet any standard of

probable cause to obtain enforcement of [a] summons." United

States v. Powell,

,

,

(1964). Rather, the government needs only to make a minimal

prima facie showing that (1) the summons is issued for a proper

purpose; (2) the material sought is relevant to that purpose; (3)

the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's

possession; and (4) the administrative steps required by the

Internal Revenue Code have been followed.

Here, the district court properly denied Maxton's petition to

quash and ordered the financial institutions to comply with the

summonses based on the answer and counterclaim filed by the

government. The government has satisfied the Powell test. The

summonses were issued to obtain information about Maxton's tax

liability and, therefore, was for a proper purpose. The summonses

1 The IRS must apply to a district court to enforce its summonses. See United States v. Claes,

(8th Cir. 1984).

2 only requested information relevant to that purpose, including

ledger sheets for Maxton's accounts, and applications for loans.

There is no evidence that the IRS possessed the requested

information. Finally, the IRS followed the required administrative

steps.

Maxton contends that Revenue Agent Flores was not authorized

to issue and serve administrative summonses. Under §§ 7602 and

7603 of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"), the Secretary of the

Treasury and his delegates are vested with authority to issue and

serve administrative summonses. The Secretary of the Treasury has

vested the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue with the

responsibility for administering the Internal Revenue laws. See

Treas. Ord. No. 150-10 (Apr. 22, 1982); Treas. Ord. No. 150-37

(Mar. 17, 1955 and Apr. 22, 1982). The Commissioner has the power

to designate IRS employees to issue summonses.

(b)(T.D. 7188,

(June 29, 1972), as

amended by T.D. 7297,

(Dec. 19, 1973). The

Commissioner has exercised this power, and delegated her authority

to issue and serve summonses to revenue agents, like Revenue Agent

Cris Flores, who issued the summons here. Delegation Order No. 4

(Rev. 20 § 1(d)(3)(March 5, 1990), 1990-

(

(Mar. 2, 1990)). Therefore, the summonses in this case were

properly issued and served.

3 Maxton further argues that the authority to issue

administrative summonses applies only in connection with alcohol,

tobacco and firearms taxes or offenses. This contention is

absolutely without merit.

gives the IRS broad

authority to issues summons enforcing all types of taxes. See,

e.g., United States v. Sanders,

(9th Cir.

1991); United States v. Joyce,

(7th Cir. 1974).

District courts across the country have been inundated with

arguments similar to Maxton's. See, e.g., Darland v. United

States, No. 4:96:MC:4,

(W.D.Mich. June 10, 1996);

Hogan v. United States,

(S.D. Ohio 1994); Wallace v.

United States, No. MS-1-94-035,

(S.D. Ohio Aug. 22,

1994); United States v. Klimek, No. 91-4682,

(E.D.Pa.

April 29, 1992); United States v. Streett,

(D.Md.

1992). Although the district court has shown restraint, it would

be well within its discretion to sanction a party under these

circumstances.

Maxton also tosses a variety of constitutional arguments into

his brief. None have merit; the IRS summonses issued here are

commonplace, and have been upheld in similar circumstances. See,

e.g., Powell,

. The district court properly denied

Maxton's petition to quash and ordered enforcement of the third

4 party recordkeeper summonses issued by the IRS. Its judgment is

therefore

A F F I R M E D.

5