Hubbard v. Sub Sea Intl
Hubbard v. Sub Sea Intl
Opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-30004 Summary Calendar
ALEX LEE HUBBARD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SUB SEA INTERNATIONAL; ET AL.,
Defendants,
versus
ROBERT L. HACKETT,
Movant-Appellant,
versus
DAVID W. OESTREICHER, II,
Movant-Appellee.
- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 91-CV-4022 - - - - - - - - - - December 26, 1997 Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Robert L. Hackett appeals the district court’s order
allocating attorney’s fees among himself, David W. Oestreicher,
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. No. 97-30004 -2-
II, and John Sullivan, and imposing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 sanctions
against Hackett. Hackett argues that the district court abused
its discretion in allowing Oestreicher to intervene in the
underlying action. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing Oestreicher to intervene in the underlying
action to protect his interest in the contingency fee contract.
See Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc.,
434 F.2d 52, 53(5th Cir.
1970); Keith v. St. George Packing Co.,
806 F.2d 525, 526(5th
Cir. 1986).
Hackett argues that the district court erred in allocating
the attorney’s fees in the underlying case between himself,
Oestreicher, and Sullivan. Because Hackett did not present any
evidence in the district court regarding the percentage of work
performed by the attorneys before or after the November 15, 1993,
partnership dissolution agreement, the district court did not err
in allocating the attorney’s fees in accordance with the terms of
the dissolution agreement.
Hackett argues that the district court abused its discretion
in imposing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 sanctions against him. Hackett
failed to comply with the district court’s order to file an
accounting of the fees and costs incurred in the instant case
even after the magistrate judge allowed him an additional ten
days to do so. Therefore, the district court’s order imposing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 sanctions was well within the district court’s
discretion. See FDIC v. Conner,
20 F.3d 1376, 1380(5th Cir. No. 97-30004 -3-
1994).
AFFIRMED.
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished